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ABSTRACT
This thesis is entitled The Effects and the Relations of 
Foreign Aid: A Case Study of Indonesia and Its Two Largest 
Donors, the United States and Japan. It examines the effects 
of foreign aid on Indonesia’s political economy and patterns 
of aid relations between Indonesia and the U.S. and Indonesia 
and Japan. It is limited to foreign aid commonly defined as 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the New Order
government era, especially from 1969-1991.
It reveals that the Soeharto regime benefitted from
foreign aid inflows both economically and politically, and 
that aid has been effectively used in Indonesia for
development purposes. Indonesia’s economy has been growing at
a steady pace. Soeharto’s government has successfully utilized 
aid to fulfil its political purposes; Aid has deliberately 
been directed toward strategic sectors to disempower political 
opposition and maintain the status quo.
The practice of aid relations is based upon the rautual- 
benefit principle. The U.S. benefits from extending its ODA to 
Indonesia by maintaining Soeharto’s Indonesia in its political 
orbit. Japan benefits from ODA to Indonesia by maintaining 
natural resources supplies inflows, markets for its products, 
and keeping its commercial interests flowing, stable, and 
secure.
IV
The study predicts a different direction and tendency 
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When the so-called New-Order government of Indonesia led 
by Soeharto took power in the mid sixties, the economy of the 
country was in the state of collapse. In the early sixties 
budget deficits had reached 50 per cent of total government 
expenditures, export earnings had slumped and in the period 
1964 to 1966 inflation turned to hyper-inflation.^ There were 
acute disequi1ibria. From 20 per cent of revenue in 1960, the 
government deficit widened up to 173 per cent in 1965, the 
money supply was drastically raised every year since 1960, and 
net reserves declined from US$ 328 million in 1960 to minus 
US$ 60 mill ion in 1965
For a good description of the economic condition of 
Indonesia before and after 1966, see Booth, Anne and Peter 
McCawley (eds.) (1981), The Indonesian Economy During the 
Soeharto Era. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
particularly chapter one, pp.1-22. See also Booth, Anne (ed.) 
(1992), The Oil Boom and After: Indonesian Economic Policy and 
Performance in the Soeharto Era. Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, for the latest study on economic policy-making in 
Soeharto administration.
“ Sutton, Mary (1984), "Indonesia, 1966-1970," in Tony 
Killick (ed.). The IMF and Stabilization: Developing Country 
Experiences. New York: St. Martin’s Press, tables 3.1 and 3.3, 
PP.69 and 71.
The national economic crisis was a legacy oT the Old 
Order government. Political ambitions of Soekarno were 
believed to contribute to this situation. Two costly military 
campaigns caused economic deterioration. The first was a 
successful campaign launched in 1962 against the Dutch for 
Irian Jaya which became part of Indonesia in May 1963. The 
second was the ’policy of confrontation’ with Malaysia which 
lasted from 1963 to 1966. It is estimated that during 1960- 
1965 over one-third of the foreign loans accumulated by 
Indonesia were exhausted for military expenditure. Another 
significant drain on resources during this period was the non­
productive investments of political prestige projects such as 
national monuments and tourist hotels, which were intended to 
inspire national unity and were accorded priority in the 
government budget.
Unlike its predecessor, the New-Order government 
subsequently emphasized economic rather than political 
development. The Soeharto regime gave first priority to the 
rehabilitation and stabilization of the economy. The 
objectives were to create wider and equal opportunity for 
state and private, domestic and foreign interests to take part 
in economic development; to achieve the so-called ’balanced’ 
budget; to pursue a rigid yet well-directed credit policy of 
the banking system; and to establish a proper link between the 
domestic and the international economy through a realistic 
exchange rate. From 1967 the government adopted the so-called
’balanced’ budget policy. It means that the government 
expenditure is limited to the sum of domestic revenue and 
external loans. Instead of printing money, the government uses 
foreign loans, described as foreign ’revenue’ to finance 
deficits. The Soeharto administration also negotiated the 
rescheduling of the existing debt inherited by the Soekarno 
regime with creditor countries. The government also sought to 
get foreign assistance from Western countries. In 1967 both 
Indonesia and Western donors agreed to establish the so-called 
Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI)^, an informal 
multilateral organization whose role would be to discuss 
Indonesia’s needs of assistance, and the policies or 
conditionalities each donor would have in disbursing its aid.
The economic rehabilitation and stabilization program of 
Soeharto seemed to get the attention of Western donors. From 
then on the foreign aid received by Indonesia always increased 
and its share to the financing of development programs in 
Indonesia became significant. Corrective economic policies and 
foreign aid stimulated economic dynamism of the New-Order 
government in its early years. As a result, the annual growth 
rate from 1968 to 1973 averaged 8.7 per cent compared to the 
average rate of 1.7 per cent in the preceding six years.
For the last 25 years, Indonesian development has 
resulted in impressive outcomes such as a persisting high rate
Posthumus, G.A. (1972), "The Inter-Governmental Group 
on Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (BIES). 
Vol.VIII, NO.2, July, pp.55-66.
of economic growth, the improvement of living standards and 
the reduction of the number of people living under the poverty 
line. The achievements of Indonesian development are praised 
by the World Bank. Some specific indicators can be mentioned 
here.*
- The number of people who live under the poverty line 
drastically fell from 60 per cent in 1970 to 15 per cent in 
1990.
- The infant mortality rate declined from 128 per 1000 in 1965 
to 68 in 1990.
- Life expectancy rose from 45 years in 1965 to 62 years in 
1990.
- The population growth rate was reduced from 2.4 per cent in 
1965 to 1.8 per cent in 1990.
- The literacy rate rose from 39 per cent in 1960 to 82 per 
cent in 1990.
Until 1981, the trends of the total amount of foreign 
assistance to Soeharto’s Indonesia demonstrated significant 
increases, except in 1972 and 1976-77. In the four consecutive 
years, i.e. from 1982-85, the trends were decreasing, caused 
by the economic recession in donor countries. From then on.
The chairman of Consultative Group for Indonesia (CGI), 
Mr. Gautam Kaji, expressed the praise for the impressive 
achievement of Indonesia development in his "Opening Statement 
By Chairman,” a speech presented the first meeting of the CGI 
in Paris. in July 16, 1992. See also data on "Human
Development Index" (HDI) of Indonesia in United Nation 
Development Programme (UNDP) (1993), Human Development Report 
1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Indonesia has again enjoyed increasing aid, except in 1990 the 
aid slightly fell down. Donor countries seem to insist on 
giving foreign aid to Indonesia for some years to come. This 
tendency can be seen by the enthusiasm of the new World Bank- 
led donor consortium for Indonesia in responding the aid 
request from the government in July 1992. This consortium, 
called Consultative Group for Indonesia (CGI), was established 
immediately after IGGI chaired by Netherlands was dismissed 
because of political strain occurring in Dutch-Indonesian aid 
relations. CGI provided aid package bigger than IGGI did.
There is an interesting thing to look at in the 
composition of total of foreign aid disbursed annually by 
donor countries to Indonesia. In the early years of Soeharto’s 
regime, the U.S. was a leading donor in providing assistance 
to Indonesia. Since 1974, the leading donor is no longer the 
U.S. It has been replaced by Japan, and now Japan is moving 
far ahead in giving foreign aid in terms of quantity. On the 
contrary, the share of the U.S. aid to the total aid Indonesia 
receives decreases every year.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Before formulating some questions which will be dealt 
with in this study, an assumption should be proposed here that 
the practice of foreign aid will exist and continue to exist
if both donor and recipient countries get benefit from it. On 
the contrary, the foreign aid practice will be terminated if 
either or both sides consider that the practice is no longer 
beneficial to any extent.
There are two important questions which I am going to address 
in this study: First, How does the New-Order government of 
Indonesia benefit from foreign aid? Second, Whv do donor 
countries persist in providing aid to Indonesia? The analysis 
will take a look at the politics of aid relations between 
donor and recipient countries. The study will limit itself to 
look at major donor countries. By looking at the statistical 
data, we find that there is a shift in the rank or composition 
of donor countries providing aid to the New-Order government 
of Indonesia. In its early years, Soeharto’s government 
received most of its aid from the U.S. This condition lasted 
until when Indonesia enjoyed its first oil boom. After that, 
Japan took over the U.S.’s position as the largest donor for 
Indonesia until now.
C. LITERATURE REVIE?
The practice of foreign aid was initially conducted by 
the US when it launched the so-called Marshall Plan, 
officially the European Recovery Program. The plan provided 
$13 billion ($60 billion in 1985 dollars) through the
organization for European Economic Cooperation (now the 
organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD) 
over a period of four years.^ This program had two aims: 
Economically, the aid would be able to recover the economies 
of the recipients devastated by the World War II; Politically, 
it was hoped that it would consequently strengthen the 
(Western) Capitalist bloc against Communist Soviets. As the 
secretary of State, George C. Marshall, stated in his address 
at Harvard Commencement June 5, 1947, the Marshall Plan was
intended "to assist in the return of normal economic health in 
the world, without which there can be no political stability 
and no assured peace."* From then on, the donor country was 
no longer only the U.S. There now were 18 country members of 
OECD which provided foreign aid bilaterally. In addition, 10 
OPEC countries have started giving aid to developing countries 
since they got petro-dollar surpluses in the early 1970s.^ At 
the multilateral level, we saw many international (financial) 
institutions giving aid to developing countries. Among of them 
were the World Bank and regional development banks for Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America.
* Krueger, Anne 0., et. al. (1989), Aid and Development, 
Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, p.2.
* Hoffman, Stanley and Charles Maier (eds.) (1984), The 
Marshall Plan: A Retrospective. Boulder: Westview Press, p. 
1 0 0 -1 .
 ̂World Bank (1990), World Development Report 1990. table 
9. See also OECD (1992), Geographical Distribution of 
Financial Flows to Developing Countries. The latter provides 
data on foreign aid disbursement annually.
1 . EFFECTS OF FOREIGN A ID
In the literature of political economy, we know there is 
a long debate on the effectiveness of foreign aid toward the 
development of the recipient countries. The early theory of 
foreign aid comes from the neo-classic economists: Chenery’s 
"two-gap model".^ According to this theory foreign aid can 
substantially increase domestic saving, which is needed for 
the desired level of investment, in order to achieve ideal 
economic growth. Foreign aid also can be used to pay for 
imported goods and services when the recipient countries have 
a foreign exchange shortage. The former is called "saving- 
investment gap" and the latter is called "trade g a p " T h e  
country cases of foreign aid success are Greece, Taiwan and 
South Korea.
Criticism of foreign aid practice comes both from liberal 
and neo-Marxist writers. Critics from the liberal perspective 
emphasize that aid is against the interest of economic 
development. Aid just strengthens the power of the ruling 
elite in the recipient countries and often does not touch the 
poor. Bauer is really vocal in this side. From the neo-Marxist 
writers, Hayter is the one of prominent critics; the purpose
See Chenery, Hollis B. & Alan M . Strout ( 1966), 
"Foreign Assistance and Economic Development," The American 
Economic Review. Vol.LVI, September, No.4, Part 1, pp.679-733.
 ̂ Pomfret, Richard (1992). Diverse Paths of Economic 
Development. New York; Harvester Wheatsheaf, p.143.
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of aid is regarded as the perpetuation and extension of 
international capitalism and support for the political motives 
of the neo-colonial power. Aid, they conclude, does not help 
the poor. Instead, it only hurts them.
Peter Bauer radically criticizes the existence of foreign 
aid practice. He rejects the practice of foreign aid,'® 
arguing that the development of a country is not influenced by 
the aid inflows. Aid does increase the resource of the 
recipient government and promote investment, but it does not 
mean that it will accelerate the rate of growth. Development 
requires some other factors which are conducive to economic 
growth, such as people economic aptitude, social institutions, 
political arrangements, natural resources and market 
opportunities. The problem of capital shortage can be solved 
from commercial market or private flows which are 
paradoxically restricted by the recipient government." Aid 
can damage the development process because donor countries 
often induce conditionalities which might be inappropriate to 
the conditions of the recipient country. The argument that aid 
is for the economic development of the recipient countries, 
that aid is intended to relieve poverty, and that aid can
Bauer, Peter (1971), Dissent on Development. London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pp.95-135. Bauer (1981), Equalitv. 
the Third World and Economic Delusion. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, pp.86-137. Bauer 
(1984), Reality and Rhetoric. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, pp.38-72.
" Bauer (1971), Op Cit. p.109.
promote exports and employment in donor countries are invalid 
because of much evidence to the contrary. Many anomalies occur 
in the practice of foreign aid. Aid does not go to the poor 
people of the recipient countries. Instead, only a small 
number of people in the recipient countries will enjoy aid 
money. They are usually the urban elite who have power and are 
usually richer than some taxpayers in the donor countries who 
pay taxes for aid program. Foreign aid is a process "by which
poor people in rich countries help rich people in poor
12countries." Another anomaly is that it is often the case
that, for the sake of relieving poverty, aid goes to a 
recipient country whose regime is authoritarian-miIitarist, 
undemocratic and whose politics are hostile and unfriendly 
toward the donors.Therefore the practice of aid should be 
stopped.
Hayter, as a neo-Murxist or left wing writer, who
concentrates on the study of the practice of foreign aid 
mostly by the World Bank and Western donors, argues that there 
is a political bias in disbursing aid. Aid is used as a 
political means for the donors to achieve their political
purposes. It is not the development purposes which are 
considered in providing aid. Regimes which are hostile against
Ibid. p.115
^^Toye, John (19891. Dilemmas of Development. Oxford, UK: 
Basil Blackwell, pp.141-2.
Bauer ( 1984), Op Cit. pp.93-6.
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the West or have left-political orientation would not receive 
aid. On the contrary, countries which politically go along 
with the Western bloc would receive aid even though their 
political regimes are militaristic, dictatorships, and not 
democratic, contrary to the political principles highly 
respected by the Western countries. This political 
consideration is also reflected in the decision making process 
of aid allocation in the World Bank. In rhetoric, the policy 
of the Bank on aid is projected to "the poorest of the poor". 
In reality, political and strategic considerations will decide 
where the money should go.^
There is no single answer on the question of the role of 
foreign aid toward the development of the recipient. Every 
study has its own country case which supports its arguments. 
We believe that when we study the effectiveness of foreign 
aid, we should treat it case by case. In its 1991 annual 
report*®, the World Bank states that foreign aid can have both 
negative and positive effects on recipient countries. The 
report lists at least seven points of the negative effects of 
aid. (1) Aid can postpone improving macroeconomic management 
and mobilizing domestic resources. (2) Due to political 
reasons of the donor countries, aid can postpone fiscal
See Hayter, Teresa and Catharine Watson (1985), Aid : 
Rhetoric and Reality. London: Pluto Press Limited. See also 
Hayter (1971), Aid as Imperialism. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books.
*® World Bank (1991), World Development Report 1991: The 
Challenge of Development. Washington, D.C.: IBRD, pp.47-8.
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reform. (3) When aid benefits lobbies that have a strong 
vested interest, it makes policy reform more difficult. (4) 
Aid quite often replaces domestic saving, flows of trade, and 
direct foreign investment. (5) When aid flows on and off, due 
to the political reasons of the donors, it will interrupt 
development programs of recipient countries. (6) Aid will not 
be fully effective when there is no coordination among 
bilateral agencies. (7) Aid will not be effective if the 
domestic administration of recipient countries is so weak.
Aid also has positive effects, as reported by the study. 
(1) Aid may improve the credibility of economic reforms. (2) 
It provides resources for investment and finances projects 
which could not be undertaken by the private sector. (3) Aid 
provides opportunity for personnel training, (4) When 
supported by good domestic policies, institutions, and 
administration, the aid project will be successful. (5) Aid
also can support better economic and social policies.
1 ?  I RSome studies done by Cassen and Associates , Mosley , 
and Krueger, et.al. indicate that the effectiveness of aid 
toward the economic development of the recipient countries, 
will depend on both donor and recipient. Aid will be effective
Cassen, Robert and Associates (1986), Does Aid Work?. 
Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press.
** Mosley, Paul (1987), Overseas Aid: Its Defense and
Reform. Sussex, Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd.
Krueger, Anne O. (1989), Aid and Development. 
Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press.
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if there is the same perception on the purpose of the aid 
between donor and recipient countries. One thing that should 
not be forgotten is that the influx of aid is not the only 
factor which affects economic development. Its effectiveness 
also will be determined by the environment in which the 
economic development scheme or program is adopted. What is 
meant here by "environment" includes three major components: 
(1) physical, institutional, and human infrastructure, (2) 
macroeconomic framework, and (3) microeconomic incentive 
structure.^ Generally, the failure of aid is caused by some 
factors such as the excessive intrusion of political or 
commercial interests of the donors, political ambitions of the 
recipients, mismanagement of aid, and administrative 
deficiencies. These studies agree in one thing, although there 
are some failures in foreign aid practices, it does not mean 
that foreign aid should be terminated. Instead aid should be 
defended and reformed to achieve the desired objectives.
2. MOTIVES FOR PROVIDING AID
The study of foreign aid is not merely dominated by the 
economic analysis on the effectiveness of aid towards the 
development of the recipient countries. It also deals with the 
political relations of both sides, donor and recipient.
I bid, p. 28
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because the practice of foreign aid is a reflection or result 
of the political decision making process. When a donor country 
decides where its aid money should go, political 
considerations will always occur. The same thing with the 
recipient countries. Political considérât ions will a 1 so affect 
the recipient country in deciding to receive the assistance. 
For this study, the scope will only be limited to the donor’s 
side.
It might De true that aid supports the recipient 
government to develop their economy but the achievement or the 
success of the development itself is not merely because of 
foreign aid. If the rate of economic growth of the recipient 
countries raises after foreign assistance inflows to the 
countries, we should take into account such as the domestic
policies, administrative capability, and the management of the
21countries, as mentioned above. Griffin and Enos questioned 
the objectives of the aid practice. They come to a conclusion 
that if there were a positive effect of foreign aid toward the 
economic development of the recipient, it is not exactly the 
main objective of the donor in providing assistance. It is 
just a consequence instead. The main objective of donor 
countries in giving aid is to serve their national interests.
Griffin, K.B. & J.L. Enos (1970), "Foreign Assistance: 
Objectives and Consequences," Economie Development and 
Cultural Change. Vol.18, April, pp.313-27.
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22McKinley and Little develop two models in examining aid 
politics; (1) Recipient Need Model and (2) Donor Interest 
Model. The first model assumes that the recipient country 
receives foreign aid according to its economic and welfare 
needs. The second model assumes that the foreign policy 
interest of the donor country will be reflected in the 
distribution of aid.
For model one, the hypothesis goes as follows: The amount 
of assistance received by each Developing country is 
proportional to its economic and welfare needs. The model 
assumes that aid will be disbursed to a country which lacks 
domestic resources or foreign exchange, as proposed by "two- 
gap" model of neo-classic economists. Per capita aid, regarded 
as a dependent variable, will be determined by some 
independent variables such as per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), per capita calory consumption, numbers of 
doctors per hundred thousand population, size of international 
liquidity holdings as a percentage of imports, rate of growth 
of real per capita GDP, and gross domestic fixed capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP.
McKinley, R.D. & R. Little (1977), "A Foreign Policy 
Model of US Bilateral Aid Allocation," World Politics. 
Vol.XXX, No.l, October, pp.58-86. McKinley & Little (1978), "A 
Foreign Policy Model of the Distribution of British Bilateral 
Aid, 1960-1970," British Journal of Political Science. Vol. 8. 
Part 3, July, pp.313-31. McKinley & Little (1979), "The US Aid 
Relationship: A Test of the Recipient Need and Donor Interest 
Model " Political Studies. Vol.XXVII, No.2, June, pp.236-50.
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The donor interest model has a hypothesis that the amount 
of foreign assistance provided to each Developing country is 
proportional to its level of interest to the donor. In this 
model, the size of the aid received, as a dependent variable, 
will be determined by one or all of the donor’s interests such 
as, the maintenance of a sphere of influence, discouraging 
association with Communist power, power politics, economic 
development, and political stability and democracy.
McKinley and Little’s studies based on the time-series 
data of foreign aid disbursed by the Western countries, 
especially the US and Britain from 1960-1970, come to the 
conclusion that the donor motives or interests, not 
recipient’s need, are the main consideration in providing aid 
and determining where that money should go.
The motives of donors providing aid are so diverse. The 
interests of donors attached to their practices of foreign aid 
could take one or combination of the following objectives such 
as: to maintain a sphere of influence, political or military 
alliances, to promote their own export trade, to maintain 
cultural links. The aid practice of the donors might serve 
different motives in different places. In allocating their 
aid, donor countries have different motives. In one place, a 
donor might pursue one motive but in another place its aid is 
intended to serve another motive. This feature of motive
White, John (1974), The Politics of Foreign Aid. 
London: The Bodley Head, p.34.
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depends on the importance of the recipient perceived by the 
donor. The donor might also pursue not just one motive in 
disbursing its aid to a Developing country.
a. Political Motives
Aid is used as a means to achieve political objectives. 
When we look at the origin of foreign aid practice, it is 
clear that "cold war consideration" is a driving force for 
donors to give foreign aid to Developing countries. 
According to Morgenthou, development aid does not differ from 
the bribes traditionally employed in diplomacy especially 
before the nineteenth century.
Aid is used to win friends for the donor country and 
increase its bargaining power in the United Nations and other 
international fora. It is also used to help a new regime whose 
political orientation goes along with the donor’s to 
consolidate its position or to support it to win an election 
in its domestic politics. When assistance is disbursed for a
Maizels, Alfred & Machiko K. Nissanke (1984), 
"Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries," World 
Development. Vol.12, No.9, pp.879-900.
Ohlin, G. (1970), "The Evolution of Aid Doctrine," in 
Bhagwati, Jadgish and Richard S. Eckaus (eds.). Foreign Aid; 
Selected Readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, pp. 21- 
62. See also Morgenthau, Hans (1962) ,"A Political Theory of 
Foreign Aid," The American Political Science Review. Vol. LVI, 
No.2, June, pp.301-9.
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Developing country whose regime is unfriendly, it is used to 
quid pro quo for such as base rights and the UN votes.^
b. Security Motives
Assistance is used by the donor countries for security 
motives. Since assistance is successful in promoting economic 
development of the recipient country, the economic gap can be 
bridged or improved and in turn, it will maintain political 
stability. It is believed that domestic political instability 
can invite outside powers to offer help.
When the security factor is considered by a donor in 
deciding to provide aid to one country, there are some 
ultimate objectives behind that security consideration. 
Presumably, by maintaining the political stability of the 
recipient country, the donor can keep the recipient away from 
revolutionary movement whose political orientation is against 
the donor’s. Economically, when domestic political stability 
exists, the market for the donor’s products, or the donor’s 
private business interests there can be maintained.
See Huntington, Samuel P. (1970-71), " Foreign Aid for 




Aid is also used to pursue the economic objectives of 
donor countries. Aid is often tied to the purchasing of goods 
and services from the donor providing the aid. It can be used 
to promote the exports of the donor country, provide jobs in 
domestic industries of the donor country, and promote 
i nves tment.
d. Social-Cultural Motives
For some donor countries, aid also can be used to promote 
their cultural ties with their ex-colonial countries. This 
assistance is usually provided in the field of language and 
cultural education.
e. Humanitarian Motives
This type of assistance is accidental in manner. It helps 
people who get natural disasters and are victim of war. 
Humanitarian aid happens commonly at the level of private 
donation conducted by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
which directly help and finance the poor and Huntington
believes that it does not happen in government to government
27aid relations.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1970-71), Ibid.
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3 . A ID  PRACTICE IN  THE POST COLD-WAR ERA
When the Communist bloc was dismantled in early 1990, 
foreign aid politics was questioned. It was predicted that the 
practice of foreign aid will lose its justification and
consequently its amount will decrease, as if it is not
28relevant any more. It is so because the ideological
confrontation between the Capitalism and Communism for which
the aid served is absent.
At the same time, advocates of foreign aid argue that the
post old War era will give the decision makers in the donor
countries or international financial agencies like World Bank
a chance to direct foreign aid in merely promoting development
purposes. Its disbursement should be tied to good governance,
sound management, democracy, good economic policies, the
record of human rights violation of the recipient,
environmental matters, gender issues, and the ideal of
29alleviation of poverty.
See Griffin, Keith (1991), "Foreign Aid after the Cold 
War," Development and Change. Vol. 22, No.4, October, pp.645- 
85.
29 For the discussion on aid policy as mentioned above, 
see IDS Bulletin. Vol.24, No.l, January 1993, UK: University 
of Sussex; Riddell, Roger C. (1992),"The Contribution of 
Foreign Aid to Development and the Role of the Private 
Sector, " Development: Journal of the Society for In t e_r.na t Lpj] aj. 
Development. No.l, pp.7-15; Lewis, John P. (1993), Pro-Poor 
Aid Conditionalitv. Policy Essay No.8, Washington, D.C.: 
Overseas Development Council.
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For the years to come, the Developing countries will be 
in a hard position to get development assistance. The 
conditionality attached to the disbursement of development 
assistance will be more explicitly actualized. Conditionality 
can be defined as the result of "bargaining process"^® between 
donor countries or international financial agencies on the one 
side and the recipient government on the other side, which 
manifests in "the set of changes in economic policy that the 
recipient government must implement in return for a loan or 
grant.
In 1980, the World Bank introduced the Structural 
Adjustment Loans/Lending (SALs). This non-project policy-based 
lending is intended to support the recipient countries which 
are willing to conform to the structural adjustment program. 
Some policy measures in terms of structural adjustment which 
should be implemented as a conditionality for the recipient
Mosley et.al (1991) define "conditionality as 
bargaining process" in the sense that conditionality is not 
the final state reached by both donor and recipient. There are 
three stages of conditionality game, that is, negotiation 
process, implementation process of the above negotiation 
result, and the response by donor to disburse or refuse 
assistance based on the recipient performance in 
implementation stage. See Mosley et.al. (1991), Aid and Power. 
The World bank and Policy-Based Lending. London and New York: 
Routledge, especially part II, pp.65-178.
Mosley (1988), "On Persuading A Leopard to Change His 
Spots: Optional Strategies for Donors and Recipients of
Conditional Development Aid," in Bates, Robert H. (ed.), 
Toward A Political Economy of Development. A Rational Choice 
Perspect ive. Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press, 
p.47-8.
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countries to have SAL finance are covered in the headings of 
trade policy, resource mobilization, efficient use of 
resources, and institutional reforms. The intention of 
structural adjustment is to make the economies of the 
Developing countries less vulnerable to future shocks and more 
adaptable to expected external conditions. Mosley in another 
study argues that structural adjustment is "devoted to 
achieving a boost to the supply side of an economy by the 
removal of market imperfection."^ In addition, Lewis asserts 
that "Poverty alleviation explicitly is the goal of structural 
adj ustment.
The inclusion of human rights in the practice of foreign 
aid will also be apparent in the era of post Cold War. There 
are two approaches to link human rights with Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), that is, punitive and 
promotional.^^ Basically, what is meant by the punitive 
approach is the donor will withdraw or postpone its aid to the 
recipient countries which (consistently) violate human rights
19 For the detail of the measures, see Mosley et.al 
(1991), O p  Cit. table 2.3., p.44.
Mosley (1992), "Structural Adjustment: A General
Overview, 1980-9," in Fontain, Jean-Marc (ed.). Foreign Trade 
Reforms and development Strategy. London and New York: 
Routledge, p.27.
Lewis ( 1993), Op Cit. p.39.
See Tomasevski, Katarina (1989), Development Aid and 
Human Rights. A Study for the Danish Center of Human Rights. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press for a good book-length discussion 
on the topics.
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practice. In promotional approach, the donors include the 
provision of human rights in their aid policy and allocate 
certain percentage of their assistance for the purpose of 
promoting human rights. Usually, this amount of aid will go 
directly to the Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) whose 
goals are to address the needs of the ordinary people.
The demise of the Cold War also gives hope that donor 
countries and international financial agencies will use 
development assistance as a means for introducing or promoting 
democratic values. As Broadbent asserts.
Four decades of Cold War contributed negatively to the 
inherently ambivalent attitude that Western democratic 
states have about making human rights and democratic 
institution a central concern in foreign relations.
Another issue which will characterize the disbursement of 
development assistance is the environmental impact assessment. 
Actually, environmental concerns has been included in the 
notion of development since 1987.^^ Proposals for development 
projects will include an assessment of their environmental
Broadbent, Edward (1992), "Foreign Pol icy, Development, 
and Democracy," in Bauzon, Kenneth E. (ed.). Development and 
Democratization in the Third World: Myths. Hopes. and
Realities. Washington, D.C.: Taylor & Francis, p.101.
37 See The World Commission on Environment and Development 
(1987), Our Common Future. Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press. This Commission is often called Brundtland Commission 
(taken after the name of Gro Harlem Brundtland, the chairman 
of the commission).
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impact, otherwise they will automatically generate national 
and international opposition.
D. THESIS STATEMENT
we would like to argue that the New Order government of 
Indonesia has been benefitting from the aid inflows in 
supporting the maintenance of their power by utilizing or 
investing the aid money to elevate economic growth. Since its 
inception, Soeharto’s New-Order government believed that it is 
politics, as experienced during Soekarno’s era, which makes 
the Indonesian economy stagger. Since then, economic 
development, which is sometimes interpreted by the amount 
economic growth, has become a buzz-word or slogan for the New 
Order government. For the New Order government the success of 
economic development means the legitimation of their power 
will be secure.
Therefore, they allocate and utilize foreign aid for the 
improvement of the social class which is regarded as a 
prospective base of their political supporters. The government 
of Indonesia believes that external financial assistance acts 
as a catalyst and helps to supplement additional domestic 
savings needed to raise the growth rate. Some case studies
10 Haryono, Subaliono (1985), "Indonesia," in Mahran, 
Hassanali (ed.), External Debt Management. Washington, D.C.: 
IMF, pp.224-30.
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on Indonesia agree that there is positive correlation between
foreign assistance and the development of the recipient
country. Foreign assistance positively affects the development
of Indonesia because it is optimally used by the government
for investment to achieve a desired level of economic 
10growth.
We also argue that there are slightly different dominant 
motives between the two largest donor countries, i.e. the U.S. 
and Japan in providing assistance to Indonesia. For the US, 
foreign assistance is meant to serve their global foreign 
policy objective. The way they implement their policy is 
determined by international conditions. When international 
politics was in the cold war era, the U.S. defined the global 
political objective as restricting the spread out of 
communism. Therefore, the objective of foreign aid is directed 
towards the containment of communism. When the cold war era is 
over, marked by the dismantling of the communist bloc, the 
U.S. came out as the only political super power and regarded 
themselves as the world police. In accordance with existing 
conditions, the implementation of foreign aid policy is 
directed to endorse universal human rights and democratic
See Haryanto, Agus (1991), The Effects of Budget 
A 1 location on External Borrowing: The Case of Indonesia, Ph.D. 
Dissertation in Department of Economics, University of 
Colorado at Boulder, Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms
International (UMI); see also Pack, Howard and Janet 
Rothenberg Pack (1990), "Is Foreign Aid Fungible? The Case of 
Indonesia," The Economic Journal. 100, March.
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principles, and sustain those values which the U.S. has 
defined as important.
Geographically, Indonesia is considered a strategic 
country for the U.S. According to the "Domino theory", when a 
country falls prey Communism, the neighboring country will be 
the next victim of Communism. Fear of the truth this theory 
encouraged the U.S. to seriously implement containment policy. 
In the first years of the Cold War era, the Western bloc saw 
Communism in the Southeast Asian region as a serious threat. 
We saw that since the Korean war, some neighboring countries 
fell Communism, such as Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea 
(Cambodia). In some countries such as the Philippines and 
Indonesia, the Communist party had a strong influence in their 
local communities. In addition, although the Communist Party 
of Indonesia (PKI) was officially banned, its influence was 
still significant.
Foreign aid for Indonesia was used to support the New- 
Order government, whose political orientation lends toward the 
Western bloc. It was hoped that foreign aid could help the 
Soeharto regime to promote its economic development or 
stabilization program. Consequently, it would enhance domestic 
political stability and remove the latent Communist threat 
which could at time be explosive.
When the Communist bloc was dismantled, marking the 
period of the end of the cold war, the implementation of the 
U.S.’s foreign aid policy towards Indonesia was slightly
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different although the basic idea was still the same, that is, 
to serve their political interest as the world police for 
democracy. In disbursing their aid, the U.S. imposed 
democratic values and human rights to Indonesia.
Unlike the dominant motive of the US, the dominant motive 
of Japan in providing foreign aid to Indonesia is economically 
oriented. Foreign assistance has been used to maintain the 
supply of raw materials for its industries. The oil price 
crisis in 1973-74 demonstrated that Japan was heavily 
dependent upon the import of oil for running its industries. 
Besides the fact that Indonesia was considered a supplier of 
important raw materials. Indonesia also has other strategic 
position. As the fourth biggest country in terms of 
population, Indonesia is a potential market for the products 
of Japanese industries.
Geographically, Indonesia also has strategic importance 
for Japanese export-import activities. The Sunda and Lombok 
straits located in Indonesia serve as a vital line for 
shipping from and lo Japan. Another important line is the 
Malacca strait which is controlled together by Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. Foreign aid is used to keep Indonesia 




In this study foreign aid is defined narrowly as the 
official development assistance (ODA) flows from both 
developed countries and international financial organizations 
to developing countries, in this case Indonesia. It has two 
main criteria. The first is that the main objective of foreign 
aid is to promote economic development and the welfare of the 
recipient countries. The second is that it is concessional in 
character and has a grant element of at least 25 per cent.
The grant element can be measured from three factors,
i.e. interest rate, maturity (interval to final payment) and 
grace period (interval to first repayment of capital). Simply 
speaking, the grant element would be greater if the interest 
rate were low, and the length of time of the funds were 
longer. As defined by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), "a loan will not convey a 
grant element of over 25 per cent if its maturity is less than 
10 years, unless its interest rate is well below 5 per 
cent. The term foreign aid, economic assistance or official 
development assistance is interchangeably used without a
OECD ( 1992), GeograpLhical_Disjtr i but Iqn__ of__Financ i,a 1 
Flows to Developing Countries: D isbursement s_, _ Comm i tment s .
Economic Indicators 1987/1990. Paris: OECD, p.327.
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different meaning. The term aid here does not include military 
assistance. It also deals only with the assistance which is 
conducted officially by the government. It excludes aid 
disbursed by the private or volunteer agencies.
2. FOCUS OF ANALYSIS
Chapter two will focus on the effects of the foreign aid 
in the political economy of the N e w  Order. In this chapter the 
total amount of ODA comes from all the OECD countries and 
international financial agencies, which consists of ODA loans 
net and grants.^* Whereas the focus of the chapters three and 
four is on the bilateral aid relations between the largest 
donor countries, i.e. the U.S. and Japan on the one side and 
the recipient, in this case Indonesia, on the other side.
The time span primarily covered by this study is 
restricted from 1969 to 1991. The reason for this is that the 
data available to date is only up to 1991. However, in the 
analysis, we also will look at the period before and after the 
main period.
The study considers that state or government as a unit 
of analysis. The argument is that it is a state or government 
which formulates a goal and implements a policy to pursue the
For the detail of which countries and organizations 
disbursing ODA to Indonesia, see Ibid.
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goal. The practice of foreign aid relations is a reflection or 
result of the political decision making processes of both 
donor and recipient countries. To analyze the dominant motive 
of donor countries in disbursing aid to Indonesia, we will 
examine the importance of Indonesia for the donor countries in 
achieving their national interests.
We assume that the practice of foreign aid relations will 
exist if both donor and recipient countries get benefit from 
it. The total amount of aid disbursement will be changed or 
the practice of foreign aid relations itself might be 
terminated if a vital objective which both donor and recipient 
pursue is questioned, or if either party considers that the 
practice can no longer be maintained.
Secondary resources such as books, journals, magazines, 
and any kinds of both Indonesian government and international 
organization publications are used for analysis of the study. 
For quantitative data, we rely primarily on the annual 
publications of the OECD, Geographical Distribution of 
Financial Flows to Developing Countries and Development Co­
operation .
3. STRUCTURE OF ANALYSIS
The study will be structured into five chapters. The 
first chapter is an introduction. Chapter two will study the
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effects of aid to Indonesia. What role the foreign aid has 
played in development program of Soeharto’s Indonesia. An 
analysis will be directed to the following questions: Does 
foreign aid properly serve or fulfill what the government of 
Indonesia really needs in implementing its development 
program? Does the aid money go merely for economic development 
purposes as the criteria of disbursement ideally formulated by 
the donor? Does the government of Indonesia utilize it 
effectively? Is there any political purpose set by the 
government behind the allocation of aid in the development 
process? What are the political implications of the way the 
government allocates the aid? And why does the government 
generally take measures, or treat aid especially, as the way 
they do? What factors associated with the maintenance of 
power, drives the government to have the policies it does? All 
of the above questions, in fact, are aimed at analyzing the 
effects of foreign aid towards the economic development 
process of Indonesia as a recipient country and merely deal 
with the analysis of domestic political process within the 
New-Order government.
Chapters III and IV will basically deal with the 
following questions: What motives dominantly encourage the 
donor countries, both the U.S. and Japan in comparison, to 
provide foreign aid to Indonesia? What is the importance of 
Indonesia for both the U.S. and Japan? It assumes that the 
condition of Indonesia is interpreted slightly differently by
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both of these donors in formulating their foreign aid policies 
or disbursement toward Indonesia- The varying interpretation 
is basically in accordance with their own vital interests.
The third chapter will specifically scrutinize U.S.- 
Indonesia aid relations. It will concentrate on the period of 
the first year Soeharto took power until 1973-74, the First 
time Indonesia enjoyed an oil price hike. In that period the 
U.S. was the largest aid provider to Indonesia. However, it 
does not mean that we will exclusively study only that period. 
We will interpret the trends of U.S. aid disbursement to 
Indonesia. The first half of the chapter discusses the 
international situation which was still dominantly colored by 
a bi-polar system, that is, the U.S. and the Western bloc on 
the one side and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other 
side. It also discusses the geographic, economic, political, 
and strategic importance of Indonesia for the U.S. pursuing 
foreign policy objectives vis-a-vis Soviet Communism. The 
motives of the U.S. providing foreign aid to Indonesia are 
related to these factors. The second half of the chapter will 
look at the prospect of the trend of US aid disbursement in 
the post Cold-War era.
Chapter IV will elaborate the aid relations between Japan 
and Indonesia. This chapter will assess the importance of 
Indonesia for Japan in deciding to allocate its foreign aid. 
Indonesia is regarded as a supplier of raw materials for 
Japanese industries, especially after the oil crisis in 1973-
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74. Indonesia is also considered a market for the products of 
Japanese industries. These economic motives are dominant in 
the foreign aid decision making of Japan. A conclusion will be 
provided in chapter V.
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CHAPTER I I
THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN AID 
TO INDONESIA
A. INTRODUCTION
The economy of Indonesia has grown steadily at a 
respectable rate for the last 25 years. The economic 
achievement of the New Order government can be seen by 
comparing the Indonesian economy of 1965 and its present 
condition. In 1965, Gross National Product (GNP) per capita is 
variously estimated at $30 to $55. It was lower than that of 
China, India, Bangladesh, and Nepal. The condition was 
worsened by high rate inflation. Prices at domestic market 
generally rose more than 500 per cent although the price of 
rice, a commodity which has a political and strategic meaning 
for Indonesia, hiked by more than 900 per cent. This bleak 
figure will goes further when we look at the macroeconomic 
condition. At that year, the deficit of the state budget 
reached 300 per cent of total receipts.' Between 1960 and 
1965, the economy had grown unsteadily at an annual average 
rate of 1.8 per cent. Whereas the annual population growth 
rate at the same period was 2.5 per cent. Therefore, per 
capita income declined over this period.
' Bresnan, John (1993), Managing Indonesia: The Modern 
Political Economy. New York: Columbia University Press, p.55.
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Now the economic condition of Indonesia is much better. 
Income per capita is $645 , leaving behind all those nations 
mentioned above. The average growth rate of GNP per capita 
between 1965 and 1990 was 4.5 per cent, the highest in 
Southeast Asia and very high for low income and middle income 
countries. Inflation was able to be controlled, under 10 per 
cent per year. The economy grew at a stable rate. From 1965 to 
1980, its growth rate averaged at 7.0 per cent, from 1980 to 
1990, when the world economy expanded around 2.5 per cent and 
the other developing economies had difficulties with 
Structural Adjustment Programs, the Indonesian economy grew at 
5.5 per cent average.
The successful achievement in economics is partly due to 
the contribution of aid. Foreign aid has played a crucial
role, especially in the formative years of the New Order
government. Some critics argue that the economic progress
achieved so far by Indonesia does not reflect the real
condition. Only certain people get benefits from development, 
and the problem of poverty is still there. Foreign aid is only 
benefitting certain people and therefore the practice of 
foreign aid should be reconsidered.
In this chapter, I would argue that the government has 
utilized the aid efficiently not only in terms of economy but 
also in that of politics. The government spends aid money in 
the direction of what they regard as a strategic sector. What
 ̂Asia Week. November 3, 1993, p.53.
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is meant by "strategic" sector is the economic sector which is 
regarded as urgent to handle immediately, otherwise domestic 
political stability will be disrupted and the government’s 
power or legitimacy will be questioned. It can also be said 
that it is the economic sector which bears the most beneficial 
result to support or strengthen power. The study comes to a 
conclusion that aid in Indonesia contributes to the economic 
development. Economic development, in turn, contributes to 
political stability such as the New Order government now 
enjoys.
Before examining the aid allocation or spending policy, 
the model of new order government will be discussed in order 
to equip us with some understanding on the rationale which 
makes the New Order government take measures or policies the 
way it does. The next section will look at the history of 
foreign aid in Indonesia. This section will study the 
existence of a donor consortium for Indonesia and the total 
amount of ODA the New Order government has received so far. 
Following this section is the aid allocation or spending 
policy of the new order government. The question which we 
attempt to answer why the government spends aid money the way 
it does. What is the political importance of the aid spending 
policy with respect towards the political purpose of 
maintaining the status quo. The chapter will be closed with a 
conclusion.
36
B. MODEL OF THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT
Soeharto came to power after the failed coup launched by 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis 
Indonesia). The former government, THE Soekarno regime, left 
the country in a bad condition. Soekarno was preoccupied with 
his big political ambition of integrating all the Dutch East 
Indies into an independent Indonesia. He also desired 
Indonesia to be a world leader in eradicating neo-colonialism 
and neo-imperialism. He was absorbed in his political 
ambition without considering the resulting economic costs. 
Multinational corporations, especially those owned by the 
Dutch, were confiscated to be nationalized without 
compensation. The economy was never paid serious attention and 
an economic plan was not systematically formulated. As a 
consequence, the social-economic condition deteriorated.
Table 2.1 below illustrates the difficult position 
Soeharto's administration inherited from the former 
government. From 1961 until 1966, the real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth was always far below 5 per cent, except 
in 1961 when it reached at 5.1 per cent. Even in 1965, the GDP 
growth was zero (Column 1). Conditions were even more severe 
when we consider the real GDP growth per capita. From 1961 
until 1966, real GDP growth per capita was always negative, 
except in 1961 and 1964 (Column 2). The cost of living at the 
same period was increasingly sky-rocketing (Column 3).
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Inflation could not be managed (Column 4). In 1966 runaway 
inflation was peaking at more than 600 per cent.^ From the 
same data, we see that the total government budget was 
increasingly deficit during the period. In 1960, the 
government budget deficit totaled at 10.2 million Rupiah 
(Indonesian currency). It was reaching at 16.7 billion Rupiah 
in 1966.4
Learning from the past, the Soeharto regime came to the 
conclusion that it was political conditions which principally 
caused the deteriorating economic condition. From then on, all 
the energy was directed to the achievement of economic 
development. However, to run an economic development program 
effectively, political stability was needed. Therefore, the 
New Order government evolved a strategy consisting of two 
measures. First, The government restructured the political 
system in order to keep political conditions stable. Secondly, 
the formulation and implementation of national development was 
fully trusted to technocrats.^ The conduct of foreign policy
Oillis, Malcolm (1984), "Episodes in Indonesian 
Economic Growth," in Harberger, Arnold C. (ed.), %ULl.d 
Economic Growth. San Francisco, CA.: Institute for
Contemporary Studies Press, p. 237.
4 Sutton, Mary (1984), Ibid. table 3.3.,p.71. The total 
government budget deficit from 1960-66 went as follows (in 
million Rupiah): 10.2 (1960), 26.3 (9161), 47.2 (1962), 167.7 
(1963), 397.9 (1964), 1602.9 (1965), and 16.7 (1966). In
December 1965, new Rupiah (Rp) was introduced with 1 new Rp 
equivalent to 1000 old. Data in 1966 was in new Rp.
 ̂ What I mean by "technocrats" here is economist- 
bureaucrats who are believed do not have political ambition to 
seek power. They come from the Economics Faculty, University
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Table 2.1. : GDP Growth and Cost of Living Index













1960 ... ... 37.7 19
1961 5.1 2.5 26.9 72
1962 2.4 -0.1 174.0 160
1963 -2.4 -4.8 118.7 128
1964 3.8 1.3 104.7 135
1965 0.0 -2.5 305.5 596
1966 2.3 -0.3 1044.7 636
1967 2.3 -0.3 171.0 111
1968 11.1 4.3 12.8 84
1969 7.1 4.8 15.9 10
1970 7.5 3.2 12.3 9
1971 5.9 6.6 4.4 4
1972 9.4 8.5 6.5 26
1973 11.3 4.9 25.8 27
1974 7.6 2.3 40.7 33
Source'. Tony Killick (ed.). The IMF and Stabilization: 
Developing Country Experiences. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
table 3.1.,p .69.
*)Gillis, Malcolm (1984), "Episodes in Indonesian Economic 
Growth," in Harberger, Arnold C. (ed.). World Economic Growth. 
San Francisco, CA.: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 
p.237. From 1975-1990, the annual inflation rate are: 20, 14, 
12, 7, 22, 16, 7, 9.7, 11.5, 8.8, 4.3, 8.8, 8.9, 5.5, 6.0,
9.5. (Data from 1982 are taken from Wibisana, Bima, IDS 
(Indonesian Development Studies) Network, 1 August 1993)
of Indonesia. They are often called "Berkeley Mafia". See 
Ransom, David (1975), "Ford Country: Building on Elite for 
Indonesia," in Weissman, Steve (ed.). The Troian Horse. A 
Radical Look At Foreign Aid. Palo Alto, CA.: Ramparts Press, 
pp. 93-116. The genesis of "Berkeley Mafia" will be discussed 
in chapter three.
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was intended to support the implementation of the strategy. It 
was much more directed to economic diplomacy, and for more 
than two decades, Indonesian foreign policy was characterized 
as "low-profile".
1. POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING
The failed Communist coup of September 1965 had a great 
impact on the Soeharto regime. Soon after Soeharto got the 
letter of March 11, 1966^, he banned the PKI (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party) and dissolved its 
affiliated organizations. PKI at that time was the biggest 
party outside of the USSR and China. It had more than three 
million members and most of them were farmers or rural people. 
Even before Soeharto got the letter, on 10 October 1965, he 
had created a martial-law like body called Kopkamt ib [Komando 
Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban. Operation Command
In Indonesian, it is often called by its acronym 
"Supersemar" {Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, the executive 
letter of March eleven). This letter was handed by the 
President Soekarno to give Soeharto an authority to keep the 
country in order and this letter was claimed to be a legal 
foundation of Soeharto rise to power. Recently, there is a 
great debate on the genesis of "Supersemar" and no one knows 
where the letter is now. He was confirmed as President by the 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR, Majeiis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat) in March 1968.
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to Restore Security and Order).^ This body had unlimited 
powers to screen and arrest both military and civilian 
personnel who were suspected of "pro-communist" activities. 
The killing of the members or advocates of PKI at that time 
was everywhere. It is believed that the total number of deaths
Awas more than 500,000 people. All the leaders of PKI were 
sentenced to death. Thousands of alleged supporters were held 
in prison camps.
Soeharro rinr, then has systematically restructured the 
political system to n ake it stable and favorable for his 
national development program. There is a fundamental 
difference between the ways Soekarno’s process of nation- 
building and that of Soeharto’s. Unlike Soekarno who heavily 
relied on the glorious past of Javanese Majapahit^ kingdom and 
on the same feeling of suffering under Dutch colonial rule for
In September 1988, Kopkamtib was replaced by the 
Coordinating Board for Assisting in the Consolidation of 
National Stability, Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Bantuan 
Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional). Unlike its predecessor, 
Bakorstanas viould have no powers of arrest and detention. Yet, 
in practice, the functions of both institutions do not 
demonstrate so much change.
A Mody, Nawaz B. (1987), Indonesia Under Suharto. New 
York: APT Books, Inc, especially on chapter two, "The
Transition." pp.31-69.
Q Soekarno once said that the Independent Indonesia is as 
the third Republic; the first is Majapahit, the second is 
Sriwijaya.
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350 years^®, Soeharto much more concentrated on restructuring 
politics to keep the country stable.'*
To secure its power, the New Order government set up 
GOLKAR (Golongan Karya, Functional Group) as apolitical actor 
in parliament. This group was controlled by military. The 
members of GOLKAR were all the civil servants or bureaucrats. 
In 1973, after the genera) election, nine political parties 
were fused into two parties. Four parties which bore the 
banner of islamic ideology although each had different ideals 
and political views became one party, PPP {Parlai Persatuan 
Indonesia, Indonesian United Party), and five parties whose 
political ideologies ranged from the radical nationalist to 
Catholic became PDI {Parlai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian 
Democratic Party). Consequently it became apparent that the 
parties never became solid parties to be the opposition of the 
ruling party, GOLKAR. Instead, they always had problems of 
internal conflict. In addition, the government interfered with 
those parties by placing its people into the leadership 
positions of those parties.
This number comes from the first time the Dutch came 
to Java island; they came as traders, not colonial ruler. In 
fact, there are some regions outside Java which were not 
touched by the Dutch colonial ruler until 1800s; for instance, 
Aceh was conquered around 1850s.
" Utrecht give a good comparative analysis on nation- 
building process in Indonesia. See Utrecht, Ernst (1989), 
"Indonesia: Nation-Building, Ethnicity, and Regional
Conflicts," in Howard, Michael C. (ed.), E_tJiJiici_ty.&_Nat i ona 1- 
Building in the Pacific. Tokyo; The United Nations 
University, pp.309-31.
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Although the political system had been simplified, the 
political condition was still regarded as fragile, especially 
every five years before the general election time comes. It 
was caused by the competing ideologies of each party. The 
ideological differences sometimes come to the surface and 
political conflicts could disrupt the national development 
process. In 1982, the government restricted the movement of 
political parties by introducing the so-called "floating-mass" 
system. The parties were forbidden to campaign in villages. In 
May 30, 1984 the government enacted a law which recognizes
Pancasila {literally means Five Principles, the ideology of 
the state) as a sole basis for all political parties and mass 
organizations. As a result of the implementation of the law, 
PPP whose symbol is k a ’bah (the sacred building for moslem in 
Mecca) was to change its symbol to one reflecting any one of 
the five principles of Pancasila.
Not only were political parties controlled by the 
government. Students and Press were also controlled by the 
government. The students’ activities were limited within the
12 The new emblem or symbol of PPP is "star". It seems 
that Islam as the religion of majority people is regarded as 
a "big enemy for Soeharto’s regime", see Utrecht, Qp Cit. This 
trend is apparent after the Iran Revolution led by Khomeini 
whose influence colored the life of students in big 
universities. The government restricted the Islamic discussion 
clubs which flourished in Universities. The government forbade 
female students and officials to wear jilbab (Islamic 
wearing). The government also took harsh measures to treat 
Islamic movements. For a good description on an episode of 
Islamic movements, see Bresnan, Op Cit. chapter "Tanjung 
Priok”
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scope of academic activities. They were not allowed to carry 
on political activities inside the campus. The self-control 
mechanism was implemented in the Press. The government could 
cancel the newspaper’s publishing permit if it criticized the 
government’s policies. In short, the government had 
effectively institutionalized its desired political system.*^
2. ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING PROCESS
William Liddle once asserted that Indonesia is a model 
that "economic liberalism is not necessary to go together with 
political liberalism."^* Compared with Soekarno’s regime, the 
economy of New Order government was more open to International 
economic forces. This was caused by two factors: (1) the
pressure of donor countries and (2) Market-oriented ideology 
of economic advisors. Since the New Order government relied 
heavily on the inflows of foreign aid, it had to accept the 
conditionalities imposed by the Western donors.
As mentioned above the formulation of economic policies 
was handed over to the group of economist-technocrats. They 
came from the University of Indonesia and were mostly trained
See, Liddle, R. William (85), ’Soeharto’s Indonesia: 
Personal Rule and Political Institution," Pacific Affairs, 
vol.58 no.l. Spring, pp.68-90.
Liddle, R. William (1987), "Indonesia in 1986: 
Contending with Scarcity," Asian Survey. Vol.XXVII, No.2, 
February, pp.206-18.
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in the U.S. educational system. Actually, the relationship 
between Soeharto and the economist-technocrats had been forged 
before Soeharto became President.^ Soeharto trusted them to 
handle the economy of the nation because besides the fact that 
they were not affiliated with any political party and they did 
not have political ambitions, the situation at that time 
required expertise. They were utilized by Soeharto to gain 
sympathy from Western donors. Both technocrats and donors had 
the same perception on the strategy of economic development; 
Their perceptions were market-oriented.
In the history of the New Order, there was another group 
which sought to influence the President in taking decisions on 
economic matters. They were often called "engineers” or 
"nationalists".'^ They believed in the promotion of 
protectionist policies to develop internal state enterprises, 
instead of opening the domestic market, because the 
enterprises were not yet able to compete in either the 
domestic or international markets. The protectionist barriers
See, Liddle, R. William (1992), "The Politics of 
Development Policy," World Development. Vol.20 No.6, June, 
pp.793-807.
Liddle (1986), Op Cit. p.207. They are personified by 
B.J. Habibie (Minister of Research and Technology and 
Coordinator for the so-called "strategic industries" such as 
IPTN aircraft industry and shipbuilding industry, PT. PAL). 
For in-depth analysis of the contending role of both 
"economist-technocrats" and "engineers" or "nationalists" 
(Robison calls for the latter as "economist-nationalists"), an 
excellent study conducted by Robison can be used. See, 
Robison, Richard (1988), Indonesia; The Rise of Capital. North 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd.
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would be lifted when the economy would be strengthen enough to 
compete in international market.
Both groups^^ competed with each other to influence the 
President. However, all decisions would ultimately come back 
to the President. Ideas from both groups were accepted by 
Soeharto at different times, and He had his own final 
strategies. There was a tendency for the ideas of the 
economists to be accepted when the economic situation was 
though. There were three periods when the economists- 
technocrats’ advice was requested. The first was in 1966 when 
inflation reached 600 per cent per year, economic growth was 
negative and Western donors’ aid was immediately needed. The 
second was when Pertamina was in crisis in 1975. The Third was 
in 1983-1984 when the oil price fell down and policy reforms 
are needed. On the contrary, the ideas of engineers or 
nationalists were accepted when the economic condition was 
really stable and there was no difficulty on balance of 
payment. This condition reflects that Soeharto is a 
"relatively autonomous" policy maker.
I n Actually Liddle distinguishes the Indonesian decision 
makers on economic matters into three groups: (neo-classics) 
economists, engineers or nationalists, and politicians. 
However, for the purpose of this study, I divide them only 
into two groups, because as Liddle also realizes, both groups 
have consistently different perspectives; whereas the group 
called "politicians" never have their own consistent 
perspective. Sometimes they are supporters of the engineers 
and at another times they are advocates of economists. In 
addition, the prominent figure of this group was no longer 
apparent. It used to be Sudharraono, the last vice president.
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For Soeharto as politician: The economists are the
producers of wealth...and the nationalists are the 
embodiment of his dream for more rapid progress toward an 
industrialized, internationally powerful Indonesia
19A recent study conducted by Woo provides a good 
analysis of the model of economic decision making in 
Indonesia. He finds that there is a difference between the 
Indonesian model of decision making and that of African 
states. As documented by Robert Bates, "elite-oriented rent- 
seeking states in Africa have systematically exploited their 
agricultural sectors". Almost all of the economic policies 
in those states have a pro-urban bias because they are 
intended to further the interests of the decision makers 
(elite technocrats) whose interests have nothing to do with 
agriculture. Yet this situation did not happen in Indonesia. 
In fact, the agricultural sector was one of the priorities 
which received much attention in the New Order government,
10 For a comprehensive detail, see. Liddle, R. William 
(1991), "The Relative Autonomy of the Third World Politician: 
Soeharto and Indonesian Economic Development in Comparative 
Perspective," International Studies Quarterly. Vol.35 No.4, 
December, pp.419.
Woo, Wing Thye (1991), "Using Economic Methodology to 
Assess Competing Models of Economic Policy-Making in 
Indonesia," ASEAN Economic Bulletin. Vol.7 No.3, March, pp. 
307-21 .
Woo (1991), Ibid. p.319, as quoted from Bates, Robert 
(1981), Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political 
Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press.
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despite the fact that groups of decision makers were
apparently limited to elite bureaucrats.
From his finding. Woo develops his model called the
"corporatist state" model. By corporatist state, he defines
"President Soeharto as the strong chairman of the board, the
army and bureaucratic elite as the senior partners, and
indif^nous capital, rural sector and regional interests as
11junior partners." He further describes the mechanism of 
economic policy-making process as, "the different lobbies and 
advisory groups propose policy initiatives, and the President 
adopts those which are either compatible with his innate
preferences, or vital to maintaining his position as the
17overarching patron."
3. THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
There is a difference in style between the conduct of 
foreign policy of Soekarno’s and that of Soeharto’s. 
Soekarno was very aggressive in pract icing the foreign policy.
Woo (1991), OP Cit. p. 313.
Ibid. p.313
23 For a good discussion on the nature of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy and how it had been practiced since 
independence until the early 1980s, see Leifer, Michael 
(1983), Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. London: George Allen &
Unwin, published for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs.
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whereas Soeharto was low-profile for more than two decades and 
much more concentrated on national development. This approach 
was consistent with his assertion to, "restore domestic 
condition first before taking part in international politics." 
Soeharto’s generation believed that an "assertive foreign 
policy was really costly and they experience the bankruptcy of 
the economy." This assertion is expressed in the decision 
of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (Tap MPRS) 
no. XIII/MPRS/1966 section  ̂, "...economic interest should be 
significantly put ahead to that of foreign policy."
Due to the immediate need for foreign aid inflows, 
Soeharto restored foreign relations with international 
organizations and Western donors which had not been good up to 
that time. In 1965, Indonesia withdrew from all international 
organizations which were believed to have been created by the 
imperialist powers as their political means to keep the new 
Independent countries under their control. The withdrawal of 
Indonesia from international agencies such as the UN, the IMF 
and the World Bank was in protest of Malaysia’s admission to 
U.N. as a member nation.
Wanandi, Jusuf (1988), "The Correlation Between 
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Indonesia," in 
Scalapino, Robert A. et.al. (eds.), Asia and the Maior Powers: 
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policv. Berkeley, CA. : Institute 
of East Asia Studies, University of California, p.187.
Sabir, M (1987), Politik Bebas Aktif. Tantanean dan 
Kesempatan (Independent and Active Policy, Challenges and 
Opportunities), Jakarta: Haji Masagung, p.209. [The author’s 
english translation.]
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Right after Soeharto came to power, Indonesia reinstated 
its membership in international organizations. In February 
1967, Indonesia was formally accepted again as a member of the 
IMF and the World Bank.^® To give a good impression to Western 
donors, Indonesia’s New Order also improved its performance in 
a number of ways. They included: to end confrontation with
Malaysia, to pay adequate compensation to the owners of the 
nationalized properties, and to open Indonesia to private 
foreign investment. These changes were also caused by the 
conditionalities imposed by the donor countries, especially 
the U.S. as a requirement in order for Indonesia to get 
assistance.
In the mid-1980s, Indonesia was more assertive in 
conducting its foreign policy. This change was due to three 
factors; (1) There was a regeneration, especially in the
military body; (2) Economic conditions were getting better;
27(3) The mechanism of foreign policy process was changing. 
In the military body, the "45 generation", a generation which
Sutton, Mary (1984), Op Cit. p.79. Indonesia joined the 
IMF for the first time in 1954 and later, the World Bank. 
Although the formal re-entry of Indonesia to the IMF occurred 
in February 1967, in 1966 the IMF had sent its mission to help 
Jakarta to formulate the stabilization and rehabilitation 
program which would be negotiated with the Western donor 
countries. The World Bank formally established its Resident 
Staff (representatives) in Jakarta in September 1968. For the 
history of the relations between the Bank and Indonesia in the 
first years, see Thompson, Graeme & Richard C. Manning (1974), 
"The World Bank in Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies. Vol.X no.2, July, pp.56-82,
Wanandi (1988), Op Cit. pp. 181-2.
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struggled for independence in 1945, lost power and their 
position was taken over by the younger generation of 
professional army personnel. They were more pragmatic because 
they did not have the emotional experience of the struggle for 
independence. In the area of foreign affairs, the involvement 
of military personnel was also reduced. Career diplomats began 
to take greater role. The area of government which was 
formerly in the hands of the military would now be in the 
hands of civil career diplomats. The posts of ambassadorship, 
although for some countries were still given to the military, 
were now being entrusted to professional diplomats.
Another significant factor contributing to the changes 
was the improved economic conditions. Some achievements of the 
New Order which were recognized as a model example for other 
Developing countries were the birth control program, the 
achievement of self-sufficiency in staple food, and the 
reduction of the population ratio who lived below the poverty 
line. In addition, Indonesia was also able to maintain its 
momentum of economic growth, and continued manage its debt 
problem. This achievement contributed to Indonesia’s political 
stability. As domestic stability was maintained, Indonesia 
began thinking about becoming active in international fora.
The center of decision making rested with the president 
with the advice of the foreign minister who was responsible
Ching, Frank (1993), "G7 Leaders Should Welcome
Dialogue with Poorer Nations," Far Eastern Economic Review. 3 
June, p.30
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for the implementation of foreign policy. Regarding ma 11ers of 
security, the president would be counselled by the c o m m a n d e r 
in chief of the armed fo;ces. Conversely in the case of the 
foreign economic relations, the president would get advice 
from the economic ministers under a coordinating minister. In 
addition to the conventional practice of formulating foreign 
policy within the executive as described above, opinions from 
outside the executive would be also considered as inputs in 
formulating foreign policy. 'I'hree sources which continuously 
gave their opinion on the practice of foreign policy were t he 
C ommission 1 of Mouse of Representative (DPR, ncwnn I ’c rwnk i I tin 
R a k y a t ) ,  which was in charge of foreign and defence matters; 
mass media which voiced public opinion, and academic 
institutions such as Universities, LlIM ( l.e/Hhaga ! linu iltin 
F e n g e t a l w a n  I n d o n e s i a , Indonesian Institution of .Science and 
Knowledge), CSIS (Center for Strategic and 1 nternationa I 
Studies) which provided the intellectual input.
C. I'ORIiIGN AID CONDITIONS IN INDONESIA
Before examining the ro le of foreign aid in Indonesia, it 
is necessary to look at the financial cond i I i o n s , left by 
Soekarno, because basically the New Order government claimed 
that the measures it took were corrective actions. The total 
debt of the Soekarno regime at the end of 1965 reached more
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than U.S.$ 2 billion and most of it, around three-fifths, came
from the Communist countries to purchase military equipment
29for pursuing the political ambitions of Soekarno.
Along with the efforts to improve its relations with 
Western countries and international agencies, the New Order 
government of Indonesia also sought to find a new package of 
assistance from the Western countries. However, before dealing 
with ? new aid package, Indonesia was asked to restructure its 
old debt of some which was due. The debt payments (including 
arrears) for 1966 amounted to U.S.$530 million. It was 70 per 
cent of the GDP and 132 per cent of export earnings.The 
only realistic option Indonesia had was to get an agreement 
from its creditors, both Western and Communist countries, on 
debt rescheduling.
The first meeting on debt rescheduling was held in Tokyo 
in September of 1966. All the creditors were invited but 
Communist countries did not come to the meeting. This meeting 
was continued in Paris in December 1966 and the result was 
that both sides, Indonesia and its Western creditors reached 
an agreement on debt rescheduling. The meeting appointed Dr.
29 Mahajani, Usha (1970), Soviet and American Aid to 
Indonesia. 1949-68. Ohio University: Center for International 
Studies, table on p.32.
Woo and Nasution (1989), "Indonesia Economic Policies 
and Their Relation to External Debt Management," in Sachs, 
Jeffrey D, & Susan M. Collins (eds.). Developing Country Debt 
and Economic Performance. Vol.3. Countrv Studies: Indonesia. 
Korea, the Philippines. Turkey. London & Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, p.114.
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Herman ABS, the Head of the board of Directors of Deutsche 
Bank of West Germany to study the Indonesia’s debt condition 
and its economic ability to fulfill the repayment. In 17 
Octob . 1968, Indonesia proposed to the Communist creditors
the same scheme of the rescheduling which would be formulated 
by Dr. Herman ABS. Dr. Herman's proposal was as follows: (I) 
The principal debt, amounting US$ 1.7 billion per 30 June 
1966, would be repaid in 30 year installment payments of which 
every year payment would be U.S.S 57 million. (2) The interest 
would be paid in 15 year installments starting in 1985. This 
formula was accepted by the creditors in Paris (they are 
called "the Paris club") on 24 April 1970
Since agreement on the debt problem was reached, the New 
Order government proposed a new package of assistance to the 
creditors of the Paris club. At this stage, the IMF started to 
get involved actively in economic policy formulation in 
Indonesia. The IMF played an active role in formulating the
instabilization and rehabilitation program whose financing 
came from donors coordinated under the so-called Inter- 
Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGl).
The IGGI was set up in February 1967 as a continuation of 
the meeting between Indonesia and the Paris club. This group
Sabir, M ( 1987), Op Cit. p.203.
See Sutton, Mary ( 1984), Op Cit. Cf. Payer, Cheryl 
(1974), The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World. New York 
& London: Monthly Review Press, especially chapter 1
"Introduction" and 4 on "Indonesia: A Success Story."
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was not an international organization and its structure was 
informal. Rather it was a forum for Indonesia and 'ts donor 
consortium to discuss Indonesian economic policies and the 
conditionalities of donors providing assistance. As described 
by Posthumus,
The structure of the IGGI is informal. It is not an 
international organization, and it does not ’pool’ 
bilateral assistance. Through intensive discussions and 
debate it has tried to harmonize several aspects of 
bilateral assistance policies.
In the early years, the IGGI met several times in a year 
and later it was agreed that they meet twice a year, in Spring 
and Fall. The objectives of those meetings were to study the 
progress achieved so far by Indonesia in a respective year and 
to consider a new package of assistance requested by Indonesia 
for the following fiscal year (starting from 1 April-31 
March). Those meetings were always held in the Netherlands.
Three fundamental principles were agreed on between 
Indonesia and all the donor countries under IGGI. First, aid 
should be able to accelerate Indonesia’s economic growth. 
Secondly, aid should enable Indonesia to repay its previous 
debt. Thirdly, the aid provided should be able to strengthen
Posthumus, G.A. (1972), "The Inter-Governmental Group 
on Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol. 
VIII No.2, July, p.55.
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the financial position of Indonesia so that it can repay its 
debt in the future.
The IGGI was very generous not only in terms of the total 
amount of aid Indonesia would receive but also in terms of the 
quality of the aid itself. The total amount of bilateral 
official development assistance to Indonesia would increase 
annually (see table 2.2). The terms of aid are soft; The 
repayment period would be 25 years including 7 years of grace 
and an interest rate of 3 per cent. Also since 1969, some of 
the IGGI donor countries such as Australia, Switzerland, and 
Norway have given 100 per cent grants to Indonesia. In some 
years Sweden, New Zealand, Finland, U.K., Belgium, Denmark, 
and Canada also gave 100 per cent grants. The grant element of 
ODA provided by each donor country was more than 60 per cent 
in the last decade. The donor country which gave the least 
grant element of its ODA was Japan, at 66.8 per cent, while 
the U.S. ODA grant element was 82.3 per cent This 
concessional aid was one of the factors which explains why 
Indonesia did not experience a debt crisis, compared with 
Mexico, Brazil, and other Latin American countries which did 
in the 1980s.
Sabir (1987), Op Cit. p.205.
It is calculated from the data provided by OECD 
(series), Geographical Distribution of Financial Fl o w t o  
Developing Countries. Paris: OECD.
The other two are: (1) high export orientation and (2) 
prudent management of the maturity structure. See, Woo and 
Nasution (1989), Op Cit. Their study gives a good and lengthy
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Table 2.2. : Total ODA to Indonesia fin Million US Dollar)
























of Financial Flows to Developing Countries. Paris: OECD.
analysis on the Debt Management Policy of Indonesia. 
Cf.Haryono, Subaliono (1985), "Indonesia," in Mahran, 
Hassanali (ed.) External Debt Management. Washington, D.C.: 
IMF, pp. 224-30.
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since 1992, IGGI has been dismissed and Indonesia no 
longer receives the Dutch assistance. Indonesia rejected 
various aid packages from the Netherlands in protest over 
Dutch interference in Indonesia’s domestic political affairs. 
The Indonesian government formally sent a letter of protest to 
the government of the Netherlands on 25 March 1992. Three 
requests were made to the Dutch government in the letter: (1) 
To terminate the disbursement of all kinds of assistance from 
the Netherlands to Indonesia, (2) Not to prepare the new 
package of aid for Indonesia, (3) Not to hold the meetings of 
IGGI .37
Although the IGGI had been dismissed, it does not mean 
that Indonesia no longer request foreign aid. The dismissal of 
IGGI was a consequence of the termination of aid relations
See the report on the dismissal of IGGI in the 
Indonesian Weekly News magazine, Tempp, 4 April 1992, pp.l3- 
25. Actually, not only the Netherlands which canceled their 
aid to Indonesia after "Dili incident" of 12 November 1991 in 
which some fifty pro-independent East Timorese demonstrators 
were killed by the Indonesian armed forces. Denmark, Belgium, 
and Canada also joined the Netherlands to suspend their aid. 
The US House of Representatives also voted a US$ 2.3 million 
cut in military training assistance. However, only to the 
Netherlands Indonesian government took counter-action to 
refuse receiving assistance. The factor is not only because of 
the small amount of the Dutch assistance received by Indonesia 
(1.9 per cent of total IGGI disbursement) but also because of 
strong emotional drives rooted from the past experience of 
colonialism. Cf. Van den Ham, Allert P. (1993), "Development 
Cooperation and Human Rights: Indonesian-Dutch Aid
Controversy," Asian Survey. Vol. XXXI 11 No.5, May, pp.531-39. 
Van den Ham gives a good analysis on the political reasons for 
Soeharto to reject the Dutch aid. See also, MacIntyre, Andrew 
(1993), "Indonesia in 1992: Coming to Terms with the Outside 
World," Asian Survey. Vol. XXXlll, No.2, February, pp.204-10.
58
50between the Indonesian and Dutch governments. The IGGI 
position was taken over by the new donor consortium for 
Indonesia led by the World Bank, the Consultative Group for 
Indonesia (CGI). The mechanism of both organizations was 
exactly the same. The members of both were also the same, 
except for the absence of the Dutch, and that South Korea 
joined for the first time as a donor country. Even for the 
last two years, CGI has disbursed the total amount of both 
loans and assistance (including the grant) from US$ 4.9 
billion (in 1992) to US$ 5.1 billion in 1993, compared with 
the last aid disbursed through IGGI of US$ 4.8 billion in 
1991. The only country which is still not disbursing its aid 
to Indonesia in a protest of human right violations is 
Belgium. The U.S. cut its aid from US$ 94 million (1992) to 
only US$ 40.4 million (1993). Meanwhile Canada did not provide 
aid before, is providing U.S.$39 million in the year 1993.^^
D. AID ALLOCATION POLICY
Since its rise to power, the New Order government has 
undertaken the so-called "balanced budget" policy. Basically,
3S The termination of aid relation between both countries 
also does not affect the other relations in other sectors such 
as diplomatic, trade, culture, social, and tourism.
IQ Tempo. "Acungan Jempol bagi Kebijaksanaan Makro," 
(Praise for the Macro Policies), 10 July 1993, p.72.
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it means that the New Order government treats foreign aid as 
"foreign revenue". When we look at the structure of the 
budget, the "revenues side" is divided into two broad 
categories: "Domestic Revenues" and "Development Revenues". 
Basically, domestic revenues come from oil and non-oil 
revenues; whereas development revenues are provided from both 
program and project aid. In the "expenditure side", there are 
two broad categories, that is, "Routine Expenditure" which 
consists of posts such as personnel salaries, subsidies, and 
debt service payments and "Development Expenditures" for which 
all foreign financing is allocated.
In the early period of Soeharto’s regime until the oil 
boom period starting in 1973, foreign financial resources, 
including ODA, played a significant role. They financed 20 to 
28 per cent of total government expenditure.*^ Since 1968, all 
foreign resources have been designated in the budget under the 
development expenditure category. In 1969/70 77 per cent of 
the development budget was financed by foreign resources.**
In the oil boom era, from 1973-1982, the share of foreign 
resources to development expenditure decreased, averaging
Cf. Fobison, Richard (1988), "Resisting Structural 
Adjustment: Conflict Over Industrial Policy in Indoner'a," in 
Calisson, Jerker & Timothy M. Shaw (eds.). Newly 
Industrializing Countries and The Political Economy of South- 
South Relations. New York: St. Martin’s Press, p.29-30.
** Robison, Richard (1992), "Industrialization and the 
Econc.iiic and Political Development of Capital: The Case of
Indonesia," in McVey, Ruth (ed.). Southeast Asian Capitalists. 
New York, Ithaca: Cornell University, p.69.
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around 25 per cent. This happened because of the avalanche of 
oil revenues and thus reduced the role of foreign financing. 
Its importance again increased after the decline of the oil 
boom, when oil no longer provided such high export earnings. 
In the second half of the 1980s the share of foreign financing 
to development spending ranged between approximately 65 per 
cent to 81.5 per cent. In the last two years, the share of 
foreign financing to development expenditure again shows its 
decrease, that is, around 40 per cent in Fiscal Year (FY) 
1992/93 and 36 per cent in FY 1993/94.^ The summary of the 
share of foreign resource inflows to development spending in 
Indonesian budget can be seen in table 2.3. below.
Table 2.3. clearly indicates that all foreign aid goes to 
the development spending side of Indonesia’s budget, even in 
the first year of the New Order some funds were intended to 
finance the routine expenditure side. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that foreign aid is utilized for productive, not 
consumptive, purposes which domestic saving alone cannot 
fulfill. Foreign aid then acts as a supplement to domestic 
saving. A further question is, to which sector does aid go? 
Which sector gets high financial priority from the New Order 
government? Why?
Woo & Nasution (1989), Op Cit. p.115, and table 7.1. 
See also, Nasution (1991), "Survey of Recent Development", 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol.27 No.2, August, 
p. 19.
Indonesia Development News Quarterly. Vol.16 No. 2, 
Winter 1993, table p.5.
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In judging which sector of the economy should be given 
high priority to be financed by foreign aid, a government 
should take into account not only economic considerations but 
also political ones. The government should select the most 
productive sector in terms its importance to the economy. It 
means that the economic sector in which foreign aid money is 
invested should promote other productive activities in the 
chain of economic development and as a consequence, the 
country will be able to repay its debt in the future years. 
From a political standpoint, selecting the economic sector to 
receive financing the social structure of the country and its 
political history must be considered.
In fact, the Indonesian government in dealing with aid, 
has clearly acknowledged in its official document that.
Having realized that the significant role foreign 
financing can play in the future, the government keeps on 
maintaining the credibility of Indonesia for donor 
countries and financial institutions. It can be achieved 
by utilizing foreign aid as efficient as possible, 
especially to support economic activities and the 
construction of productive projects so that the projects 
will either directly or indirectly have the capabilities 
to repay the debt which has been used.
Republik Indonesia (1992), Nota Keuangan dan Rancangan 
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belania Negara Tahun Anggaran 1992/93 
(Financial Note and the Draft of National Budget FY 1992/93), 
p. 65.
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Table 2.3.: Size of Government Budget and the Share of Foreign 






















69/70 216.5 118.2 334.7 243.7 91 .0 76.9
74/75 1,016.1 969.6 1,985.7 1,753.7 232.0 23.9
79/80 4,061.8 4,016.1 8,077.9 6,696.8 1,381.1 34.3
80/81 5,800.0 5,920.8 11,720.8 10,227.0 1,493.8 25.2
81/82 6,977.6 6,944.0 13,921.6 12,212.6 1,709.0 24.6
82/83 6,996.3 7,362.0 14,358.3 12,418.3 1,940.0 26.3
83/84 8,411.8 9,903.3 18,315.1 14,432.7 3,882.4 39.2
84/85 9,429.0 9,954.5 19,383.5 15,905.5 3,478.0 34.9
85/86 11,951 .5 10,873.9 22,825.4 19,252.8 3,572.6 32.8
86/87 13,559.3 8,333.5 21.892.8 16,140.6 5,752.2 69.0
87/88 17,481.5 9,479.8 26,961.3 20,803.3 6,158.0 64.9
88/89 20,739.0 12,256.0 32,995.0 23,004.3 9,990.7 81 .5
92/93 33,196.6 22,912.0 56,108.6 46,508.4 9,600.2 41.9
93/94 37,094.9 25,227.2 62,322.1 52,769.0 9,553.1 37.8
taken from Haryanto, Agus (1991), The Effects of Budget Allocation on 
External Borrowing: The Case of Indonesia. Ph.D. dissertation, Boulder: 
University of Colorado, table 3.4., p.48.
**) The last two year data are taken from Indonesia Development News 
Quarterly. Winter 1993, Vol.16 No.2, p.5.
Note;
1. The structui A  Routine Expenditures consists of such the following 
categories as. Personnel, Debt service. Subsidies to Regions, Food 
Subsidy, and Oil subsidy.
2. The structure of Development Expenditure comprises such following 
sectors as. Infrastructure, Agriculture and Irrigation, Regional 
Development, Human Resources, and Industry & Mining.
3. "Domestic Revenues" comes from Oil (Oil and LNG) and Non-Oil (which 
consists of tax and non-tax receipts) revenues.
4. "Foreign revenues" is all kind of foreign resources inflows.
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When we examine the structure of Development Expenditure 
in Indonesia’s budget, four sectors always given high priority 
by the government in its development program are: 
Infrastructure; Agriculture and Irrigation; Human Resources; 
and Regional Development. Their share is more than three- 
fourths of total development spending. For the New Order 
government, these four sectors are regarded as strategic both 
economically and politically. Denying to consider the 
importance of the development of these sectors might be a 
potential threat for Soeharto’s political legitimacy, as 
realized by Glassburner, "Soeharto regime is concerned with 
political legitimacy; and seeks to establish it in 
demonstration of its ability to solve the nation’s economic 
problems effectively and equitably.
Sabir^* asserts that about 90 per cent of aid is directed 
at maintaining and building infrastructure in various sectors, 
especially sectors such as transportation and road 
construction, dams, irrigation, and fertilizer plant 
complexes. The policy of allocating aid to rehabilitating and 
buildin» infrastructures is based on the bad infrastructure 
conditions left by the Soekarno administration. This occurred 
because Soekarno did not seriously pay attention to the 
economic sector. The priority to infrastructure financing
Glassburner, Bruce (1978), "Political Economy and the 
Soeharto Regime," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. 
Vol.XIV No.3, November, p.51.
Sabir (1987), Oo Cit. p.205.
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policy set by the Soeharto regime concurs with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank policy 
that sees providing infrastructures as the prerequisite for 
economic growth.
Table 2.4.: Structure of Development Expenditure 
fin percent of total)
Sector 69/70 74/75 79/80 84/85 88/89
Inf restructure 23.3 21 . 1 19.8 23.5 30.8
Agricltr & Irrigation 19.8 31.4 12.7 17.1 14.6
Human resources 11.8 8.7 19.5 22.1 22.8
Regional development 10.0 14.1 8.4 8.0 11.6
General Public Service 9.4 5.0 11.8 9.3 7.3
Industry & Mining 4.6 7.3 10.0 8.4 4.2
Capital Participation 0 10.2 11.6 2.9 2.3
Others 0.7 2.2 6.2 8.7 6.4
*) Source: same as table 2.3. above.
From the first five-year development plan initiated in 
1969 to the fifth five-year development plan, the New Order 
stressed development of the agricultural sector. The prcgi m 
of self-sufficiency in rice emerged when the rice crisis 
happened in 1973. At that time, Indonesia experienced its 
lowest rice harvest and imported rice from the international
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market '.n which the price was high.^' Until late 1980 
Indonesia was still the largest importer of rice in the world, 
buying 2 million tons of rice annually. That amount 
constituted almost 20 per cent of the rice that was on the 
international market. In 1984, Indonesia became self- 
sufficient in the rice production, producing around 26 million 
tons, compared with 14.6 million tons in 1973 when the crisis 
occurred.** Rice output for 1993 is estimated at 30.5 million 
tons
Agriculture is defined as a "strategic" sector and should 
be given first priority because more than 60 per cent of 
Indonesia’s people live in rural areas and depend their 
livelihood depends on agriculture. Historically, they have 
easily been infiltrated by extreme ideologies and were 
utilized as a foundation for radical political movements which 
sought to implement alternative political systems. In 
Independent Indonesia’s history, the Communist party has twice 
tried to impose its ideology, that is, in 1948 and 1965, and 
failed. Its supporters were mostly those who lived in rural-
Scherr, Sara J. (1989), "Agriculture in an Export Boom 
Economy: A Comparative Analysis of Policy and Performance in 
Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria," World Development. Vol. 17 
No.4, April, pp.543-60.
Bresnan ( 1993), Op Cit. p.124.
** Gelb, Alan & Associates (1988), Oi 1 Windfalls:
Blessings or Curse?. New York: The World Bank, table 12-5,
p.216.
** Business Monitor International (BMI) (1993), Indonesia 
1993. London: BMI Ltd, June, p.6
66
agricultural areas. Extreme Islamic organizations far are 
still regarded as a political threat. They also have a rural 
base for their movement and activities. Their concerns, which 
can gain the sympathy of the people are usually the same, that 
is, land reform and equitable distribution of wealth.
Another sector which gets high priority is Regional 
Development. This sector is intended to counteract political 
secessionist movements, by equalizing the distribution of 
development benefits. Since independence, Indonesia has never 
been quite free from secessionist movements. Since the New 
Order came to power, the government faced continuously 
political resistances from the*, provinces outside Java, 
especially Aceh, West Irian, and East Timor. The main factor 
underlying the political conflict between provinces outside 
Java and the central island of Java (especially Jakarta) is 
the wide economic gap between the central island and islands 
outside Java. The local people feel that their natural 
resources are exploited by the center.
Actually, when we examine the foreign capital movement as 
a whole, since 1987, there have been capital outflows from 
Indonesia. When foreign capital inflows are subtracted from 
the repayment of principal and interest debt, the net capital 
transier has been negative. Data from 1987 to 1989 demonstrate 
that the votai net capital transfer is, in billion of Rp̂  ̂: -
Since the last devaluation of September 1986, US$ 1 is 
equivalent to Rp.1.644.
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238, -215, and -90 respectively.^^ With such conditions, while 
the Indonesian economy adjusts structurally, the continuation 
of foreign resource inflows, especially concessional 
assistance, becomes significant. This trend can be seen from 
table 2.3. Further, the share of foreign financing to the 
total development spending from 1986/87 until 1988/89 highly 
increases. Increases are around 69, 65, and 81 per cent 
respectively, compared with 32 per cent in 1985/86. Foreign 
aid is needed to maintain the level of development achieved so 
far, otherwise the budget for development spending will be 
drastically reduced.
E. CONCLUSION
From the study above, it is clear that the economy of 
Indonesia under the New Order government has grown steadily. 
For 25 years, Indonesia was able to boost its per capita 
income from only around US$50 to almost US$650. This 
achievement is partly due to the big amount of foreign aid 
inflows.
Donor countries have been generous in providing aid to 
Indonesia not only in terms of total aid, but also in terms of 
concessions. All kinds of foreign aid were designed to finance
IMF (1992), International Financial Statistics Year 
Books 1992. Washington, D.C.: IMF, p.410-11.
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development expenditures in Indonesia’s budget. Aid was 
utilized for productive investments. Four sectors were always 
given high priority in development spending: Infrastructure, 
Agriculture and Irrigation, Human resources, and Regional 
Development. The New Order chose these four sectors because 
they are strategic not only in terms of the economy but also 
in terms of politics.
Economically, these four factors were strategic because 
are regarded as highly important in running the economy and 
boosting its growth. Politically, those four sectors were 
considered as strategic also. By promoting these sectors, the 
New Order government was able to counteract the secessionist 
or separatist movements caused by economic gap. At the same 
time, as the government demonstrated its capability to boost 
economic growth, it could gain its legitimacy of power from 
i t s peop1e .
In conclusion, foreign aid has played a significant role 
in keeping the economic growth of Indonesia steady, and as a 
consequence of this economic growth, it can also be said that 
foreign aid has supported the New Order government in 
maintaining its political legitimacy.
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CHAPTER I I I
THE POLITICS OF AID:
UNITED STATES - INDONESIA
RELATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Foreign aid programs have evolved as a form of foreign 
policy since the implementation of the Marshall Plan. The 
Marshall plan was an aid package provided by the U.S. to the 
economies of western European countries devastated by the 
Second World War. Basically, since the plan, the U.S. foreign 
aid has been directed toward politically strategic objectives, 
that is, to contain Communism, by promoting the economic 
welfare of recipient countries. This purpose was intensified 
during the subsequent four decades after the Marshall Plan as 
the international political constellation revealed a bi-polar 
system. This is not to say that the practice of foreign aid 
lacks humanitarian, "philanthropic" initiatives or development 
motives of the constituents of the donor country. In fact, the 
humanitarian face of aid at the state or government level has 
been politicized to pursue political strategic purposes.
As domestic and international political-economic 
conditions change, so do the practice and direction of foreign 
aid. Other purposes are attached to the practice of foreign 
aid such as export promotion, employment creation, deraocratic-
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values institutionalization, and human rights promotion —  all 
can be regarded as the donor’s national interests. The 
allocation of foreign aid has also been shifting according to 
changing international political conditions and the 
interpretation of the decision makers of the political 
situation. In addition, the relations between donor and 
recipients will also determine its practice and direction. 
Foreign aid will be directed to countries which are regarded 
by the decision makers of the donor country, as favorable and 
supportive of the donor country’s national interests.
The New Order government of Indonesia (as explained in 
chapter two) came to power in a victory of the right wing 
coalition (in which the military was the main actor) over 
Communist forces mobilized by the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI). This occurred at a locus of ideological conflict, 
between Western allies and Communism. Geographically, 
Indonesia had a strategic importance for the U.S.’s global 
political objective of containing Communism in the region. 
Unlike its predecessor, the New Order government was regarded 
by the U.S. as able to accommodate its political strategic 
purposes.
It is from this perspective, that foreign aid relations 
between the U.S. and Indonesia should be taken viewed. In this 
chapter we argue that the U.S. persisted in providing 
assistance to Indonesia because Indonesia was regarded as 
having political strategic importance both in terms of its
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geography and of the political attitude of the New Order 
government. According to the U.S. Indonesia deserved aid 
because it met foreign aid policies criteria, evolved by the 
U.S. The total amount of ODA received by Indonesia
continuously decreased since the early 1980s and fell 
drastically in 1991. We do not pretend to deny that the
introduction of democratic values and human rights promotion 
has been a recent and new dimension in the practice of foreign 
aid politics. However, this trend proves that the U.S. 
government is consistent in their political strategic 
principles of foreign aid practice. The trend towards
reduction of total ODA received by Indonesia can be 
interpreted as a shift of direction of the U.S.’s foreign aid 
allocation to countries which are regarded as the "high-
priority" targets for the purposes of political strategic 
objectives without abandoning the main objective of aid 
practice itself.
This chapter will be structured into five sections. After 
this introduction, section B will study the evolution of the 
U.S. foreign aid program. This section will explain the 
formation of foreign aid policies since the Marshall plan. 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the 
principles of foreign aid practice are forged and developed 
within the surrounding domestic and international political 
economy. Section C will analyze the implementation of foreign 
aid principles in Indonesia by interpreting the trends of the
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U.S. ODA allocations to Indonesia from OECD data. Section D 
will give a prediction of the U.S.’s foreign aid practice 
toward Indonesia in the years to come. The last section will 
be a conclusion.
B. EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. AID PROGRAM
Before beginning to study the evolution or development of 
the U.S. foreign aid program, it is necessary to put forward 
some assumptions. First, we should bear in mind that foreign 
aid can fundamentally be used as a tool for achieving the 
national interests of the donor country in the arena of 
international relations. Second, although there are really 
some apparent improvements in the formation of aid policies, 
political strategic concerns have appeared to be a dominant 
factor for more than four decades. Third, it would be 
misleading to assess the U.S. foreign aid program if we just 
take a look at the policies which have been formulated so far 
without considering how the government implements the policies 
under real conditions. What has always happened in the U.S. 
foreign aid program is that formulated policies have differed 
from their implementation or practice. Fourth, it is actually 
hard for us to differentiate one phase from another in the 
evolutionary process of the U.S. foreign aid program, both 
when we analyze it from the new policies every administration
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introduces and from the span of time we deliberately make it 
for. Whatever method we use to make it into phases, each phase 
shares a common principle and it should be borne in mind that 
each phase does not reflect its extremely specific feature.
For the purpose of this study, we would like to divide 
the U.S. foreign aid program into five phases or periods. This 
division is made in a loose manner, following the
implementation of new policies. To further our understanding, 
we try to examine the dominant features of the domestic and 
international political economic conditions which shape and 
influence the practice of foreign aid in each of these 
periods.
The five periods or phases of the U.S. foreign aid 
program are structured as follows; The first period of 1947 - 
1961 is called the ’initial’ period of aid which was inspired 
by the success of the Marshall plan. Second, the period of 
1961 - 1973 is called ’the legalized assistance’ period
characterized by the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 and the creation of U.S. Ag^n^.y for International 
Development (U.S. AID). The third period, from 1973-1980, is 
the "New Directions" period in which aid was formally directed 
to "the poorest of the poor". It was also in this period that 
human rights principles were deliberately incorporated for the 
first time. The fourth period, occurring in the 1980s, was a 
hard period for the foreign aid program. The last period, 
starting from the dismantling of the Communist bloc which
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ended the Cold War era, was "searching" period for a new 
formula of foreign aid practice.
1. THE INITIAL PERIOD: 1947-61
As we have mentioned before the first practice of U.S. 
foreign aid was the Marshall plan. It was officially called 
the European Recovery Program, initiated by the Secretary of 
State, George C . Marshall in June 5, 1947. In 1948, the
American Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act to 
implement the European Recovery Program. The Act authorized a 
$13 billion allocation of funds over a four-year period (1948- 
52), most of which was to be given as grants to the European 
countries to buy U.S. goods.
The basic idea of the program was to rehabilitate the 
war-torn economies of Europe and thereby bolster the economic 
and political strength of the continent. The motivations 
behind the program were a combination of humanitarian and 
political security concerns. The success of the program 
inspired the practice of U.S. foreign aid later. Actually, 
there is a debate on this. Some critics of foreign aid argue 
that the present practice of foreign aid is different from the 
Marshall plan program. The success of the plan cannot be 
duplicated by foreign aid. Some factors which differentiate 
the two are as follows: First, the political and economic
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settings in which both are implemented are different. The 
recipients of the Marshall plan were actually economies which 
had conditions or prerequisites to successful development, 
such as political orientation, infrastructure, and human 
capital which were conducive for economic growth. Their 
economic development process was abruptly interrupted by the 
war. All conditions, except financial capital, required as 
prerequisites for economic development had been there. 
Therefore, when foreign aid inflowed to the region, their 
economies could run as expected and they did not rely on aid 
inflows too long. Meanwhile, the setting in which the present 
foreign aid program was implemented in the Third World 
countries was in extreme contrast to that of Europe. The 
Developing countries not only lacked financial capital or 
investment but also the infrastructure, skilled people, and an 
economic-minded political orientation. Therefore, some 
continue to depend deeply on the inflows of aid without 
knowing when they will be able to delink from aid dependency.' 
In short, the aid in the Marshall plan had a function to the 
reconstruction of post war economies while present aid
practice functions towards the construction of the Developing
. . 2 countries.
* For a detail argument of the critics on this matter, see all 
Bauer’s writing on aid as used in the first chapter of this study.
2
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The Marshall plan was expanded to the Developing 
countries by introducing the Point Four of President Truman 
(in power from 1945-53) in 20 January 1949. The first form of 
aid is in technical and scientific assistance. In 1953, the 
Point Four was transformed into the Mutual Security Agency as 
a consequence of the Congress passed the Mutual Security Act 
(MSA), a bill which deliberately links U.S. aid policies to 
"the threat of Communists in the emerging nations of the Third 
World. In this period, aid was intensively used to 
strengthen allies and build up the low-incorae economies so 
that they would be less vulnerable to Communist penetration or 
takeover.* The security concerns of aid policies reflected the 
intensity of the Cold war situation. John Foster Dulles once 
criticized that Non-aligned (neutral) policy in the context of 
East-West confrontation was inherently immoral. At this 
period, the influx of U.S. foreign aid in Asia went to Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Pakistan.^
Vernon, Raymond & Debora L. Spar ( 1989), Beyond Global ism.
RemakioR Foreign Economic Policy. New York: The Free Press and
London: Collier Macmill?' Publishers, p. 150-1.
* Selim, Hassan M. , Ph.D. (1983), Development Assistance 
Policies and the Performance of Aid Agencies. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, chapter 3 on "The United States of America", pp.
39-54.
 ̂ Lewis, John P. ( 1987), Asian Development: The Role of
Development Assistance. Lanham, New York, London: University Press 
of America with the Asia Society, p. 24.
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2 . THE U . S .  A ID  FORMATION PERIOD: 19 6 1 -7 3
In the Kennedy administration (1961-1963), foreign aid 
was intentionally to serve security objectives. He did not 
distinguish between development and security assistance 
because he believed that "development aid was security 
assistance."® This objective can be read from the legalization 
of Foreign Assistance Act in 1961. According to the Act, the 
purpose of foreign assistance is.
to promote the foreign policy, security, and general 
welfare of the U.S. by assisting peoples of the World in 
their efforts toward economic development and internal 
and external security, and for other purposes.
To implement this Act, in November 1961, President Kennedy 
initiated the creation of U.S. Agency for International 
development (U.S. AID) as "the new foreign-aid program" to 
facilitate those purposes.
It was recognized that to contain Communism, political 
stability should be maintained and it could be achieved by 
continuously supporting the economic development program. One 
interpretation of this principle is that in the same year.
Eberstadt, Nicholas (1988), Foreign Aid and American 
Purpose. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, p. 33.
 ̂quoted from Black, Lloyd D. (1968), Strategy of Foreign 
Aid. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, p.14.
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Kennedy launched the so-called Alliance for Progress. It was 
a program to provide long-term assistance to Latin America.
There is a shift in the U.S. ODA policy between the first 
and the second period, although the basic idea remains the 
same. In 1950s, as mentioned above, aid was directly designed 
to contain the Soviet Union by strengthening the allies. In 
1960s, however, assistance was shifted towards the 
strengthening a number of countries against internal 
subversion. The emphasis was to support "nation-building" and 
win the "hearts and minds" of people in the Third World.*
The aggressiveness of the U.S. government to contain 
Communism by providing aid to the Developing countries had 
been used by the Developing countries’ leaders as a strategy 
to get more aid from the U.S. As recorded by Black,
...government officials in more than a few countries 
where Communism has not been a problem have asserted that 
they should "import” 1,000 communists as a means of
getting a larger share of U.S. aid.
Sewell, John & John Mathieson (1982), "The United 
States and the Third World: Ties That Bind," in Cassen, Robert 
et. al. (eds.). Rich Country Interests and Third World 
Development. New York.: St. Martin’s Press, p. 41.
* Black, Lloyd D. (1968). Op Cit. p. 19.
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3 . "NEW DIRECTIONS" PERIOD: 1 9 7 3 -8 0
Frustrated by the situation in Vietnam at the end of 
1960s and early 1970s, when economic assistance continued to 
be used explicitly for political strategic purposes but 
without any evident results. Congress turned against any aid 
policy proposals. In 1971 and 1972 Nixon’s foreign aid 
proposals were defeated in Congress. It demonstrated that the 
U.S. people suffered from "aid-fatigue".
To restore Congressional confidence in the foreign aid 
program, reforms of foreign aid policies were made. These were 
written into law in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and the 
Mutual Development and Cooperation Act of 1973. The Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1973 recognized that economic growth did not 
always go along with the social advancement of the poor. 
Instead, the poor did not benefit from the growth. The aid 
policy reforms of 1973, also known as the "New Directions” 
legislation, formally directed foreign aid to the targeted 
poor. Although the bilateral assistance objectives were still 
dominated by political security concerns, there was 
increasingly pressure in this period to disburse a larger 
share of development assistance through multilateral 
organizat ions.
The "New Directions" of U.S. foreign aid program also 
went along with, if not influenced by, the evaluation of the 
World Bank under McNamara’s presidency that there had been no
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"trickle down” and that to optimalize the effectiveness of 
foreign aid, a "Basic Human Needs" strategy should be 
implemented. Aid should be allocated to the "poorest of the 
poor" by providing them nutritious food, better education, 
clean water, and easily accessible health care services.
in 1976, the spirit of these "New Directions" in the 
foreign aid program was expressed in the enactment of a new 
amendment which made U.S. assistance contingent upon the 
provision of human rights in the recipient countries. The 
amendment also provided Congress the power to review the 
executive’s aid program on a case-by-case b a s i s . T o  realize 
this goal, the Carter administration {1977-1981) created the 
International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) in 1979, 
an institutional umbrella above AID. With the institution of 
IDCA, from then on AID became formally separated from the 
direct authority of the U.S. Department of State. It was hoped 
that development assistance could be removed from the 
political strategic concerns of state. President Carter also
agreed to a continuing cutback in military and security
• . 1 1  ass 1 stance.
In policy formulation, the U.S. government undertook a 
drastic shift in providing assistance, a good sign of "new
** Vernon, Raymond & Debora L. Spar ( 1989), Op Cit. p. 
159-60.
Eberstadt (1988), Op Cit. p. 47. See also Eberstadt, 
Nicholas (1990). U.S. Foreign Aid Policy - A Critique. 
Headline Series No. 293. Summer, New York: Foreign Policy
Associat ion.
81
directions" to detach the provision of aid from non- 
development considerations. However, this sound policy has 
always been hamstrung in practice, dictated by security 
concerns. Since the signing of the Camp David Agreement. Egypt 
and Israel have been the largest recipient of U.S. ODA. They 
have received a far higher share of U.S. aid than all other 
recipients of U.S. ODA.^
4. THE HARD PERIOD: 1980s
In this period, security concerns once again began to 
overshadow humanitarian and development motives. The 
enthusiasm that once surrounded the basic human needs approach 
and human rights promotion initiatives in the previous decade 
had waned. As mentioned above, since 1980-81 over one-third of 
all U.S. ODA has been spent on just two countries —  Egypt and
As an illustration, in 1980-81, Egypt and Israel got 
respectively almost 13 and 12 percent of total U.S. ODA. 
Whereas India, Turkey, Bangladesh, and Indonesia which were 
the next main recipients of U.S. ODA in order received only 3 
percent for the first two and 2 percent for the last ones of 
total U.S. ODA. Egypt in this respect in 1990-91 left far 
behind the other last four. In that year, it received 32 
percent of the total U.S. ODA and Israel received 8.3 percent. 
The other largest recipients in order were Honduras (2.4), 
Nicaragua (2.2), Jamaica (2.1), and Bangladesh (1.9). Turkey, 
India, and Indonesia only received 1.1, 0.8, and 0.6
respectively, which ranked them as twelfth, fourteenth, and 
nineteenth of U.S. recipient countries. For details, see the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(1992), Development Co-operation. 1992 Report, Paris: OECD, p. 
A-64.
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Israel. During the Reagan presidency (1981-89). decisions as 
to which countries get how much development assistance are 
increasingly made on the grounds of political security rather 
than recipients’ need. In general, Reagan’s foreign policy was 
overwhelmed by the fear of the Soviet Union's penetration of 
the Developing countries.
However, unprecedented domestic and international 
political economic conditions arose. The period of 1980s is 
regarded as a hard period for the U.S. economy. This condition 
is not restricted to the U.S. The Western industrialized 
countries also suffered economic recession, a slow growth 
rate, and a rising rate of unemployment. At the same time, 
many Developing countries were trapped in mounting debts and 
a defaulting on their repayment. Global trade flows have also 
been sluggish. On the U.S. side, a heavy debt in the 
Developing countries meant the loss of an additional 1.1 
million jobs because their trade with those countries failed 
to grow.*^ Other facts which seriously concerned the U.S. 
government are that the U.S. has been transformed from a 
creditor to a major debtor country and their trade deficit 
(mainly against Japan) approached $170 billion in 1986.*^
Brown, Janet Welsh (ed. ) (1990), In the U.S. Interest: 
Resources. Growth, and Security J_n_ the Developing World. 
Boulder, San Francisco & London: Westview Press, p. 4.
Sewell, John W. & Christine E. Contee (1987), "Foreign 
Aid and Gramm-Rudman , " For^ijgn Af_f a i rs , Vol. 65 No. 5, Summer, 
p. 1017.
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Because of the economic recession, the public attitude 
towards foreign aid, surveyed by the Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations has turned and remains negative. Of seven 
federal government spending programs tested, foreign economic 
aid and foreign military aid were the least popular. The 
majority of the public persistently want to cut back 
allocation for both.'^ Another finding from this poll is that 
of U.S. vital interests regarded by the public as urgent for 
the government to pursue in international relations, none 
dealt with the development of the Third World.^
Along with hard economic conditions, a new dimension in 
U.S. foreign aid practice evolved. Restraints on the foreign 
aid budget became apparent. The pressure to cut back foreign 
aid not only persistently comes from the public opinion but 
was also legalized through the enactment of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, sometimes 
called the Gramm-Rudman-(Ho 11ings) Act.^ The consequence of 
the Act was that some specific aid program would be cut back 
on a range from 10 to 50 percent, as an effort to enforce 
spending ceilings. For example, total U.S. bilateral ODA in
Rielly. John E. (ed.) (1983), American Public Opinion 
and U.S. Foreign Policy 1983, Chicago, Illinois: The Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations, p. 5.
Ibid, p. 5.
For a more detailed discussion on Gramm-Rudman- 
(llollings) Act, see Sewell, John W. & Christine E. Contee 
(1987), Op Cit and Obey, David R. & Carol Lancaster (1988), 
"Funding Foreign Aid," Foreign Policy. Vol. 71, Summer, pp. 
141-55.
84
the years 1980-85 almost doubled from around $ 4.3 billion to 
$ 8.2 billion before the Gramm-Rudman-(Hoi 1ings) budget-
cutting began. But since 1986 the bilateral ODA has been
increasingly reduced until it reached st $ 6.8 billion in
181989. The latest poll on the foreign aid program 
demonstrates that an increasing number of the public questions 
the practice or effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid.
Because of the combination of the fear of Soviet 
penetration in the Developing World by the Reagan 
administration and the hard economic conditions, another 
dimension of the foreign aid program was apparently accepted. 
Adopted the policies initiated by the World Bank’s Structural 
Adjustment Program, the Reagan administration forced the Third 
World countries to turn toward the free market and to welcome 
foreign private investment. However, in practice, security 
concerns still seem to dominate the disbursement and 
allocation of foreign aid. For example, while aid for many 
programs in low-income countries was sluggish between 1981 and 
1987, aid for countries which provided military-base 
facilities such as Greece, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain,
OECD (various issues), Geographical Distribution of
Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Paris: OECD, p. 315.
See Contee, Christine E. (1987), What Americans Think: 
Views on Development and U.S. - Third World Relations, New 
York: Inter Action & Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development
Counci 1.
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and Turkey rose by nearly 60 percent during the same period, 
exceeding $ 1.5 billion in 1987.^®
5. "SEARCHING" PERIOD: AFTER 1990
The dismantling of Communist bloc in Eastern Europe since 
mid-1989, followed by the breaking apart of Soviet Union into 
some independent Republics, has influenced the policies and 
practice of U.S. foreign aid. The spirit of containing Soviet 
penetration of the Developing countries as a rationale behind 
assistance allocation has lost its solid ground. New 
dimensions of foreign aid program have been initiated and are 
still being evolved. Ideal motives and factors of foreign aid 
program such as humanitarian, development purposes, 
environment-related matters, introducing democratic values, 
and human rights promotion which were always interrupted and 
hamstrung by security concerns, again came to the fore and for 
the first time were placed in a strong position.
Another factor which increasingly determines the policies 
of U.S. foreign aid program is the state of domestic economic 
conditions reflected in a growing deficit, high unemployment 
rates, and continuing recession. On the other side, some 
Developing countries which benefitted from the post second
?fl Obey, David R, & Carol Lancaster (1988), Op Cit. p.
152.
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World War influx of U.S. aid, have "graduated" into the 
category of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), no longer 
in need of assistance. As a consequence, economic or trade 
concerns will be increasingly determinant of aid allocation.^*
Conditionalities for U.S. foreign aid will be harder for
22some Developing countries. Not only political
conditionalities, such as the introduction of democratic 
values and the promotion of human rights, but also economic 
conditionalities, such as economically and environmentally 
sound government management practices will be imposed by the 
U.S. on recipient countries through the Structural Adjustment 
Program advocated by the World Bank. The Task Force on Foreign 
Assistance has recommended to change old Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 with a new International Economic Cooperation Act
Cf. Morss, Elliott R. & Victoria A. Morss ( 1986), TJhe 
Future of Western Development Assistance. Boulder & London: 
Westview Press. They give a new insight in the discussion on 
ODA by looking at the emergence of NICs and the steady-growth 
Developing economies. One of their hypotheses (pp.101-8) on 
the future possibilities of international cooperation is that 
technical exchange programs are to replace technical 
assistance activities.
One proposal of U.S. aid policies for the 21st century 
drafted by the U.S. AID demonstrates that the disbursement of 
assistance should be directly tied to overcoming the economic 
problems faced by U.S. economy. In this position, aid should 
be coordinated with other economic activities such as trade, 
investment, and debt problem. See U.S. Agency for 
International Development (1989), Development and the National 
Interest: U.S. Economic Assistance into the 21st Century, A 
Report by the Administrator, 17 February, Washington, D.C.: 
AID. This study is customarily referred to as the Woods 
Report, after the then AID Administrator, Alan Woods.
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of 1989 which would specify four major foreign economic policy 
objectives, namely:
1. Growth = Encouragement of broad based economic-growth.
2. Env i ronmental sustainabi 1 i ty= Improved environmental, 
natural resources, and agricultural management.
3. Poverty aJleviation = Human Resources Development 
aimed at improving the well-being of the poor and 
their capacity to become productive citizens.
4. Plural ism = Promotion of political, social and 
economic pluralism.
C. THE U.S. FOREIGN AID PRACTICES TO INDONESIA
1. FEATURES OF U.S. AID
In the first years of Soeharto’s coming to power, the 
U.S. was the largest donor for Indonesia. The U.S. ODA inflows 
reached its peak in 1971 and decreased in 1972. This pattern 
of decrease feature went along with the trend of total ODA 
disbursed by the U.S. (See table 3.1., column 2 and 3, below) 
and since 1974, its position as the largest ODA provider has 
been taken over by Japan (See column 3 and 5 of the same 
table). In general, in the 1970s, U.S. ODA inflows to
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(1989), Report of the Task Force on Foreign Assistance to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. February, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office (GPO), pp. 29-30.
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Indonesia was subject to considerable fluctuation, reflecting 
U.S. political security interests at stake in Indonesia, which 
will be further explained below.
From 1980 onward, it can generally be said that the 
inflows of U.S. ODA to Indonesia has been continuously reduced 
and substantially so as of the mid-1980s. This reduction, to 
some extent, can be seen as a reflection of the budget deficit 
cutting efforts of the Gramm-Rudman-(Ho I 1ings) Act in effect 
as of 1986. The U.S. position as foreign assistance provider 
to Indonesia has been surpassed by other Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) countries of the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), such as West 
Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, and France.
In concessionary terms, the grant element of U.S. ODA to 
Indonesia in last ten years roughly averaged at 82.3 percent. 
This is well below the average grant element in the total ODA 
disbursed by the U.S. over the same period. Total U.S. ODA in 
this period had a grant element of 95.5 p e r cent.In this 
context, assistance for Indonesia was a little bit less 
concessional than aid disbursed by the U.S. to other 
countries. As mentioned in the previous chapter, compared with 
ODA from other DAC countries, U.S. aid has the second least 
grant element after that of Japan.
This average percentage comes from the calculation of 
existing data provided by OECD (series). Geographical
Distribution of Financial Flows to Deve1 op ing . Count ries,
Paris: OECD. They have provided such data as of the ODA
disbursement in 1983.
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Table 3.1.: Bilateral ODA (to Indonesia) from the U.S. and
Japan (in million US dollar)






Japan ODA to 
Indonesia
1969 2,754 151.0 339.7 65 .8
1 970 2,646 186.0 371.5 125.8
1971 2,866 227.0 432.0 111.9
1972 2,714 158.0 447.8 103 . 2
1973 2,341 158.0 765 . 2 142.9
1974 2,542 82.0 880.4 221 . 1
1975 2,927 91 .0 850.4 197.9
1976 2,838 127.0 753 .0 200.5
1977 2,897 102.0 899.2 148.4
1978 3,474 142.0 1,531.0 227.6
1979 4,076 181.0 1,968.8 226.9
1980 4,366 117.0 2,010. 1 350.0
1981 4,317 103.0 2,260.4 299.8
1982 4,861 72.0 2,367.3 294.6
1983 5,563 80.0 2,425.2 235.5
1984 6,457 61 .0 2,427.4 167.7
1985 8,182 43 .0 2,556.9 161 .3
1986 7,602 46.0 3,846.3 160.1
1987 7,007 36.0 5,134.8 707.3
1988 6,765 22.0 6,421 .9 984.9
1989 6,826 31.0 6,778.5 1,145.3
1990 8,367 31 .0 6,788.5 867.8





) , Geographical Distribution of Financial 
Countries, pp. 153 & 315.
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2 . U . S .  INTERESTS IN  SOUTHEAST ASIA
The presence of the U.S. in Southeast Asia, at least 
until the end of the Cold War period, has been generally 
driven by political security interests despite the growth of 
other interests such as trade, investment, and access to raw 
materials. A study conducted by a Committee on Foreign 
Relations asserted that three major objectives shaping the 
U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia were as follows.
We firmly support the progress and stability of our 
ASEAN friends and allies as the heart of our policy 
toward Southeast Asia.
In cooperation with ASEAN, we seek to restrain the 
aggressive ambitions of Vietnam.
We seek to curb the growing Soviet military presence 
and influence in the region.
On the basis of our review of the trend of the U.S. foreign 
assistance inflows to the region, it can be argued that 
political security interests have always been a dominant force 
for the U.S. involvement in the region. Foreign aid is 
allegedly and apparently used as a significant tool of the
25 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Relations
(1982), United States Relations with ASEAN (Th a iJa nd,
Indonesia. Malaysia. Singapore, and the PhijjRpines.Hong 
Kong, and Laos. Washington, D.C.: GPO, p.58. Along with the 
recognized objectives, Krause argues that the countries in the 
region "are of great political and strategic importance in 
themselves because they straddle crucial sea-lanes and are 
neighbors of troubled Indochina." 5>ee Krause, Lawrence B.
(1982) , U.S. Economic Policy towa.d the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations: Meeting the Japanese Challenge,
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institutions, p.68.
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U.S. intervention in the Third World. Although the U.S. 
assistance program is commonly accused of having failed in 
promoting economic growth, they have strengthened the defense 
of some nations.^®
The Southeast Asian region to which Indonesia belongs has 
been regarded by the U.S. as a strategic region in the context 
of the U.S. global foreign policy of containing Soviet or 
Communism. In his reflective thought on the Containment 
policy which he initiated, Kennan asserts that what is the 
immediate factor the policy addresses is not the threat of 
Soviet military aggression but its political ideology which 
gives an alternative for many of the then newly independent 
countries colonialized for many years by Western countries. As 
his interview reads.
The objective is not to contain the threat of Russian 
military because the condition of her so devastated. No 
nuclear weapon, 25 million of its people died and 
physical destruction need to be reconstructed. What 
Kennan thinks was the potentiality of ideological and 
political threat. The communist party in the world is so
Bandow, Doug (1992), "Economic and Military Aid," in 
Schraeder, Peter J. (ed.). Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. 
Foreign Policy in the Third World. Second Edition, Boulder & 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 92.
27 The source of Soviet containment policy firstly 
allegedly comes from the article titled "The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct," written by George F. Kennan under the pseudonym "X" 
in Foreign Affairs. July 1947. It is reprinted in Foreign 
Affairs. Vol. 65 No. 4, Spring 1987, pp. 852-68.
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unified discipline movement under the control of the 
Stalin regime in Moscow.
The first chosen instrument of containment was economic 
assistance provided for Western Europe countries through the 
Marshall Plan. But as the theater of intense ideological 
conflict moved from Europe to the Asian continent 
characterized by the eruption of the Korean War in early 
1950s, U.S. foreign aid shifted towards Asia. This was the 
case until the end of 1970s, at which point the largest share 
of U.S. foreign assistance has gene to the Middle East, 
especially and exclusively to Egypt and Israel, as a 
consequence of the application of Camp David agreement.
Southeast Asia has been important to the U.S. because it 
is one of the areas where the Soviet Union attempted to break 
out of Western containment. The enthusiasm of containment in 
the region is echoed by the "domino theory" first evolved in 
the National Security Council in January 1954 and accepted by 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower as a policy guideline in 
dealing with the region. The domino theory predicted that the 
falling down of any single country in Southeast Asia into 
Communist control would lead to the neighboring country in the 
region becoming the next victim. The theory assumed that "if 
some key nation or geographical region falls into communist
Deibel, Terry L. & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.) (1987),
Containing the Soviet Union: A Critique of U.S.__Policy,
Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense
Publishers), p.16.
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control, a string of other nations will subsequently topple 
’like a row of d o m i n o e s ' T h i s  threat, and the validity of 
this domino theory became evident with the consolidation by 
Vietnam of its control over all of Indochina in the mid 1970s.
As the political security motive drives the U.S. to deal 
with the region generally, its important significance can also 
be seen with respect to aid relations between the U.S. and 
Indones ia.
3. INTERPRETATION OF U.S. AID INFLOWS TO INDONESIA
The emergence of Soeharto’s New Order government can be 
seen as the victory of the military in Indonesian politics 
against the Communist party. In his last years, Soekarno tried 
to keep his power by mobilizing popular support from the PKI 
as a balance to the increasingly strong position of the 
military. The political power constellation of Indonesia at 
that time was pictured as a struggle of "three" political 
actors, in which Soekarno as a balancer and at the same time 
as a manipulator of the conflicting two (PKI and military). 
That military came out as a winner could not be completely 
separated from U.S. support. The main motive driving the U.S. 
to prop up Soeharto was due to the Soekarno’s supportive
Esterline, John H. & Mae H. Esterline (1990), "How the 
Dominoes Fell": Southeast Asia in Perspective. Lanham, 
Maryland: University Press of America, p. 4.
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political attitude towards Communist bloc and hostility 
against the West.
Actually, the U.S. had been involved in Indonesian 
politics since the mid-19: s in efforts to topple down the 
Soekarno regime.At that time, the Central Intelligence of 
America (CIA) backed up the secessionist revolutionary 
movement in Padang (West Sumatra) by supplying them military 
equipment and its military pilot with a base camp in the 
Philippines. The Padang rebellion was one of the center- 
periphery (regional) conflicts the Indonesian government has 
had to contend with, and it will potentially occur in the 
future. In that involvement, one American military aircraft 
was shot down by the Indonesian government and its pilot was 
caught.
However, there some factors that have made the position 
of Indonesia so important to the U.S. that it has assiduously 
kept up friendly relations, and a hospitable political 
orientation towards the government of Indonesia, even without 
treating it as her ally. First, geographically Indonesia
lies across the sea lines of communication between the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans. A hostile Indonesia could aeny passage
Tilman, Robert O, ( 1987), Southeast_Asja and the. F n e m y
Bevond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Th re a t s, Boulder &
London: Westview Press, pp.129-31.
For the involvement of CIA in Padang revolt, see 
Worthy, William (1966), The Silent Slaughter. New York; Youth 
Against War and Fascism, as cited by Selden, Mark (ed.) 
( 1974) , Remaking Asia: Essays on the American _U s.e s ,p f__ Ppwe r, 
New York: Pantheon Books, especially pp.21-49.
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through the waters controlled by its archipelago and thus 
immensely complicate the logistics of American power 
projection into the Persian Gulf area. This strategic position 
often recalls a dilemma for decision makers in the U.S. in 
dealing with Indonesia. The Indonesian authoritarian regime is 
often accused of having abused democracy and human rights, but 
strategically it could contain Communism. A dilemma faced by 
the U.S. is whether to help them or to punish them.
Second, Indonesia has abundant natural resources, 
especially oil. This strategic natural resource has tended to 
dictate the formulation of U.S. policy towards Indonesia. As 
Richard M. Nixon (1969-74) put it: "Indonesia, which has big 
population and natural resources, constitutes the greatest 
prize in the Southeast Asian area."^ The factor of accessible 
oil in Indonesia again appears to be the second priority 
(after Western Europe) in a general strategic planning 
elaborated by Pentagon officials for the Defense Secretary in 
May 1982. in case of world war with the Soviet Union.^ The
See Pauker, Guy (1991), "Indonesia under Suharto: The 
Benefits of Aloofness," in Pipes, Daniel & Adam Garfinkle 
(eds.), Friendly Tyrants. An American Dilemma. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, pp. 379-99.
Ping, Ho Kwon (1982), "ASEAN: The Five Countries," in 
Droinowski, Alison (ed.). Understanding ASEAN. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, p. 229.
Wionczek, Miguel S. (1991), "Energy and International 
Security in the 1980s: Realities or Misperceptions?" in
Ahooja-Patel, Krishna, et. el. (eds.). World Economy in 
Transition: Essays Presented to Surendra Patel. New Delhi; 
Ashish Publishers, p. 76.
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U.S. oil companies operating in Indonesia participated in the 
U.S. government’s attempt to topple the Soekarno regime.
Having recognized those factors, the U.S. has had a two­
fold interest in Indonesia. Maintenance of stability in 
Indonesia is necessary because of its strategic position and 
rich mineral wealth. But another major reason has been U.S. 
efforts to establish a bulwark against Communism/**
As Soeharto came to power, there was a promising shift of 
Indonesia’s political stance towards pro-Western orientation. 
Immediately after Soeharto came to power, he banned the PKI 
and the slaughter of PKI members soon spread across the 
Indonesian islands, with the killing mostly happening in 
Central and East Java. The U.S. direct involvement in the PKI 
massacre is apparent. The U.S. embassy in Jakarta provided the 
army a list of PKI members which "targeted" to be killed. The 
CIA was deeply involved in the bloodbath by training the army 
and manipulating and dramatizing the news of the death of top- 
ranked generals killed by the PKI members so as to fire the 
popular hatred against the Communists. A research study
Mody, Nawaz B. (1987), Indonesia Under Suharto. New 
York: APT Books, Inc., p. 51. The lobby of oil companies was 
so influential in forcing the U.S. to threat to take a firm 
measure against Soekarno’s regime if they nationalized all 
Western-owned oil companies. Soekarno, in fact, did not 
nationalize the companies. See, Payer, Cheryl ( 1974), The_De_bt 




conducted by the CIA acknowledges the U.S. backed PKI massacre 
as "one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century."
In the first years Soeharto came to power, the U.S. 
provided ample foreign assistance. The amount continuously 
increased until 1971 when Indonesia received the third largest 
share of total U.S.’ disbursed ODA, after India and Vietnam. 
For the Soeharto regime, U.S. was at that time his largest 
donor. This significant amount represented what could be said 
to be a "reward" for the Soeharto regime for its pro-Western 
political orientation. The New Order government’s Western 
oriented policy was supported if not directed by the 
appointment of the American-trained bureaucrats who hold key 
positions in formulating Indonesian economic development 
planning. Three of five Economic ministers graduated from 
Berkeley University. They are Wijoyo Nitisastro, Emil Salim, 
and Ali Wardhana. They are collectively often called as 
"Berkeley Mafia". Their policy if, still influential until 
recently and one of them, Wijoyo Nitisastro, is still in the 
position of the advisor to President on Economic Affairs.
The "Berkeley Mafia" is the example of the importance of 
education as an arm of statecraft to contain Communism. The 
intellectuals and bureaucrats which will potentially hold the 
key position in the decision making process are "worked out" 
in order to have an expected intellectual and political
Scott, Peter Dale (1985), "The United States and the 
Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967," Pacific Affairs. Vol. 58 No. 
2, Summer, p. 240.
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orientation. They are given a scholarship to be trained within 
the American (Western) accepted values circumstances.
This containment method as the complement of providing 
foreign assistance has been systematically conducted by the 
U.S. since 1950s. As acknowledged by Dean Rusk, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, in 1952,
"to contain Communist aggression, not just to train 
American to combat it in Pacific but also to open 
training facilities for increasing numbers of our friends 
from across the Pacific.'
To implement this policy Ford Foundation working together with 
Rockefeller Foundation provided scholarship granted to 
Indonesian intellectuals to study at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT), Cornell, Berkeley, and Harvard. As a 
result, in the first "Development Cabinet" of Soeharto’s, of 
seven influential positions for formulating economic 
(’evelopment program, only one was held by the alumnus outside 
the U.S.’ universities. The rest are in the hands of the 
graduated from Berkeley (four). Harvard (one), and MIT 
(one) .
Ransom, David (1975), "Ford Country: Building on Elite 
for Indonesia," in Weissman, Steve (ed.), ThA-Xrpj.an_.Hpr.se,. A 
Radical Look at Foreign Aid. Palo Alto, California: Ramparts 
Press, p. 95.
Ransom, David (1975), Ibid. p.110. For the importance 
of the education and training program in the U.S. foreign aid 
program, see also Naya, Seiji (1988), The Role of U.S. 
Economic Aid in Promoting Development. Implications for Tradej. 
Investment, and Human Resource Development, Honolulu, Hawaii:
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In 1972 the amount of the U.S. ODA inflows decreased 
around 35 percent of the previous year’s and remained at the 
same rate in the following year, that is, $158 million before 
falling again in 1974, to almost 50 percent down from this 
figure. This declining trend can be explained from both sides 
with the consideration that the aid inflow cut did not bother 
the political security concerns of the U.S. in Indonesia and 
generally in the region. First, as explained in section B.3. 
above, the American tax-payers suffered from "aid fatigue" as 
a result of squandering money for political purposes in 
Vietnam. Second, at that time Indonesia was inundated by oil 
money as a consequence of quadrupling oil price hike. It was 
assumed that oil money would compensate the falling of aid 
inflows without leaving any significant political stability 
problem.
In 1975, the Portuguese authorities gave up maintaining 
its power control over the colony of East Timor. This led to 
the political stability caused by the fighting among the 
various political factions there. In 5 November 1975, the 
anti-Indonesian dominant leftist group called Fretilin came to 
power and claimed East Timor to be an independent country. For 
Indonesia, Fretilin’s coming to power was regarded as a 
serious threat for its national security. This concern was 
also shared by the U.S. Since August 1975, Henry Kissinger
Resource System Institute, East-West Center,
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(then U.S. State Secretary) had signalled Jakarta that the 
U.S. would agree to the Indonesians’ invasion of East Timor.
On December 5, 1975, while the U.S. President Gerald R. 
Ford (1974-77) accompanied by Kissinger was visiting President 
Soeharto, the Indonesian government gave a briefing foreign 
ambassadors on the East Timor situation which was increasingly 
aggravating for Indonesia’s national security.Two days 
later, on 7 December 1975 or one day after Ford and Kissinger 
left Jakarta, the Indonesian sea and air forces invaded East 
Timor and seized the Capital. It is clear that the Indonesian 
invasion of East Timor was fully supported by the U.S. which 
sought to contain Communism and which had just witnessed the 
falling down of Indochina region into Communism. Kissinger is 
once noted to argue that "we can’t construe a Communist 
government in the middle of Indonesia."** He was quite certain 
that "No one has complained that it was aggression. Indonesia 
did a self-defense."*^
It is estimated that 60,000 people were killed during the 
clash and 100,000 people or 15 percent of the population died 
mostly of disease and starvation.*^ On 17 July 1976, East 
Timor became 27st province of Indonesia. The U.S. accepted the
*** Esterline & Esterline (1990), Op Cit. p.316.
** Hertsgaard, Mark (1990), "Arms and the Man," New 
Statesman & Societv. Vol. 3 No. 125, 2 November, pp.17-9.
*̂ Ibid.
** Esterline & Esterline (1990), Op Cit. p.316.
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incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia in the same year 
and this position has not changed under Carter administration 
(1977-81) which is allegedly strong in campaigning the 
promotion and protection of human rights.**
In this period, the trend of U.S. ODA inflows 
demonstrated a relatively continuing increase, except in 1977 
which showed a slight decrease. This figure becomes more 
interesting when we compare it to the total U.S. bilateral 
ODA. In 1976, while there was a decrease in total U.S. 
bilateral ODA, from $2.9 billion to 2.8 billion, in the figure 
of U.S. ODA disbursed for Indonesia there was a significant 
increase, from $91 million to $127 million. This trend shows 
that the political security motive of Communist containment 
was still a dominant factor in determining aid allocation or 
d i sbursement.
In addition, the U.S. also had pledged $5.5 million 
assistance over a period of 3 years for East Timor 
development, besides contributing $2.3 million in funds 
channelled through the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) program and $11.04 million in funds and 
commodities through the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) 
efforts.*^ The rationale for providing these funds, without 
denying the humanitarian motives, goes along within the
** U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Relations 
(1982), OP Cit. p.53.
*■ Ibid.
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context of containment policy. The worse the economic 
conditions, the more susceptible the region to Communist 
infiltration or penetration. Therefore, to contain Communist 
influence and preventing it from blooming or flourishing it 
was necessary to restore and promote socio-economic 
conditions.
In 1980s, the figure of aid inflows from the U.S. 
demonstrated a constant tendency to decrease. Some factors can 
be mentioned to explain this decline. First, the economy of 
the U.S. increasingly suffered from a deficit. Second, since 
the Camp David Accord was in effect, the Middle East, 
including the Gulf Area, was regarded as the intense 
antagonistic theater which was given high priority. As the 
security priority moved from Asia to the Middle East, so did 
the aid transfer from the U.S.
D. U.S. AID INFLOWS IN THE FUTURE
In the years to come, the aid inflows from the U.S. will 
be slugyish. It is so because of not only the economic 
problems hardly hit the U.S. such as burdensome deficit in her 
balance of payment and high rate of unemployment but also the 
end of the long lasting cold war era which makes the political 
security justification of providing aid lose ground. Although 
it almost does not make any difference, the total amount of
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U.S. ODA disbursed both for (bilateral) Developing countries 
and multilateral institutions in 1991 showed tendency to 
decrease, from $11,394 to $11,362 million. It means that in 
1990, the total amount of ODA was .21 percent of Gross 
National Product (GNP) while in 1991 it decreased to only .20 
percent, a figure which is quite far from the expected 
target
In addition. Its disbursement will be strictly tied. Its 
conditionalities will be harsh. The time of the avalanche and 
easiness of foreign aid is over with the ending of the era of 
cold war. Foreign aid will be more directed to the country 
whose economic performance demonstrates reasonable prospects. 
It will go to the countries which are willing to take the 
recipe of Structural Adjustment Program. Political 
conditionalities, such as the protection of human rights and 
the introduction of democratic values which were often denied 
in the Cold war era will be seriously tied to the disbursement 
of aid.
In the Cold war era, we did not see the application of 
human rights as one of the conditionalities for aid 
disbursement. The human rights principles were marginally used
Having studied from the "Pearson report", the United 
Nation (U.N.) set up the first "Development decade" in the 
late 1960s for which the Developed industrialized countries 
were urged to transfer their money to the Developing countries 
at one percent of their own GNP (0.7 percent of GNP for ODA). 
The figure of U.S. ODA comes from OECD (various years). 
Development Co-operation.
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as a conditionality for aid disbursement.^^ The Ford 
administration kept providing aid to Indonesia although they 
received criticism within both Congress and House to reduce or 
stop it because of human rights violations of ex-PKl member 
detainee. The Carter administration. which allegedly 
intended to promote and protect human rights practices, 
supported Indonesian action in East Timor and gave addition 
foreign aid to Indonesia.
With the ending of Cold war era, everything has changed. 
U.S. ODA decreased almost 50 percent in 1991, from $31 to $18 
million. In 1992, the Congress passed a foreign aid bill which 
froze $2.3 million in defence training aid to Indonesia in 
protest of the "Dili incidence" in which 50 separatist 
demonstrators were killed by the Indonesian military in 
November 1991.^^ Actually the U.S. measure followed the 
cancellation or suspension of aid from the Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Canada. The Clinton administration has adopted a 
tougher stance on rights violations. In late April, the U.S.
Forsythe, David P. (1989), "U.S. Economic Assistance 
and Human Rights: Why the Emperor Has (Almost) No Clothes," in
Forsythe (ed. ) , Human Rights and Development. Internat.iona 1
Views. London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., p.174-9.
Newsom, David D. (1985), "Release in Indonesia," in 
Newsom (ed.). The Diplomacy of Human Rights. Lanham, MD. : 
University Press of America and Georgetown University, 
Washington, D.C.: The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 
pp.101-9.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Relations 
(1982), Op Cit. p.52-4.
Far Eastern Economic Review. October 22, 1992, p.14.
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supported a resolution of the U.N. Human Rights Commission 
expressing "deep concerns” over violations in East Timor. 
Under the Reagan and Bush administrations, the U.S. helped to 
block similar resolutions. When the Consultative Group for 
Indonesia (CGI) agree to provide more aid (and loans) to 
Indonesia, the U.S. stiil criticizes the practice of human 
rights in Indonesia and its share in CGI decreases.
In the years to come U.S. ODA inflows to Indonesia will 
be more sluggish. Political factors such as introduction of 
democratic values and promotion of human rights as explained 
above will still play an important role in the disbursement of 
ODA from the U.S. Another factor which will determine the 
trend of U.S. ODA inflows to Indonesia is the economic 
performance of Indonesia itself. As the Indonesian economic 
grows steadily, the foreign assistance inflows from the U.S. 
will be increasingly reduced or at least kept at the same 
level as the previous year. Only if there is a drastic 
political change in Indonesia which will disturb domestic 
stability, will U.S. ODA inflows increase.
E. CONCLUSION
Since the New Order government of Indonesia came to 
power, the U.S. provided the largest share of total foreign
"Acungan Jempol bagi Kebijaksanaan Makro" (Prize for 
Macro Policies), Tempo. 10 Juli 1993, p.72.
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aid Soeharto administration received. The U.S. aid inflows 
could be regarded as ’’reward" for the Soeharto administration 
whose political orientation tends to be pro-Western. 
Geographically, Indonesia has strategic meaning in the context 
of global containment policy pursued by the U.S. Having failed 
in Vietnam (or Indochina as general), the U.S. did not want to 
see the "domino theory" work in neighboring countries.
Therefore, when an Anti-Indonesian, leftist dominant group, 
called Fretilin, proclaimed East Timor as an independent 
country, the U.S. enthusiastically supported the Indonesian
invasion in the second half of 1970s. The U.S. ODA inflows at
that time demonstrated a relative increase. The U.S. did not 
want to see a Communist country exist in the middle of
Indones ia.
Indonesia benefitted by the intense ideological conflict 
between Communism and the Western bloc in the region. Since 
the late 1970s, U.S. political security considerations have 
been directed to the Middle East (including Persian Gulf) area 
in which the "hot war" could easily erupt. Meanwhile the
political stability of Indonesia appears assured, accompanied 
by steady economic growth. These conditions explain the 
falling of the U.S. ODA inflows in this period.
For the future, there is no reason the trend of U.S. ODA 
inflows will rise. Some factors which support this argument
are as follows. As the Cold war era draws to an end, the
political security justification of aid disbursement loses its
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base. The U.S. balance of payments has been relatively high 
deficit, accompanied by the problems of unemployment and 
inflation at home. It makes the U.S. not only adjust her trade 
relationship with her large trading partners in the region 
such as Japan and NICs but also to cut off ODA in real terms. 
The "old" dimensions, such as human rights and support of 
democratic values, which were always overshadowed by a 
security justification, will be apparently accentuated in the 
future of the aid program. U.S. ODA inflows to Indonesia will 
not be exempt from such conditionalities. From the side of 
Indonesia, Soeharto regime can maintain the steady economic 
growth and domestic political stability. This good economic 
and political performance also becomes a factor which 
contributes to the declining of the U.S. aid inflows to 
Indonesia.
Only if there is a dramatic political change in 
Indonesian politics which is deemed able to unexpectedly 
disturb the stability in the region, will U.S. ODA inflows be 
higher than at the present. The only reasonable feature of 
financial transfers to Indonesia in the years to come will be 
in terms of commercial loans, foreign direct investment, and 
other such issues of economic interest to the U.S.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICS OF AID: 
JAPAN - INDONESIA RELATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
As a donor country, Japan is in many ways quite different 
from the U.S. With her Marshall Plan, as described in the 
preceding chapter, the U.S. was a pioneer in evolving the 
practice of foreign aid as we understand it now. Japan, on the 
other hand, is a latecomer in the club of donor countries, as 
a result of the U.S.’ pressure through San Francisco peace 
treaty. Unlike the U.S., Japan arose from the devastation of 
World War II on the strength of aid from other countries and 
international organizations before becoming the largest donor 
for 25 nations in the Developing world.* As a country in the 
losing side of the War, Japan is restricted from developing 
its military capability. This condition, in turn, influences 
its policy and practice of foreign aid. Almost all scholars 
studying Japanese aid program say that for more than two 
decades Japan did not have an aid philosophy. In fact, Japan
Japan once was one of the largest recipient of foreign 
aid (the second, after India) from the World Bank. The last 
payment of the financing from the Bank was in 1989. For the 
list of the countries which receive ODA from Japan as the 
largest of their donors, see Yasutomo, Dennis T. (1989-90), 
"Why Aid? Japan As An ’Aid Great Power’," Pacific Affairs. 
Vol.62 No.4, Winter, p.490.
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ties aid to its economic interests such as opening the markets 
for their products abroad, developing their business interests 
by investing in the recipient countries, and securing natural 
resource supplies from the Developing countries. Until the 
last decade, the appearance of Japanese foreign aid was one 
dimensional, driven by an economic rationale. In addition, 
only recently does Japanese aid go beyond the Asian border, 
although it is still concentrated in Asian countries. Of the 
ten largest recipient of its ODA, only one, i.e. Turkey, is 
not from Asia.
Problems in the way Japan disburses its aid are 
compounded by the quantity and the quality of its aid. In 
1991, the share of Japan’s Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to Gross National Product (GNP) was 0.32 percent, 
slightly below the DAC average of 0.35 percent. It ranks the 
sixteenth of 18 donor countries. In terms of quality, the aid 
from Japan is considered as less concessional than that from 
other Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries’. This 
figure is of course unexpected, coming as it does from a donor 
which enjoys relatively stable economic growth and a 
persistent trade surplus. Therefore, many have expected more 
from Japan in improving her aid program. The expectation is in 
fact supported by recent statistics on Japan’s foreign aid 
which in 1988 and 1989 temporarily surpassed that disbursed by 
the U.S. In the years ahead, Japan will be under increasing 
pressure not only in terms of enlarging the total amount of
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aid but also in terms of improving the concessionary part of 
it. At the same time, the orientation and rationale of its aid 
program are under strong criticisms.
Since the New Order government of Soeharto came to power, 
Japan has played a significant role in propping up financially 
Indonesia’s economic development program. It was Japan which 
firstly appealed the Western donor countries to come together 
to discuss Indonesia’s debt rescheduling. This effort 
continued to the creation of Inter Governmental Group on 
Indonesia (IGGI), as explained in chapter two. Actually, 
Indonesia has been the largest recipient of Japan’s ODA for 
more than three decades and only some time in the 1980s was 
its position taken place by other Asian countries. Since 1974, 
Japan has been the largest donor for Indonesia, replacing the 
U.S.
We argue that Japan has been providing a significant 
amount of aid to Indonesia because Indonesia geographically 
and demographically can serve to fulfil Japan’s economic 
interests, and in fact has done so. Indonesia has been 
supplying natural resources, such as oil. Liquid Natural Gas 
(LNG), timber, iron ore, and aluminum, needed for Japan’s 
industries. Indonesia is in a strategic position, lying 
between two oceans (the Indian and Pacific) through which 
passage is made to and from Japan. Together with neighboring 
Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia controls the Strait of 
Malacca and the Straits of Sunda and Lombok. These three
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straits are passageways for vessels that come and go to Japan. 
With nearly 190 million people, Indonesia is also regarded as 
a huge potential market for Japan’s industries.
This chapter will be divided into five sections. Section 
A is an introduction. Section B will examine the evolution of 
Japan’s foreign aid program. This section will look at the 
continuity and improvement of Japan’s aid program. The 
mechanism of aid policy- making and the way it is disbursed 
will also be briefly reviewed. Section C will review the 
implementation of aid policy in the context of Indonesia. This 
section will interpret the trends of Japan’s aid inflows to 
Indonesia. Section D will propose some possibilities of 
Japanese aid to Indonesia in the years ahead. The conclusion 
will be given in the last section.
B. EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE AID PROGRAM
Japan provided foreign aid for the first time in early 
1950s, although some scholars mention that the Japanese ODA 
program began in earnest in 1960s.^ The concept "foreign aid"
Prominent scholars such as Okita, Caldwell, Rix, and 
Hasegawa date the first Japanese foreign aid practice in early 
1950s at the time the Export-Impor t Bank of Japan was 
established (1950) and the first reparation payment was 
concluded (1954). Whereas Yamaguchi, the chairman of Japan’s 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), argues that Japan 
"became a true donor nation" not until mid-1960s. This 
argument is based on the year of the creation of OECF of 1961 
and the initiatives originated from Japan herself to disburse
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itself in the first decade of Japan’s aid program did not come 
explicitly as the one which should be dealt with seriously and 
independently. The program of aid was always included in the 
larger concept of "economic cooperation" encompassing other 
elements such as trade and investment. Before examining the 
evolution of the Japanese aid program, it is noteworthy to 
mention some features of the program.
First, the Japanese government’s aid program does not 
seem to go along with a humanitarian point of view. It is not 
inspired by a motive to contribute to global prosperity or the 
moral principle that rich countries should give assistance to 
poor countries. There is a tendency for Japan to disburse its 
foreign aid because of external pressure, i.e. all the other 
developed countries have undertaken such a program. "Aid seems 
to be as little more than the price of admission to the club 
of rich countries," one Japanese scholar, Koichi Mera, 
acknowledges
This assertion is supported by three conditions. First, 
The level of Japan’s ODA as a percentage of GNP is always low. 
It was never beyond a ratio of 0.29 percent, well below the 
DAC average of 0.35 percent. Only recently, since 1987, has 
the ratio gone beyond 0.30 percent, but it remains below the
aid, instead of the disbursement of externally pressured 
reparations payment. See the interview with Yamaguchi in 
"Directing Japan’s Aid Efforts", Japan Echo. Vol.XVI, No.l, 
Spring 1989, pp.8-12.
 ̂ Mera, Koichi (1989), "Problems in the Aid Program," 
Japan Echo. Vol.XVI, No.l, Spring, p.13.
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DAC average. Second, Japan is stingy in term of the "grant 
element". For the last ten years, it is only 66.8 percent, the 
lowest among 18 DAC countries, whereas the average for DAC 
countries is 93.2 percent. Third, Japanese aid is heavily 
"tied" to purchases from Japanese suppliers. It is commonly 
known that "companies in other countries have a hard time 
participating in the business generated by Japan’s grant and 
loans even when this aid is untied."*
The second prominent feature of Japan’s aid program is 
that in disbursing its aid, Japan concentrates geographically 
in Asia, and most of it goes to the Southeast Asian countries. 
Since 1970-71, Four Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) countries, namely Indonesia, the Philippines,
Thailand, and Malaysia, have enjoyed the lion’s share of 
Japan’s ODA. In 1990-91 the geographic total gross
disbursement of ODA in percentage terms is as follows. Sub- 
Sahara Africa received 11.5 percent of the total. Asia 
received the lion’s share, 68.5 percent. The Middle East and 
North Africa received 11.7 percent, while Latin America and 
the Caribbean received only 8.3 percent. Of the ten largest 
recipient countries, only one two countries are not from Asia; 
Egypt in 1980-81 and Turkey in 1990-91. As recipients of 
Japanese ODA, they are ranked eighth and seventh
* Ibid. p.14.
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respectively.^ The geographical concentration of aid 
disbursements is not merely driven by the neighboring region 
and historical (colonial) ties which exist between Japan and 
the Asian recipients. The pattern of aid relations is largely 
influenced by or in accordance with Japan's pursuit of 
economic capitalism. These countries are regarded as both a 
market and as natural resource suppliers for Japanese 
industries. As a resource-poor country, Japan heavily depends 
on imports from these countries to run its industries, as 
recognized by the chairman of Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund (OECF), "Japan can’t live in isolation from international 
society; our country depends on other countries for 
survival.
Third, Japan prefers to disburse project aid to program 
aid. This is so because ODA is defined as a tool to encourage 
private investment by providing infrastructure.^ As 
comparison, in 1975-76 Japan’s aid disbursed for 
infrastructure uses accounted for 40 percent and the share of 
program assistance was only 0.1 percent. In 1989-90, 
infrastructure-related aid became 51 percent of total ODA
 ̂ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (1992), Development Co-operation. 1992 Report, Paris;
OECD, p. A-18 & A-60.
 ̂ "Directing Japan’s Aid Efforts," Qp._C_i_t, p.8.
 ̂ Healey, Derek (1991), Japanese. Capital Expp.r t s__ and
Asian Economic Development. ParisiOECD, p.106.
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disbursements and program assistance jumped to 19 percent. 
Critics of Japan’s ODA assert that in disbursing its aid, 
Japan traditionally has focused on growth with scant attention 
to poverty.® Japan’s ODA is heavily disbursed for projects 
on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, ignoring the human 
aspects. Japan concentrates on big-scale projects which 
provide quick-benefits for Japanese business and industry, 
neglecting the basic human needs of people. They dub Japanese 
ODA as "Official Destruction and Alienation".^®
Japan also gives less technical assistance. Its share in 
Japan’s ODA disbursed in 1989-90 averaged only 13.7 percent, 
far below the 21.0 percent DAC average in the same period. Its 
position is twelfth of 18 DAC countries. The main reason for 
this is that technical assistance is not commercially 
attractive. When ODA is directed towards technical assistance, 
much of the expenditure will go to pay technicians. In fact, 
a large portion of the cost of financial aid goes towards 
materials and machinery because it commercially benefits 
Japanese economy. This reason is coupled with a lack of 
linguistic capability of Japanese experts. On this situation.
' OECD (1992), Op Cit. p.A-19.
® Lewis, John P. (1993), Pro-Poor Aid Conditionality. 
Policy Essay No.8, Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development
Council, p.38.
Schultz, Richard W. (1991), "Japan’s ODA: The Blessings 
and the Bane," Tokyo Business Today. September, Vol.59, No.9,
p. 12.
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a report of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress 
comments :
Externally... Japan has continued to give less priority to 
areas without commercial rewards. Among industrial 
nations it ranks near the bottom in terms of the share of 
its resources devoted to...development assistance. To the 
extent that Japan has provided development assistance, it 
has had a reputation for tying and to purchase of 
Japanese exports.
Fourth, Japan’s aid program is a result of interaction 
between government agencies and private entities.'^ In the 
implementation of aid policy, Japan also relies not only on 
her public institutions and agencies for capital and technical 
assistance activities, but also on private business for the 
provision of credits and investments. There are four ministry 
agencies acting as decisive actors in the process of foreign 
aid policy formulation in Japan. They are directly involved in 
deciding every single yen that Japan disburses. As a result, 
it is quite often that the aid process is characterized by 
frequent interministerial conflict of interests.
As cited by Healey (1991), Op Cit, p.108. from Joint 
Economic Committee (1988), Restoring International Balance: 
Japan’s Trade and Investment Patterns, Washington, D.C., 1st 
July, p.37.
12 For good and comprehensive discussion on how foreign 
aid policy is made in Japanese politics, see Rix, Alan (1980), 
Japan’s Economic Aid. Policy-Making and Politics, New York: 
St. Martin’s Press.
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA, or Gaimusho) acts 
as the "window" for aid through which all request must be 
channeled. The forum of the four-ministry group is chaired by 
the ministry. It also has authority to supervise technical 
assistance activities and disbursement of grant aid. The main 
interest of the ministry, in the context of aid disbursement, 
is to foster stable political relations between Japan and the 
Third World. The Ministry of Finance (MOF, or okurasho) 
exercises considerable influence through its budget-making 
authority. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI, or tsusansho) stresses the commercial aspect of foreign 
aid. The last ministerial agency is the Economic Planning 
Agency (EPA) which emphasizes on the implication for Japan’s 
economic prospects. This agency is legally in charge of 
controlling the activities of ODA disbursement. In addition to 
the above government agencies, certain prominent members of 
zaikai, the business world, also play a significant influence 
during the preparation stage of aid formulation and 
implementation.
On the side of foreign aid program implementation, there 
are four institutions each with a specified domain. The Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), under MFA, handles 
technical assistance and grants. The Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund (OECF) is in charge of disbursing development
Hasegawa, Sukehiro ( 1975), Japanese Foreign Aid. Policv 
and Practice. New York; Praeger Publishers, p.131.
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assistance (ODA). The Export-Import bank of Japan is 
responsible for providing loans at near-commercial rates to 
recipient countries. The last agency is the Japan Overseas 
Development Cooperation (JODC), whose main task is to promote 
industrial development and trade in Developing countries by 
providing required capital for joint-ventures carried out by 
small and medium-sized Japanese companies.
Compared with the U.S., Japan relies more on the private 
sector to implement its aid program. This is reflected in the 
total number of aid personnel stationed abroad. In 1988 the 
Japanese government employed 357 personnel abroad to 
administer aid program related activities. This contrasted 
with U.S. AID which stationed 1,275 American personnel abroad 
and recruited 1,170 foreign nationals for its operations. The 
comparison is also relevant in the case of Indonesia. In 1987, 
Japan posted 26 aid professional in Indonesia to handle over 
$700 million in Japanese aid. In the fiscal year (FY) 1989 AID 
employed 41 Americans and 69 Indonesian people to run a 
program of a little more than $57 million.’̂
Fifth, Japanese foreign aid has consistently appeared for 
more than three decades with its one-dimensional "face". More 
than 15 years ago, Hasegawa argued that "Japanese aid is seen 
as an instrument of Japan’s national policy to serve the
Healey (1991), Op Cit. pp. 126-30.
Orr, Robert M. (1989-90), "Collaboration or Conflict? 
Foreign Aid and U.S. - Japan Relations," Pacific Affairs. 
Vol.62 No.4, Winter, p.481.
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kokueki, or national interest, of ’secularized postwar 
Japan’. W h a t  is the national interest of "secularized 
postwar Japan" is economic interests. Aid disbursement has 
been always driven by economic interests and even it seems 
that until now those motives are still dominant. Japan extends 
aid as a means of increasing its exports, securing adequate 
supplies of natural resources, and creating conducive 
conditions for private investment in the recipient countries. 
As Orr puts it, Japanese aid is exercised "as an extension of 
the notion of Japan Inc. Aid is linked to investment and 
trade, as a means to promote overseas commercial interests.
Historically, Japan’s aid policy can be divided into five 
10stages or periods. It should be borne in mind that when we 
divide the evolution process of Japanese foreign aid policy 
into five stages or periods, one stage encompasses a certain 
period of time and the period will overlap with the next
Hasegawa (1975), Op Cit. p.7.
Orr (1989-90), O p  Cit. p.447.
10 Caldwell, Hasegawa, Orr, and Okita have made the 
periodization of Japanese aid policy history. In making the 
phases of the history, each has a slightly different opinion. 
See Caldwell, J. Alexander (1972), "The Evolution of Japanese 
Economic Cooperation," in Malmgren, Harald B. (ed.). Pacific 
Basin Development: The American Interests. Lexington,
Massachusetts, D.C.: D.C. Heath and Company, pp.31-45;
Hasegawa (1975), Op Cit. pp.11-23.; Orr, Robert M. (1937), 
"The Rising Sun: Japan’s Foreign Aid to ASEAN, the Pacific
Basin and the Republic of Korea," Journal of International 
Affairs. Vol.41 No.l, Summer/Fall, pp.39-62.; Okita, Saburo 
(1990), Approaching the 21st Century; Japan’s Role. Tokyo: The 
Japan Times, Ltd., pp.101-5.
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stage. Through the evolution of foreign aid policy initiatives 
or formulation, we find a prevailing consistency in the motive 
or rationale behind Japan’s provision of aid in every stage or 
period, i.e. for the sake of its economic interests. This does 
not mean that there are no other dimensions, such as the 
political and strategic. These come later in the evolution 
process, but both dimensions are subordinate to the economic 
one. They serve to keep or secure and promote Japan’s economic 
interests.
In the following paragraphs, we would like to make the 
division of Japanese aid policy as follows. Stage one is 
"Reparations payment" which lasts from 1955 to early 1970s. 
Stage two, from 1960 to 1973, is the period when aid is used 
as a means of its Asian Diplomacy, in the search for natural 
resources, besides the promotion of exports. In stage three, 
inspired by the first oil price hike, aid is directed to 
resource-rich countries and nations located on energy shipping 
routes. Stage four occurs in 1980s, when the political and 
strategic dimensions come up to supplement in foreign aid 
program. The last stage appears after the end of the Cold War 
era, in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
1. STAGE ONE: REPARATIONS PAYMENT, 1955-EARLY 1970s
The reparations payment initiatives that Japan’s 
government took are all directed towards the neighboring Asian
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countries as a compensation of suffering they got when 
Japanese colonial rule occupied their territories before the 
end of the World War II. Japan first concluded a reparation 
(baisho) agreement with Burma in 1955. In subsequent years, 
Japan also provided reparations and quasi-reparation (grants 
in lieu of formal reparation commitments) payment to the other 
neighboring countries such as the Philippines (1956), 
Indonesia (1958), Laos and Cambodia (1959), (South) Vietnam 
(1960), Thailand (1962), South Korea and Burma (1965), 
Singapore and Malaysia (1968), and Indonesia (1972).^he total 
amount disbursed for baisho and economic grants accounted for 
a little more than $1.5 billion.^®
In the 1950s, Japan allegedly had not yet evolved its 
specific aid policy. Even the word or concept "aid" did not 
exist in its official political agenda. Instead, the larger 
concept "economic cooperation" had been introduced in December 
1953 by Yoshida Cabinet. The principles involved are as 
foilows,
1. Japan will respect the position of the countries to 
which it gives assistance and positively cooperate in 
related plans by a third country or the U.N. in 
promoting economic cooperation with Asian nations.
2. The economic cooperation will be done on the basis of 
the creative will of private enterprise in principle, 
and the government will provide necessary assistance 
to carry out the project.
Rix ( 1980), OP Cit. p.33. 
Hasegawa (1975), Op Cit. p. 28.
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3. Japan will try to settle with the countries with which 
it has reparations problems as quickly as possible.
In a later semi-official document of 1959, it is clear that 
economic cooperation encompasses reparations, direct private
investment, yen credit, deferred payment, and technical
22coopérât ion.
The 1958 White Paper on Economic Cooperation published by 
MITI was quite specific. It stated that economic cooperation 
was to serve two objectives: to keep the market for .1 apanese 
export commodities stable and to secure supplies of raw 
materials. To these ends, the Japanese government cncou raged 
the private enterprises actively involved in the program. 
This condition is reflected in the practice of reparation 
grant disbursements. The government did not lake part directly 
in this program. Private business handled this on behalf of 
the government. The mechanism went as follows. The list of 
projects whose financing comes from the reparation money was 
proposed by the recipients to be approved by .Japatiese 
government. When approved, the recipient government offered 
the projects to Japanese private businesses and negotiated 
with them its implementation. This method is regarded as a 
successful means of making J apanese business fami liar willi the




situation of the recipient countries and in turn opening 
prospective market for their products there.
Economically, baisho were utilized to help Japan’s 
economic recovery, to promote its export, and to facilitate 
heavy industrialization at home. Politically, the initiative 
to pay baisho was made to establish diplomatic ties between 
Japan and neighboring countries, as an essential step towards 
Japan’s reentry into the international community. Once such 
diplomatic ties are forged, Japan’s economic interests are 
protected and advanced.Because of the nature of these 
reparation payments, it is hard not to judge Japanese aid as 
self-oriented. As Okita realized: "...there was a conscious
policy decision made in this stage not to inquire whether or 
not the funds were actually contributing to the recipient 
country’s economic development."^^
Although criticisms of Japanese foreign aid strongly 
prevails, it is not easy to blame Japan for her heavy trade 
orientation in the first two decades of its program. With a 
per capita income of only $357 in 1958^^ and persistent
Hasegawa ( 1975), Op Cit. p.38-44.
Okita ( 1990), Op Cit. p.101.
This economic indicator actually makes Japan entitled 
to receive aid. One of the factors explaining Japan’s 
disbursements of aid in this period is U.S. pressure, 
reflected in the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed on 
September 8, 1951.
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27balance of payment problems , it seemed to be unrealistic to 
expect more. The main problem Japan had to deal with was its 
own economic survival and growth.
2. STAGE TWO: AID WITHIN ASIAN DIPLOMACY, 1960-73
As explained above, some argue that the truly Japanese 
aid program began in this period. It can be understood because 
in this period, Japan started evolving aid institutions and 
aggressively demonstrating its aid diplomacy. Initiated on 
becoming a member of the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), Japan set up in March 1961 its OECF under the 
ministry of EPA, which was responsible for providing long-term 
and iow-interest capital assistance (ODA) to the Developing 
countries. In the following year, June 1962, Overseas 
Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA) was created to execute 
official technical cooperation activities.
In the diplomatic scene, Japan around 1965 began to 
actively integrate its "economic cooperation" principle into 
Japan’s Asian foreign policy. The statistical figure of ODA 
disbursement illustrates this step. In 1963, Of the total ODA
2? Until 1965, Japanese trade continuously suffered from 
a deficit vis-a-vis its trading partners. See, Hasegawa 
(1975), Op Cit. table 6.1., p.79.
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28disbursed by Japan, 98.7 percent was directed towards Asia , 
whereas in 1959 almost 100 percent of its ODA was disbursed in
Asia, 48.5 percent of it in Southeast Asia. Economic
Cooperation agreements were reached with Taiwan and Korea, and 
Japan was actively involved in the creation of Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) in 1966. Japan also hosted the 
ministerial conference for the Economic Development of
Southeast Asia and the first meeting on Indonesia’s debt 
scheduling arrangement. From the inception of IGGI through 
early 1970ŝ **, Japan shouldered the burden for one-fourth of 
the foreign credits extended to Indonesia and since then 
Indonesia has always been receiving the lion’s share of 
Japanese aid.
These conscious steps cannot be separated from Japan’s 
intention to double its per capita income through the so-
called "income-doubling plan" during the 1 9 6 0 s . T o  
materialize this plan, Japan redesigned its aid program. Japan
Rix ( 1980), O p  Cit. p.33.
29 For the comprehensive study on the topic, see Yasutomo, 
Dennis T. (1983), Japan and the Asian Development Bank. New 
York: Praeger Publishers.
Over the same period, the U.S. provided about 40 
percent of total assistance channeled through IGGI. On this, 
see chapter three.
Hasegawa (1975), Op Cit. p.78. In fact, by the end of 
1960s, Japan had achieved the world’s third largest GNP and 
had become one of the few countries persistently registering 
a trade surplus since 1965 until the oil price hike of 1973 
again hit its trade balance.
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developed its kaihatsu yunyu ("development-cum-import") 
scheme. According to this scheme, Japan would extend capital 
and technical assistance to develop and process natural 
resources in recipient countries for their export either to 
Japan or other countries. To enhance the scheme. Japan in 
February 1970 set up the Overseas Trade and Development 
Association (OTDA) charged with the responsibility of 
extending funds for the construction of physical and social 
infrastructure directly related to the production of primary 
commodities. In this context, it seems no exaggeration to say 
that the practice of "development-cum-import" scheme involves 
"the exploitation of energy and mineral resources"^^ of the 
recipient countries for the sake of the security of Japanese 
vital energy resource and raw material supplies.
3. STAGE THREE: AID FOR SECURING NATURAL RESOURCES
SUPPLIES, 1973-EARLY 1980s
The oil price crisis of 1973 demonstrated how dependent 
upon the natural resources supplied from the Developing 
countries Japan’s economic viability is. This event also 
taught Japan a valuable lesson that aid can be used 
effectively as a diplomatic tool beyond Asia. Before the oil 
crisis, nearly 100 percent of Japanese ODA flowed to Asian
" Ibid. p.80,
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countries. Japan began directing its ODA to natural-rich 
countries and the countries which are located on energy- 
shipping routes.
At the first oil crisis of 1973, Japan disbursed ODA both 
bilaterally to the Developing countries and through 
multilateral institutions almost double than that of the 
preceding years. In 1972, Japan disbursed ODA of around $611 
million and in 1973 little over $1 billion. This increase, of 
course, made the percentage of ODA disbursements against its 
GNP jump from 0.20 percent to 0.25 percent. This percentage 
was still far below from the ideal target of 0.7 percent 
desired by the U.N. and accepted by Japan and even still less 
than percentage of the DAC average. Yet when compared with the 
total ODA disbursed by the U.S., it indicates a quite dramatic 
increase. At the same time the U.S. cut its ODA up to one- 
third, from $3.9 billion in 1972 to $2.6 in the following 
year. As a consequence, its ODA share against its GNP slid 
from 0.33 to 0.20 percent. The factors causing this fall, as 
explained in chapter three, were "aid fatigue" of the American 
people and their frustration abc : Vietnam. The average
percentage of DAC countries also fell from 0.35 to 0.29 
percent (See table 4.1.).
The same increase of Japanese ODA reoccurred in the 
second oil crisis in the late 1970s. Again in total terms, in 
the ODA disbursed both bilaterally and through multilateral 
institutions, in three consecutive years from 1978 to 1980,
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Japan increasingly extended aid from $2.2, $2.7, to $3.4
billion. This meant that its ODA as a percentage of GNP 
increased from 0.23 to 0.27 and 0.32 percent respectively.
In this period, Japan also recorded an improvement of its 
ODA quality. As a comparison, the terms of Japan’s ODA in 
1960s was as follows. Its interest rate was 5.25 to 5.50 
percent; the maturity period was 15 years, with five years as 
a grace period. In contrast, the composition of its ODA terms 
and condition in 1970s for the same items was respectively 3.5 
percent, 20 years, and 6-7 years. The new procedure of 
technical assistance activities was introduced by establishing 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) which is in 
charge for managing Japan’s technical aid program, some 
development funding and assisting emigration in 1 August 1974. 
JICA has replaced the former institution OTCA. This move can 
be explained as Japan’s accommodât ionist attitude in 
responding to the hostile feeling of people in some recipient 
countries. This hatred was expressed when Prime Minister 
Tanaka made his official visit to ASEAN countries in 1974. He 
was welcomed by the strong protest and demonstration of 
students, especially in Bangkok and Jakarta.
Despite such an Improvement, Japanese aid quality, as 
described above, was still well below the average DAC
19 In Indonesia, the of protest is usually called "Malari" 
(for Malapetaka Lima belas Januarl, or literally Disaster of 
January the fifteenth) event of 1974 which caused both 
material and life loss.
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countries. As an example, only 5 percent of 1977 aid was in 
the form of grants to multilateral agencies, compared with the 
DAC average of 15 percent. It is "Japanese business" rather 
than "poverty need" which is still predominant in determining 
aid allocation.
4. STAGE FOUR: POLITICAL STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS,
LATE 197ÛS-EARLY 1990s
The initiative to use aid as a means for achieving 
political and security objectives as well as economic benefits 
initially came up in the second half of 1970s. Over this 
period, external political conditions were so vulnerable that 
Japan should take measure to secure its economic benefits. 
Saigon completely fell down. The Indochinese region was seized 
by Communist forces. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The 
Iranian hostage crisis erupted and there was a second oil 
crisis. Constitutionally, Japan is prohibited from exercising 
any military role in securing international peace and 
stability. Japan’s military is allowed for self-defense. 
Because of these conditions, Japan sees its ODA as an 
alternative means Japan can use in participating in the 
efforts of maintaining international stability.
Japan recognizes that economic and social stability in 
the Developing countries ca’.noL be separated from the 
maintenance of world peace anc stability. Regarding this 
condition, Japan realizes thac its aid can be an important
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element to support world security. As of this period, Japan’s 
government has begun to seriously evolve a series of medium- 
term plans to guide the expansion of its ODA program/** The 
first plan, adopted in 1977, was intended to double the annual 
value of aid to $2.8 billion in the 1978-1980 period. This 
goal was fulfilled and in fact, in 1980, the total disbursed 
aid reached $3.3 billion (see table 4.1).
Under PM Masayoshi Ohira (1978-80), the Japanese 
government for the first time deliberately attached political 
and strategic conditions to the use of foreign aid by pledging 
more aid to "countries bordering conflict" (limited to 
Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey). It canceled aid to Vietnam 
and initiated aid to China in 1979-80.^^ Although the steps 
taken by Japan to increase its aid disbursement is to some 
extent caused by external pressure as a compensation for its 
limited burden sharing of international defence^, the
For a good discussion on the series of medium-term
plans, see Sudo (1989), "Japan’s Role in the Context of the
Emerging Asia-Pacific World," in Southeast Asian Affairs 1989. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, pp.51-65.
Vasutomo (1989-90), Op Cit. p.494, For an excellent 
discussion on the attachment of strategic dimension into 
Japanese ODA program so far, see Yasutomo, Dennis T. (1986), 
The Manner of Giving. Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign 
Policv. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company.
The Western donors also criticize the pattern of 
Japanese ODA disbursement which follows such a rule as 70-10- 
10-10, that is, 70 percent is directed to Asia and each of the
other tens are for Africa, Middle-East, and Latin America.
Japan is encouraged to widespread its aid geographically. See, 
Orr, Robert M. (1988), "The Aid Factor in U.S.-Japan 
Relations," Asian Survey. Vol.XXVIII, No.7, July, p.754.
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government’s initiative to disburse more aid seems to be 
supported by its constituents. Public opinion polls conducted 
during the years 1977 to 1981 demonstrated that the foreign 
aid program was registered to have a consistent 75 to 80 
percent support rate. This support reflects the realization 
of the Japanese that their country’s economic survival depends 
on the supplies of natural resources which Japan itself does 
not have.
In December 1980, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki adopted 
"Comprehensive National Security" as a national policy. The
stress on "economic cooperation" in this policy refers to
10military means of pursuing national security. In the area 
of aid, this policy endorses the practice of "Aid for 
countries bordering on areas of conflict" pursued by P.M. 
Ohira. In this year, the second medium-term plan was 
acknowledged. This plan was aimed at providing aid worth $24 
billion in the period from 1981-1985, double the amount of the 
assistance extended in the 1976-1980 period. Yet this goal was 
not achieved. The total amount of aid disbursed at that 
period, in fact, reached only $18 billion.
Vasutomo (1986), Ibid. p.3.
See Akaha, Tsuneo (1991), "Japan’s Comprehensive 
Security Policy, A New East Asian Environment,” Asian Survey, 
Vol.XXXI, No.4, April, pp.324-40. Actually, the concept 
"Comprehensive National Security" was developed by a study 
group which was deliberately created to discuss and formulate 
the issue. The group was established by P.M. Ohira in 1979 and 
comprised of academics, businessmen, and government officials.
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Table 4.1.: Comparison of Total Net ODA from U.S. and Japan 
and Their ODA as Percentage of GNP










1969 3,376 0.36 436 0.26 0.37
1970 3,153 0.32 458 0.23 0.34
1971 3,112 0. 29 511 0.22 0,33
1972 3,958 0.33 611 0. 20 0.35
1973 2,655 0.20 1,011 0.25 0.29
1974 3,673 0.25 1, 126 0.25 0.33
1975 4, 160 0.27 1 , 148 0.23 0.35
1976 4,360 0.25 1,105 0.20 0.33
1977 4,682 0.24 1,424 0.21 0.33
1978 5,664 0.27 2,215 0.23 0.35
1979 4,684 0.20 2,686 0.27 0.35
1980 7,138 0.27 3,353 0.32 0.37
1981 5,782 0.19 3,171 0. 28 0.35
1982 8,202 0.27 3,023 0.28 0 .38
1983 8,081 0.24 3,761 0.32 0.36
1984 8,711 0.24 4,319 0.34 0.36
1985 9,403 0.24 3,797 0.29 0.35
1986 9,564 0.23 5,634 0.29 0.35
1987 9,115 0.20 7,342 0.31 0.34
1988 10,141 0.21 9,134 0.32 0.34
1989 7,676 0.15 8,965 0.31 0.34
1990 11,394 0.21 9,069 0.31 0.35
1991 11,262 0.20 10,952 0.32 0,33
Source: OECD (1985), Twenty-Five Years of Development
Coopérât ion. Paris: OECD, pp.334-5. and OECD (some issues). 
Development Cooperation. Annual Report, Paris: OECD.
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The third plan was initiated in September 1985. Under 
this plan, the government intended to extend more than $40 
billion during the seven-year period until 1992. In the same
IQmonth, as a result of "Plaza Agreement" , the value of Yen 
climbed up against the U.S. dollar. Because of the Yen’s 
appreciation, the ODA budget for 1986 was raised to 52 percent 
in Dollar terms, although in Yen terras it was hiked by only 7 
percent. In 1987 it was similar. A rise of just under 6 
percent in Yen became a 23 percent Dollar increase.^** In the 
three consecutive years after 1985, ODA jumped up from $3.8 
billion in 1985 to $5.6, $7.3, and $9.1 billion respectively 
(see table 4.1). This situation made it obvious that this goal 
would be achieved well ahead of schedule. Therefore, the 
fourth plan was developed before Japan came to the Toronto 
summit of the Industrialized economies in June 1988.
In May 1988 P.M. Noboru Takeshi ta announced an 
"International Cooperation Initiative". By acknowledging the 
initiative, Japan intended to demonstrate its intention of 
promoting peace and international prosperity to international 
community. The initiative was based upon three pillars: (1)
The "Plaza Agreement" was reached in New York in 
September 1985. All finance ministers of the major 
industrialized countries agreed to bring about a weaker dollar 
and a strong yen. The Yen since then has risen from a value of 
Y260 to the dollar to about Y125 to the dollar. See, Ping 
(1990), "ASEAN and the Japanese Role in Southeast Asia," in 
Broinowski (ed.), ASEAN Into the 1990s. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, p.167.
*** Motoo ( 1989), "Foreign Aid: A Dissenter’s View," Japan 
Echo. Vol.XVI, No.l, Spring, p.20.
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strengthening of Japan’s contribution to international peace. 
(2) expansion of ODA, and (3) promotion of international 
cultural exchange.To implement the initiative, in the June 
1988 Toronto summit of the industrialized countries. Japan 
acknowledged its fourth medium-term plan which aimed at 
doubling the ODA extended over the 1983-1987 period to at 
least S50 billion in the five years from 1988 through 1992.
In 1989, Japan temporarily became a largest donor. The 
total amount of ODA disbursed by Japan surpassed that of the 
U.S., i.e. $9.6 billion versus $7.6 billion (see table 4.1.). 
Unlike the controversial nature of the military budget, the 
ODA program still enjoyed great support from the people. A 
survey conducted by P.M.’s office at the time shows that 42.4 
percent of the respondents approved of the amount, 39.4 
percent supported a larger amount, 8.2 percent preferred a 
smaller amount, and 1.2 percent wanted an end to all ODA.^
5. STAGE FIVE: SEARCHING FOR A NEW AGENDA IN POST COLD 
WAR ERA
When the Cold War ended, the economy of Japan came up as 
the most steady among the industrialized countries. During the 
years 1980-91, the Japanese economy grew at 3.6 percenl 
average annually, while the U.S.’ economy over the same period
Akaha (1991), Op_ C_i t, p. 3 28.
Ibid. p.332.
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grew only 1.7 percent. Other indicators such as the inflation 
rate, the unemployment rate, and the Current Account 
demonstrates the relative strong position of Japanese economy 
against that of the U.S. The table of economic indicators 
below illustrates the solidity of Japanese economy, compared 
with the U.S.’ Even since 1980, Japan has enjoyed a persistent 
dramatic surplus against its trading partners. Its trade 
balance shows a continuing surplus, except in 1982 when the 
Japanese surplus slightly decreased from the preceding year 
although the figure was still dramatic. The figure of trade 
balance, from 1980-88, went as follows (in US$ billion); 2.1; 
19.9; 18.0; 31.4; 44.2;
Table 4.2.: Economic Indicators for Japan and the U.S.
JAPAN U.S.
GNP Per Capita 1991 (in U.S. Dollar)*) 26,930 22,240
GNP Annual Average Growth Rate, 1987-90 5 . 2 3 . 6
Inflation Annual Average Rate, 1980-91 3 . 6 1 . 7
Unemployment Rate in 1990 2. 1 5 . 5
1989 Budget, Surplus (+) or Deficit (-) 
as % of GNP
(+) 2.5 (-)l .7
Current External Balance, % of GNP 1990 1 . 2 -1 .8
Total Government Outlays as % of GNP 
1989
32.9 36.9
Source: OECD (1991), Development Cooperation. 1991 Report,
Paris : OECD, p.184.
*) Taken from World Bank (1993), World Development Report 
1993. Washington, D.C.; IBRD.
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55.9; 92.8; 96.3; 95.0 respectively.*^ As of the last decade,
Japan has become a country with a great capital surplus.
Therefore, Japan is encouraged to recycle its capital surplus
for the Developing countries, in term of grant or soft 
11loans.
The external pressure for Japan to disburse more aid 
becomes apparent in the period of the post-Cold War era. 
Robert McNamara, former president of the World Bank, argued 
that, with per capita income much higher than other 
industrialized countries, Japan should be the leader in 
extending ODA.*^ This assertion parallels Okita's idea.
It would be unreasonable to ask the Japanese people 
suddenly to raise their propensity to consume. It would 
be more feasible for them to channel a large fraction of 
their continued high savings into development 
assistance.
The Japanese ODA program has been so far under strong 
criticisms due to some factors, as explained above. Japanese
See Katsuzo, Sakamoto & Richard C. Conquest (1992), 
"The Internationalization of Japanese Capital," in Hook, Glenn 
D. & Michael A. Weiner (cds.). The Internationalization of 
Japan. London & New York: Routledge, table 7.1., p.132.
** See Ozawa, Terutomo (1989), Reeve 1ihr Japan *s Surpluses 
for Developing Countries. Paris: OECD, for a good discussion 
on the topics.
do Rosario, Louise (1992), "Help Those Who Help 
Themselves," Far Eastern Economic Review. 18 June, pp.58,60.
As cited from Lewis, John P. (1987), Asian_Deye 1 ppment : 
The Role of Development Assistance. Lanham, New York, London: 
University Press of America with the Asia Society, p.42.
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ODA has concentrated on infrastructure and production projects 
which bring about economic or commercial benefit for itself, 
neglecting social projects such as education, health, and 
population control. Japanese ODA consists more of loans than 
grants. Japan is still ranked the lowest of the DAC countries, 
with grants accounting for 43.2 percent of its total ODA, 
compared with the DAC average of 75.6 percent. Japan, in 
disbursing aid, is concerned with economic growth, rather than 
fccoMomi . distribution.^^
Because of the strong criticisms, accompanied by the 
changing international political situation after the Cold War 
period, in October 5, 1992, the Japanese government issued a 
White paper on foreign aid which stressed that disbursement of 
ODA should be tied to the so-called Four Principles. The 
principles are that ODA disbursement should be linked to the 
recipient country’s records on (1) military spending, (2) arms 
exports or sales, (3) democracy, and (4) market reforms. Two 
major themes which get a great space in every public debate on 
Japanese aid both outside and inside the country are human 
rights and the environment.
In the near future, it seems that the Japanese ODA 
program will still facilitate its prevailing commercial or 
economic drives. It does not mean that we have a pessimistic
Rowley, Anthony (1991), "Generosity Has Its Limits," 
Far Eastern Economic review. 20 June, p.63.
do Rosario, Louise (1992), "Flexible Principles," Far 
Eastern Economic Review. 15 October, p.20.
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view of the Japanese ODA program in the future. In fact, we 
believe that the post-Cold War concerns such as democracy, 
human rights, and environmental awareness will also become 
significant determinant in allocating Japanese ODA. Yet for 
Japan, to come to this situation is not an overnight process. 
It is so because the dependence of Japan upon the supplies of 
natural resources for its economic survival is so profound 
that its government will not let its economy slow down or be 
disturbed just for the sake of pursuing such ideas.
C. JAPANESE FOREIGN AID PRACTICES TO INDONESIA
1. FEATURES OF JAPANESE AID
As mentioned in the preceding chapters, when the New 
Order government of Indonesia came to office, Japan took the 
initiative to bring together Western donor countries and the 
Indonesian government to discuss debt rescheduling for 
Indonesia. Since then, Japan has extended a significant amount 
of aid to Soeharto’s regime. Until 1982, Indonesia received 
the lion's share of Japanese aid. It was always ranked as the 
largest recipient, accounting for an average 15 percent of 
total ODA disbursed by Japan annualiy over that period of time 
(see table 4.3). From 1983 to 1986, Indonesia’s position as
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Table 4.3.: Japanese ODA to Indonesia
(in million US dollar and as % of total disbursed)
Year Total ODA 
Disbursed by Japan
Japanese ODA to 
Indonesia
As % of 
Total
1969 436 65.8 15.1
1970 458 125.8 27.5
1971 511 111.9 21.9
1972 611 103.2 16.8
1973 1,011 142.9 14.1
1974 1 , 126 221.1 19.6
1975 1,148 197.9 17.2
1976 1, 105 200.5 18. 1
1977 1,424 148.4 10.4
1978 2,215 227.6 10,3
1979 2,686 226.9 8.4
1980 3,353 350.0 10.4
1981 3, 171 299.8 9.5
1982 3,023 294.6 9.8
1983 3,761 235.5 6.3
1984 4,319 167.7 4.4
1985 3,797 161.3 4.2
1986 5,634 160.1 2.2
1987 7,342 707.3 9.6
1988 9,134 984.9 11.0
1989 8,965 1145.3 12.6
1990 9,069 867.8 9.6
1991 10,952 1065.5 9.7
Source: the same as tables 4.1. and 3.1. above,
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the largest recipient country of Japanese ODA was temporarily 
assumed by China. Since 1987, Indonesia again has been 
receiving the largest amount of Japanese ODA.
In the first half of the 1980s, Japanese ODA extended to 
Indonesia tended to decrease continuously. It was along with 
the general trend of Japanese ODA disbursement in the first 
two years of 1980s, indicating slowing down and unstable. 
After value of the Yen was aopreciated against the dollar in 
September 1985, Japanese ODA disbursement has demonstrated a 
significantly increasing trend, with the exception of 1989. In 
1987, Japan provided ODA more than quadruple the amount of 
that extended a year earlier, from $160 million to $707 
million, and since then Indonesia once again has been the 
largest recipient of Japanese ODA. Of that total amount. 60 
percent was in the form of program lending for Indonesia’s 
debt repayment.
Since the appreciation of the Yen, Indonesia’s debt 
repayment obligation which was due at the time doubled.This 
was because around 45 percent of Indonesia’s foreign borrowing 
consists of Yen-denominated credits while most of its export 
earnings are in U.S. dollars. Therefore, Indonesia should 
spend more dollars in purchasing yen. This condition 
deteriorated Indonesian economy which had been hit by the
Before 1985, Indonesia’s debt repayment obligation was 
still $2 billion per year and suddenly it soared at $3-$4 
billion per year. See, "Experiment Mata Uang," (The experiment 
of Currency), Tempo. 17 Oktober 1992, p.91.
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decline of export earnings from oil. The Indonesian 
government, through its then Minister of Finance Sumarlin, 
proposed to Japan that the repayment of the outstanding debts 
at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of their 
disbursement or before "Fiaza Agreement". But the Japanese 
government quickly turned it down.̂ *̂  Indonesia also requested 
dollar-denominated loans from Japan but this request was also 
rejected by Japan.
It is quite interesting to take a look at the figure of 
aid disbursement in the year 1989. Japan was the largest donor 
of DAC members, surpassing temporarily the U.5. In fact, the 
total amount of ODA extended by Japan at the time declined 
from the preceding year, from $9.1 billion in 1978 to $8.6 
billion of 1989.
At the same year, the total ODA disbursed by the U.S. 
both bilaterally to the Developing countries and through 
multilateral institutions was drastically cut off, from $10.1 
billion in 1988 to $7.6 billion of 1989 (see table 4.1). This 
figure contrasted with the total amount of ODA bilaterally 
disbursed by the U.S. In 1989, the U.S. stepped up its 
disbursement, from $6.7 billion to $6.8 (see table 3.1) 
billion. It means that the Lraaiic cut off only applied to 
the ODA extended through multilateral organizations. Since 
multilateral aid is regarded as freer from political strings
Halldorsson, Jon (1989), "A Higher Profile for 
Indonesia," Southeast Asian Affairs 1989. Singapore: I SEAS,
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p.139.
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or any non-developmental conditions pursued by the donor than 
aid disbursed bilaterally, this condition can also be 
interpreted to mean that the U.S. consciously used aid as a 
means for achieving its political objectives.
In term of concessionary aid, Japanese ODA to Indonesia 
has a grant element of an average 66.8 percent in the last ten 
years. In contrast, the total Japanese ODA has a grant element 
of 68.8 percent over the same period. It means that ODA 
provided to Indonesia is slightly less concessional than ODA 
extended to another country or multilateral organization. 
Compared with other DAC countries which extend aid to 
Indonesia, Japan is ranked the least in term of the 
concessionary element.
2. JAPAN’S INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
In general, the involvement of Japan in the Southeast 
Asian region is a reflection of Japanese motives in conducting 
foreign policy with the Third Wold countries. Japan regards 
the Developing countries as, inter alia, suppliers of raw 
materials or natural resources, a field for Japanese 
investment, a market for Japanese products, and directly or 
indirectly, the source or threat to Japan’s security. These 
priorities or principles of Japanese foreign policy can also
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be clearly seen in the way Japan concentrates its foreign aid 
allocation to the region.
Some factors which encourage Japan to get involved 
closely in Southeast Asia through its aid can be explained as 
follows. First is historical colonial ties between Southeast 
Asia, including Indonesia, which is manifest in the practice 
of reparations payments as described above. Second, when 
expanding Japanese industries need market for their growing 
products, and ASEAN economies which grow relatively steady 
compared with the economies in the other parts of globe 
attracts Japanese business as their destinations. ASEAN 
countries as a unit are the important suppliers of natural 
resources or raw material such as oil, LNG, rubber, tropical 
timber, and tin. Third, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia 
together control the Straits of Malacca through which passage 
of vessels to and from Japan. As a booklet on Philosophy of 
Economic Cooperation issued on April 1981 by MFA states:
"Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia as guardians of the 
Straits of Malacca through which passes 85 percent of 
Japan’s oil supply and 40 percent of its foreign trade. 
The Friendship of these nations is critical for 
Japan.
See Dore (1982), "Japan and the Third World; 
Coincidence or Divergence of Interests," in Cassen, et. al. 
(eds.). Rich Country Interests and Third World development. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, p.138-52.
Yasutomo (1986), Qp Cit. p.31.
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Fourth, For Japan, the ASEAN countries are hoped to provide a 
stabilization force for the unstable neighboring Indochina 
region.
3. INTERPRETATION OF JAPANESE AID INFLOWS TO INDONESIA
Japan’s post war foreign policy is often described as 
"low-cost, low-risk foreign policy".^ For many years it 
adopted a policy of seikei bunri^^, that is, to separate 
economics from politics. The principle of the policy is that 
Japan would concentrate on trade and other economic 
development activities and let the others afford costly 
military and political burdens.
As explained above, the emergence of Soeharto regime in 
Indonesia was welcomed by the Western countries. It can be 
said that the New Order government is a coalition of Japanese- 
trained generals^^ led by Soeharto and the U.S.-trained 
technocrats known collectively as "the Berkeley Mafia". Since 
then, large capital inflows from Japan has rushed in.
Arase (1993), "Japanese Policy Toward Democracy and 
Human Rights in Asia," Asian Survey. Vol.XXXIII, No.10, 
October 1993, p.935.
Ping (1990), Op Cit. p.163.
Soeharto and his first generation of generals are the 
product of the so-called PETA {Pembela Tanah AJr, literally 
meaning guards of father land), a military course conducted by 
Japanese colonial rule.
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Indonesia has emerged as the largest recipient. Aid can be
interpreted as the prize Japan should pay for the security of
the supplies of natural resources or raw materials from
Indonesia. By the end of 1960s, Indonesia was the third
supplier of oil for Japan, after Iran and Saudi Arabia,
accounting for 13 percent of Japan’s total oil imports. The
export value of Indonesia’s oil to Japan accounted for $318
million in 1970 and it doubled to $648 million. In 1972,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia supplied more than 98
percent of the entire bauxite market in Japan. In 1973,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand provided around 90 percent
of total imported rubber.^ Japan also is Indonesia’s biggest
customer for minerals. Almost all of Indonesia’s mineral
production such as tin, bauxite, copper ore, nickel, and
aluminum is exported to Japan. Japan also imports around
300,00 tons of Indonesian coal a year in 1991.^^
According to one study, Japan prefers Indonesian oil to
that from the Middle East because the latter has a higher
£0sulfur content which exacerbates Japan’s pollution problem. 
Another factor is the closeness of distance between Japan and 
Indonesia which reduces the financial cost of shipping
Hasegawa (1975), Op Cit. p.84.
Marr (1993), Digging Deep, the Hidden Costs of Mining 
in l nd_one_sia, London: Down to Earth, p. 47.
Caldwell (1974), "Oil Imperialism in Southeast Asia," 
in Selden, Mark (ed.). Remaking Asia: Essays on the American 
Uses of Power. New York: Pantheon Books, p.25.
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compared with the cost of importing oil from the Middle East.
Related to the issue of distance, shipping will also be
cqrelatively more assured.
With the first oil crisis of 1973, Japan inc.eased iis 
aid disbursement to Indonesia around 40 percent, from $103 
million in 1972 to $143 million in 1973. In the following year 
this amount was raised another 50 percent, reaching $221 
million in 1974. This trend can be interpreted as a measure 
taken for securing oil supplies. The same step was also taken 
during the second oil crisis at the end of the 1970s. in 1980, 
Japan increased its ODA more than 50 percent over the 
preceding year, from $227 million to $350 million.
P.M. Kakuei Tanaka visited Indonesia in 15 and 16 January 
1974 to protect the stability of Indonesia’s oil supplies to 
Japan and to promote the development of supplies of LNG. 
Unfortunately, he was welcomed by a demonstration and rioting 
of Indonesian youths and students. They protested that 
Japanese foreign aid and investment were benefitting only lI 
few and that the Japanese were exploiting the Indonesian 
economy. During the demonstration, usually called as Malari 
(Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari or "the disaster of January the 
fifteenth"), 11 youths were killed and more than a hundred
59 For avoiding a route through increasingly hazardous and 
potentially hostile Strait Malacca, Japan once had an idea to 
construct a canal or pipeline across the narrowest part of the 
Kra Isthmus. See Ibid, pp.31-2.
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injured. Some 1,000 vehicles were destroyed and 144 were 
burned or damaged.^
The "January 15 Disaster" has been a valuable lesson for 
Japan. Japan began to reconsider its foreign aid policy. In 
the Summer 1975, P.M. Takeo iJiki sent Saburo Okita, then 
chairman of OECF, to the ASEAN countries to survey the 
situation. Yet, instead of improving the quality of its ODA, 
Japan tended to increase its total amount disbursed. In 1976, 
Japan increased its ODA a little bit to Indonesia, from $198 
million in 1975 to $201 million in 1976. At the same time, 
Japanese ODA in total decreased.
Aid to Indonesia has steadily declined from a high of 
$350 million in 1980 to $160 million in 1986. This trend can 
be explained by several factors. Japan at this period shifted 
its ODA to China. Japan was also under strong criticism from 
the international community on the way it concentrated its aid 
on Indonesia. As a consequence, Japan improved its ODA policy 
in 1983 in extending ODA to countries with the lowest per 
capita incomes. However, in practice Japan has not 
consistently applied this new policy. Japan is rather always
Bresnan (1993), Managing Indonesia: The Modern
Political Economy. New York: Columbia University Press,
pp.135-47.
See Elsbree & Hoong (1985), "Japan and ASEAN," in Ozaki 
& Arnold (eds.), Japan’s Foreign Relations: A Global Search 
for Economic Security. Boulder, London: Westview Press,
pp.119-32.
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inspired by pursuing or securing its economic or commercial 
interests in extending foreign aid.
Another rr.ctor which can explain why Japan disburses a 
significant amount of ODA is Indonesia’s strategic position. 
As explained above, Indonesia, together with Singapore and 
Malaysia, controls the Strait Malacca through which vessels 
pass to and from Japan. It is hard for Japan to imagine a 
hostile Indonesia denying an international commercial passage 
through that Strait. Most of Japanese oil supplies and its 
foreign trade are routed via the Strait. In addition to the 
Malacca, Indonesia also has two strategic straits, namely the 
Sunda and Lombok, through which international shipping passes. 
They can be as ways of avoiding the crowded and busy Malacca 
strai t.
In October 1988, the Indonesian government for the first 
time temporarily denied passage to all foreign vessels through 
the Sunda and Lombok Straits. Some analysts interpreted the 
move taken by the Indonesian government as directed towards 
Japan. By closing the Straits, which hit Japan’s commercial 
interests hard, Indonesia wanted to pressure Tokyo to give 
more aid on more favorable terms. At the time, there was a 
signal from Tokyo that Japan would like to cut off the level
Pauker (1991), "Indonesia under Suharto: The Benefits 
of Aloofness," in Pipes, Daniel & Adam Garfinkle (eds.).
Friendly Tyrants. An American Dilemma. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, p.379. In September 1989, again Indonesia takes a brief
closure of the Lombok strait. See Vatikiotis (1993),
"Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s," Contemporary
Southeast Asia. Vol.XIV No.4, March, p.363.
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of concessionary aid to Indonesia because Indonesia had been 
improving its economic growth rate. In fact, in the 
consecutive three yeas, from 1987 to 1989, Japanese ODA 
disbursed to Indonesia was significantly increased. Over the 
period, Indonesia received $707 million, $985 million, and 
$1,145 million respectively.
D. JAPANESE AID INFLOWS IN THE FUTURE
In the following years and those ahead, when Western aid 
donor countries are busy tying their aid disbursement to the 
practice of democracy, the record of human rights, and 
environmental preservation matters; we have not been able to 
see and are still hoping to see such enthusiasm emerge from 
the Japanese side. We have a reasonable hope that Japan might 
become the largest donor, surpassing the U.S. As a country 
which has enjoyed a great surplus against its trading 
partners, Japan should take a position as the leader among 
other donor countries by recycling more of its capital 
surpluses. When Japan becomes the leading donor society, the 
international community will demand that it not be as selfish 
as it has been so far, in comparison to other DAC members.
The end of the Cold War era also should have made 
Japanese reconsider its foreign aid practices. Redefining its
Vatikiotis ( 1993), Ibid. p.363
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aid policy alone is not enough. The implementation of an 
improved policy is indeed expected. In fact, those who are 
eager to see the improvement of Japanese foreign aid practice 
should retain their optimism. Japan is seemingly not 
interested in the political nature of the countries to which 
it offers its aid. In the absence of any overt pressure from 
other nations, Japan is still less likely to tie its aid 
disbursement to Asian neighbors to such conditions adopted by 
any Western donors as human rights record, democracy, and 
other internal affairs of Asian recipients. This condition 
makes Japan attractive for Asian countries as an alternative 
source of capital for their economies.^*
It sometimes appears that whenever the external pressure 
is strong enough, Japan will "artificially" follow as a 
formality. Examples can be found in the practice of Japanese 
foreign aid towards China, Myanmar, and Indonesia itself. For 
the first two countries, Japan was the last donor country, 
after having overt pressure from other DAC countries, which 
postponed its aid disbursement to China as a protest of 
Chinese treatment of "tiananmen incident". Japan was the first 
donor countries which resumed its aid inflows, after
Lincoln, Edward J. (1991), "Development in the Japanese 
Economy and Their Implication for the Asian Region," in 
Scalapino, Robert A. and Gennady I. Chufrin (eds.), Asia in 
the 1990s. American and Soviet Perspectives. Berkeley, 
California; Institute of East Asian Studies, University of 
California at Berkeley, p.189.
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suspending aid only a short period^ In September 1988, Japan 
froze its aid to Myanmar as a consequence of not recognizing 
the military regime of the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC) which came to power through a coup d'etat. In
February 1989, Tokyo recognized SLORC and resumed its aid
disbursement to Myanmar.
in the case of Indonesia, Japan seems to be more 
reluctant to touch such sensitive areas in disbursing its aid. 
Some factors which explain this reluctance relate to the 
importance of Indonesia to Japan’s economic interests. Japan 
has a great stake in the continuity of natural supplies: the 
security of sea-lanes upon which Japanese economic or 
commercial interests are dependent; and, of course, ihe
endurance of political stability, all of which Japan has so 
far got from its good relations with Indonesia.
On November 12, 1991, the "Dili incident" in which some 
50 unarmed demonstrators were killed, erupted. Some Western 
donors, i.e., the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, and, to some 
extent the U.S., suspended its aid disbursement to Indonesia 
as a protest against the way the Indonesian government behaved 
in this event. Yet Japan announced the results of its
See Zhou, Xiaoming (1991), "Japan’s Official 
Development Assistance Program, Pressure to Expand," As ian 
Survey. Vol. XXXI No.4, April, pp.341-50.
See, Seekins (1992), "Japan’s Aid Relations with 
Military Regime in Burma, 1962-1991, The Kokunaika Process, 
As 1 an_ _Su_ryey , Vol.XXXII No.3, March, pp.246-62.
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investigation that evidence of Indonesian official wrongdoing 
was "inconclusive". In late December 1991, there was overt 
pressure from Diet members against P.M. Miyazawa to link 
Japanese ODA to human rights. However, after an investigative 
commission created by Soeharto produced its report, the 
Japanese government asserted that there was "no need" to
change its economic cooperation policies.
After Indonesia got assurance from Japan that it would
continue to extend aid to Indonesia, Indonesia dared to refuse
aid from the Netherlands and dismiss the Nether lands-led IGGl . 
The dismissal of IGGl allows for the following interpretation. 
Indonesia would have not rejected aid from the Netherlands if 
at the time Indonesia did not have assurance from Japan of a 
continuity in its aid inflows. It is so because the
Netherlands’ position as the chairman of the IGGl forum was so 
vital, regardless of its share, which was less than two 
percent of total aid channeled through IGGI. Refusing the 
Netherlands’ aid meant practically the dismissal of IGGI. In 
terms of total aid provided to Indonesia, the Netherlands was 
"not so meaningful" compared with Japan which provided two- 
third of total bilateral aid received by Indonesia. The 
refusal of Dutch aid would not have a big impact on Indonesia.
In the eye of Western donors, the Japanes*. measure of 
guaranteeing the continuity of u id inflows to Indonesia was 
really controversial, even a "betrayal" of I he principles of
Arase (1993), Ĉ _C_i_t, p. 947
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protecting human rights and introducing democratic values 
which are vigorously campaigned for by them. Moreover it 
happened after the "Dili incident", in the post Cold War 
period. Even Japan has gone further by helping to organize a 
new forum called CGI which is officially chaired by the World 
Bank.
Another "controversial" political move taken by Japan is 
that Japan has signed the Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights 
in March 1993. The key points of the Declaration were that.
Developed countries should not tie aid to human rights, 
should respect the sovereign rights to manage human 
rights within their border, and should not promote human 
rights through "the imposition of incompatible values" on 
Asia."
It seems that Japan does not intend to use the principles of 
universal human rights, democratic values and other sensitive 
internal affairs of recipient countries in judging its aid 
allocation whenever its primary interests are at stake. In 
other words, the prospects for Japanese aid inflows to 
Indonesia in the years ahead will be slightly influenced by 
the universal principles taken by other Western donor 
countries. The trend of Japanese aid to Indonesia in the 
future will be more affected by the interaction between the 
level of its primary interest pursued in Indonesia and the 
opportunity or chance to achieve or fulfill those interests
Arase (1993), Ibid. p.940.
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offered by Indonesia. Aid is extended as quid pro quo for the 
opportunity offered to fulfil its primary or economic 
interests.
E. CONCLUSION
In contrast with the U.S., Japan does not Intend to
"calculate" political factors in disbursing its aid. Instead, 
the opportunities or chances to fulfil its economic interests 
are regarded as the determinant in providing aid. This is
apparent when we look at its aid relations with Indonesia. 
Japan has been extending the largest amount of its total ODA 
to the New Order government of Indonesia since IGGI was 
created. Ever since 1974, a year after the first oil crisis, 
its ODA figure has surpassed that of the U.S. and since then 
Japan has been Indonesia’s largest donor.
Some factors explain why Japan persists in disbursing its 
largest share to Indonesia. First, Japan is heavily dependent 
upon the supplies of natural resources for its economic 
survival. On the other side, Indonesia, which possesses 
abundantly natural resources, can fulfill the Japanese needs. 
Two oil crises, i.e. in 1973 and in 1979, have demonstrated
that aid can be regarded as the high prize Japan should pay
for the security of oil supplies. A year after each crisis, 
Japanese ODA was increased by 54 percent. Second,
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geographically, Indonesia straddles two oceans and controls 
the strategic sea-lanes such as the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok 
Straits. These sea-lanes, through which most of its natural 
resources inflows and its trade passage pass, have strategic 
importance for Japan. In 1SB8, for the first time Indonesia 
briefly closed of the Sunda and Lombok Straits. A year after 
this move, Indonesia got more Japanese ODA than a year before, 
reaching more than $1 billion. Third, of course, the political 
stability of the Indonesian government keeps Japanese ODA 
flowing there. This factor is important, regardless of the 
nature of the regime, because for Japan in principle foreign 
aid cannot be separated from the other component of "economic 
cooperation" such as trade and investment. Indonesia’s 
political stability and friendly political stance has made 
Indonesia the largest recipient of Japanese ODA since the New 
Order government came to power, except for the years 1983-86.
In the near future, Japan can be expected to be 
consistent in the way it allocates its ODA with the way it has 
done so far. It means that Japan is not willing to be 
"dictated" by the common principles vigorously promoted by the 
other Western donors, such as democracy, human rights, and 
environmental preservation matters. This tendency can be seen 
in the last three years. When the "Dili incident" erupted, 
some Western donors canceled their aid disbursement as a 
protest of official handling of the case. Yet Japan did not 
intend to follow its Western fellows and the Japanese
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government did not even acknowledge that anything was wrong 
with Indonesia’s official treatment of the problem. Japan took 
a further "controversial" political move by assuring two- 
thirds of total aid received by Indonesia and helping to 
organize a substitute for IGGI called CGI. In other words, the 
end of Cold War era has not seemed to change drastically 





This Study departs from the assumption that the practice 
of foreign aid relations which occurs bilaterally between 
donor and recipient countries is based upon the quid pro quo 
principle, mutual benefit. It means that there are 
expectations from the recipient country by the donor. 
Likewise, when the decision-makers in the recipient country 
consider seeking foreign aid, their preference to have aid 
disbursed from a certain country, along with their acceptance 
of a foreign aid offer, depends their political economic 
interests. Aid is used by the donor as a means of influence 
over the recipient country for the sake of the donor’s 
benefit. A donor country will cancel its aid disbursement if 
its interests will not be fulfilled from the practice. The 
donor’s power in this context lies in its aid disbursement. 
Conversely, the recipient country can also refuse aid when the 
practice is perceived as threatening to its sovereignty. The 
power of the recipient country rests in its political and 
economic importance as perceived by the donor. This strategic 
importance could depend on the recipient governments’ 
political orientation or ideological stance, the stability of
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its political condition, its country’s location or natural 
resource base.
The study illustrates that the New Order government of 
Soeharto has enjoyed receiving aid inflows for more than one 
quarter of a century. In the first years, Soeharto’s 
administration got a significant amount of aid from the 
Western countries, especially the U.S. Until 1971, Indonesia 
was the third largest recipient of the U.S. ODA, and accounted 
for 7.8 percent of total U.S. aid disbursed bilaterally, after 
India and Vietnam. At the time the U.S. was Indonesia’s 
largest donor. Calculated from the total aid received by 
Indonesia through IGGI, the aid from the U.S. accounted for 
one-third. The New Order Government also was and is still the 
largest recipient of Japanese ODA. For the same period, Japan 
extended its ODA to Indonesia by more than 20 percent average 
of the total aid disbursed by Japan. Indonesia since then had 
been the largest recipient of Japanese ODA until 1983, when 
China temporarily replaced Indonesia’s position and again 
since 1987 onward, Indonesia has enjoyed the lion’s share of 
Japanese ODA. Japan has been Indonesia’s largest donor since 
1974 until now, replacing the American position.
As many studies reveal, aid inflows can be beneficial to 
the recipient country in financing its development when 
domestic savings raised are insufficient as illustrated by the 
"two-gap" model. Aid also can be harmful to the recipient 
countries, as both Liberal and Marxist critics argue. Instead
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of aid being used for economic investment activities, aid is 
often wasted on non-development purposes and some poor 
countries are trapped in mounting foreign debt. The success of 
foreign aid depends on it being supported by effective 
management, and an environment conducive to sound management. 
The case of Indonesia confirms this proposition.
Generally, Indonesia’s success in utilizing foreign aid 
cannot be separated from the condition of Indonesian political 
economy. Since Soeharto came to power, there is strict 
division of state management. Economic development is 
exclusively formulated and managed by economist-technocrats 
which are excluded from the political power arena. Meanwhile, 
to accommodate this economic development process, the 
government tightly controls or tames the political condition, 
which the military and the ruling party GOLKAR are entrusted 
to do.
Since its inception, the New Order government has 
undertaken the principle of "balanced budget" in which all 
foreign financing the government receives is treated as 
"foreign revenues". In the structure of the budget, all kinds 
I id is allocated in the post "Development Revenues". Aid is 
utilized for economic investment activities. When we take a 
closer look at the composition of "Development expenditure", 
it is clear that four economic sectors are always given high 
priority by the government. Those sectors are Infrastructure, 
Agriculture and Irrigation, Human Resources, and Regional
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Development. It means that most foreign aid money goes to 
finance the development of these sectors. The deliberate 
allocation of aid money in these sectors is based on political 
and economic considerations.
In the eye of the government, those sectors have
strategic importance both economically and politically. 
Economically, especially in the first years of Soeharto’s
administration, the development of these sectors was pre­
requisite for achieving steady economic growth. Politically, 
concentration on developing these sectors was a strategic 
choice. The majority of Indonesian people live from 
agriculture and in rural areas. The social or political
rebellions which were and could potentially be launched by 
either extreme Communists or Islamic fundamentalists always 
relied on the peasant community as their popular power base. 
Indonesia is a multi-ethnic society and this condition is 
still worsened by the social-economic imbalance between Java 
islands and the rest of Indonesian islands. The problem of 
economic gap is always the primary factor used by the
extremists or fundamentalists to ignite a social or political 
revolution. In turn, this condition makes the government’s 
political stability, or even the regime’s legitimacy worse or 
in question. By developing these sectors, the government 
provide the majority of Indonesian people an equal chance to 
participate in production activity. As a consequence, the 
standard of living of the majority can be improved and
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economic growth can be maintained at a steady level. From the 
political power stand point, foreign aid has been effectively 
directed by the government to prevent the potential 
secessionist movement or political unrest to explode. In 
conclusion, foreign aid has been utilized effectively by the 
government for developing or promoting economic sectors which 
are regarded as having strategic effects both economically and 
politically. The way the government directs or allocates aid 
monies has also to some extent explained the endurance of 
political stability and status quo Soeharto has so far 
enjoyed.
In the Cold War era, the U.S.’s foreign aid practice was 
based on political strategic considerations of containing 
Communist influence spreading to the Developing countries. The 
trend of its ODA concentration is in the area in which the 
intense ideological conflict between two Super Power occurs or 
is potentially to occur. In the first years after its Marshall 
Plan program, the U.S. concentrated its aid on the European 
continent because at the time the region was regarded as the 
main theater for bi-polar ideological conflict. Since the 
early 1950s, when the Korean War erupted, the U.S. began 
shifting its concentration in directing aid from Europe to 
Asia. U.S. aid inflows to this region reached an anticlimax 
when American constituent suffered from "aid fatigue" of the 
Vietnam war. However, the largest share of total American ODA 
still flowed to this continent. In the late 1970s, shortly
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after the Camp David agreement was reached, the U.S. changed
its direction from Asia to the Middle East region. Egypt and 
Israel, actually, have enjoyed the lion’s share of U.S. ODA.
In the first years of Soeharto’s coming to power, the 
U.S. extended its ODA to Indonesia in a significant amount, 
accounting for the third largest percentage after India and 
Vietnam. The U.S. was Indonesia’s largest donor. Aid was 
regarded as a "reward" to the New Order government for being 
Western-oriented in conducting its foreign policy. Instead of 
yelling "go to hell with your aid" as Soekarno once did to the 
Kennedy administration, Soeharto relied on a group of
American-trained economists, called the "Berkeley Mafia", for 
the economic development program. From the American point of 
view, the rise of the "Berkeley Mafia" as the main economic 
decision makers in Indonesia was an achievement of American 
foreign aid practice. In the political arena, the military
disbanded the Communist party, arrests and execute its
proponents, and eliminate its potential influence. The U.S.’s 
involvement in this political project is demonstrated by the 
U.S. embassy’s providing the list of the PKI activists to the 
military and the "approval" of Indonesian military to seize 
East Timor before 't would be a Communist country in the back­
yard of Indonesia. On the International scene, after Soeharto 
was in power, Indonesia was no longer hostile to the Western 
bloc. In fact, Indonesia broke its diplomatic ties with Ch ..a 
and withdrew from the Communist bloc’s orbit. In short,
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foreign aid was used by the U.S. for keeping Indonesia in its 
orbit.
The prospect of the U.S.’s aid trend towards Indonesia is 
that it is rather demonstrably slowing down, instead of
promising. This is not due to the steady growth level of the 
Indonesian economy, as a main factor influencing such a 
decreasing trend. The main reason is the demise of the Cold 
War period. In the post Cold War era, accompanied by the 
decline of U.S. economy, the U.S. is getting tight in
disbursing its ODA and reconsiders its priority of aid 
direction. In the years ahead, the U.S. will tie its ODA with 
the practice of demc'cratic values. Human Rights records, 
environmental preservation and impact, and other universal 
humanitarian concerns in the selection of the prospective 
recipient countries. On the contrary, Indonesian politics 
demonstrate opposite conditions to those regarded as ideal by 
the U.S. The "Dili incident”, the "controversial" treatment of 
ex-PKI opponent prisoners, the relatively worse condition of 
Indonesian labor, and the development of economic 
infrastructure such as dams, roads, and electricity power 
which denies the demands of local communities whose properties
are used for such projects are now The U.S.’s main concerns in
extending its ODA to Indonesia. The U.S. government strongly 
criticizes these practices.
Unlike the U.S., Japan in disbursing its ODA is guided by 
its economic or commercial interests. For more than two
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decades, its aid allocation has been concentrated in Asia and 
for that period of time Indonesia has enjoyed the lion’s share 
of Japanese ODA, except from 1983-86 when its position as the 
largest recipient was temporarily replaced by China. As of 
1974, a year after the first oil crisis erupted. Japan has 
been the largest donor for Indonesia.
This study reveals that Japan has been successfully 
extending its ODA to Indonesia for keeping the inflows of 
natural resource supplies from Indonesia and its commercial 
interests secure and stable. Aid is the cost Japan is willing 
to pay for the security of natural resources from Indonesia. 
Aid also is the effective means used by Japan to open the 
Indonesian market for its products. Another achievement is 
that Japan has skillfully used aid to keep open its sea-lanes 
for commercial passage from and to Japan.
We would argue that in the future the Japanese ODA 
inflows is not likely to be affected by political agendas such 
as democracy, human rights, and environmental preservation for 
which its Western donor fellows are at present vigorously 
pushing. The overall amount of Japanese ODA will be sustained 
if not increased in the near future. Japan's primary interests 
will continue to guide its aid direction.
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